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WITH

NOTES.

BY

W. S. T Y L E R,
GRAY'S PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

Nec ego tamen hunc animum malum, quam eorum omnium fortunas,

NEW YORK:
D APPLET ON AND COMPANY,
448 & 445 BROADWAY.
LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN.
1868.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1859, by
D. APPLETON & CO.,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
TO

PROFESSOR FELTON,
OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

THIS EDITION OF THE APOLOGY AND CRITO

Is Dedicated,

AS A MEMORIAL OF PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP,

AND AS A TOKEN OF HIGH REGARD

FOR HIS DISTINGUISHED SERVICES TO CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP,

AND HIS PHIL-HELENIC SPIRIT.
P R E F A C E.

The "Græca Majora," which was all the Greek read in college by many successive generations of American students, contained Plato's Crito and the narrative part of the Phædo; and among all the extracts in that admirable collection, none are cherished in fresher remembrance or with a more reverential love than these inimitable productions of the great spiritual philosopher of ancient Greece. The simple beauty of the style and the almost inspired truth and grandeur of the sentiments, have graven these immortal compositions, as with the point of a diamond, on thousands of hearts, and entitle them to the high place which they have held among the select educational instruments of former generations. Many a scholar saw with regret Plato dropped for a time entirely out of the academic course, and accessible to American students only in the obsolete Græca Majora, or in the imported editions of foreign scholars. And, though their favorite classic author is now brought again within the reach
of American students, and restored in some measure to his proper place in college education, in President Woolsey's scholarly edition of the Gorgias, and Professor Lewis's profound Annotations on portions of the Laws, still many an older and many a younger scholar cannot but sigh to see the simpler and more Socratic Dialogues of Plato *superseded*, even by the more finished dramatic imitations of his middle life, or the more profound moral and political speculations of his riper years. It is to meet expressed regrets and felt wants of this kind, that the present edition of the Apology and Crito is given to the public.

While these pieces breathe in every part the moral purity, the poetic beauty, and the almost prophetic sublimity, which pervade all Plato's writings, and which have won for him the epithet "*divine*," they exhibit Socrates more adequately than he appears in any of the works of Xenophon, more truly and purely, just as he was, than he is seen in any of the other writings of Plato. They are therefore the connecting link between the two beloved disciples, and the clue to the interpretation of both. The Apology, especially, written shortly after the death of the Moral Philosopher, and under the full inspiration of his last words and last hours, gives us the very soul of Socrates speaking, as it were, with the very lips of Plato. Mr. Grote has
seen this; and, with characteristic wisdom, has made the Apology the corner-stone of his admirable chapter on Socrates. How superior to the cold and barren defence which bears the name of Xenophon on the one hand, and on the other, how pure from the impractical and impracticable speculations which Plato has interwoven in some of his later dialogues! It is doubtless a faithful representation of the defence, or rather justification, we might almost say, glorification, of his own life, character, and mission, which Socrates actually pronounced before his judges. At the same time, perhaps, it may be regarded as an exemplification of Plato's beau ideal of the true Orator, whose aim and office it is not to save the life of the accused by whatever means of falsehood, bribery, and seduction he can invent, but to set forth the claims of truth and justice in all their native right to command universal obedience. In this view the Apology may, perhaps, be considered as the counterpart of the exposure of rhetoric falsely so called in the Gorgias, and so take its place among the consecutive labors of Plato to realize the idea of all the arts and sciences; though it must be confessed, that the want of the introduction and the dialectic structure, which are so characteristic of the scientific dialogues, seems rather (not to set it aside, as Ast would set it aside, as un-Platonic, for it has all the palpable
and marked peculiarities of Plato's style), but to set it apart to the more specific and no less sacred purpose of a defence by a gifted and beloved disciple of his honored and revered master.

The exordium opens, if we may be allowed to go before the reader with a brief analysis of the piece, with an expression of the astonishment of Socrates at the misrepresentations of his accusers, who have represented nothing as it is, and a declaration of his purpose to speak the plain and simple truth, in the same plain and simple language which he has been accustomed to use in his every day conversations; and as this is his whole office as an orator speaking in his own defence, so it is their sole duty, as judges, to consider whether or not he speaks the truth. (17, 18, A.) This exordium, if it does not set forth Plato's beau ideal of true oratory, in contrast with the studied and false rhetoric of the forum and the schools, yet it no doubt exhibits the author's idea of the style and manner in which Socrates actually defended himself when on trial for his life. Accordingly, we shall find the Socrates of the Apology excluding all artificial rhetoric, all appeals to prejudice or passion, and declaring the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, with the simplicity and directness, the frankness and fearlessness of a phi-
losopher who values truth and justice far more than life. *

After this brief and plain exordium, Socrates asks leave to reply first to his first accusers, those less formal but more powerful and formidable accusers, to wit, who had been insinuating their slanders into the public mind during his life, and who had all the advantage of numbers and time, of a tribunal numerous and credulous, and of not being confronted with the accused; nay, of being personally unknown, except some one of them might chance to be a comic poet (18, b. c.), alluding especially to Aristophanes, whose name is mentioned further on, and his comedy of The Clouds distinctly pointed out. (19, c.) The charges thus informally brought against him were, that, "with a wicked and mischievous curiosity, he inquired into things in heaven above and things under the earth; that he made the worse appear the better reason; and that he taught others to do the same; in short, that he was a natural philosopher and a sophist." (19, b. cf. 18, b.) Socrates utterly denies the truth of these charges; declares his entire ignorance of natural philosophy as then taught, as well as of the sophist's art; offers to present witnesses in

* Cf. Valer. Max. VI., 4: Maluitque Socrates extinguui, quam Lysias superesse—in allusion to the Oration which Lysias prepared for the use of Socrates, but which Socrates refused to deliver.
proof that he taught no such things to his disciples, and calls upon all present to testify against him, if they had ever heard from him any conversation, great or small, on such subjects. (19, c. d.) Moreover, he did not profess to be a teacher, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, Hippias the Elean, and Evenus the Parian, who drew away the young from the society of the wisest and best citizens (which they might enjoy gratuitously), to receive their instructions at a great price. He congratulated the possessors of such wisdom and power, and would doubtless be very proud if he possessed it himself. But truth obliges him to confess, that he has no part nor lot, great or small, in such knowledge. (19, e.; 20 c.) The modesty and irony which mark this passage, the short dialogue, into which he runs unconsciously, and which is given in the form and the words of the original conversation, and the unfavorable view which he takes of the vague and unprofitable speculations of the physical philosophers who preceded him, are all highly characteristic of the real Socrates, as he appears in the Memorabilia of Xenophon. (Cf. Mem. I., 1, 11, seqq.; I., 2, 3, seqq. et passim.)

"But what then is your business or profession? What have you said or done to raise all this hue and cry about you?" In answer to this question, Socrates admits that he bore the name of philoso-
pher, or wise man. But he pretended to merely human wisdom, such as man may properly aspire to, and such as pertains to the proper regulation of human life. (20, d. e.) This wisdom he did indeed possess. And in proof that he did, he would refer them to no less authority than the God at Delphi. (21, a.) He never supposed himself to be wise in any sense, till, in response to a question of his friend and the friend of the people (Chærephon), the Delphic Oracle declared, that there was none wiser than he. Not daring to discredit the Oracle, he then set himself to discover in what possible sense, if indeed in any sense, he was wiser than others. (21, b. c.) Accordingly he visited successively various classes of men in high repute for wisdom—politicians, poets, orators, philosophers, artisans, &c. ; and he discovered to his surprise, that while they really understood pretty well their respective departments, they fancied they understood everything else (22, d.), though, in fact, with a partial exception in favor of the artisans, they did not understand the fundamental principles even of their own profession. (22, c.) And they all, without exception, thought they knew a great deal more than they did know, while he was conscious that he knew almost nothing. (21, d.) And when he came to inquire whether he would choose to be as he was, or to have their wisdom with their want
of self-knowledge, he was constrained to answer, that he would rather be as he was, and so to assent to the truth of the Oracle (22, \textit{e}.); though he modestly adds, that the chief intent of the Oracle was doubtless to teach this general truth, that \textit{he} was the wisest of men, who preferred that kind of wisdom which Socrates cultivated, viz., the moral and practical, and who, \textit{like} Socrates, was conscious of the poverty of his acquirements in knowledge, and the comparative worthlessness of all the wisdom of men. (23, \textit{a. b.})

In the course of the investigation which he thus prosecuted, he offended all he visited, by showing them that they knew far less than they supposed. At the same time, his pupils (or rather his young friends and followers, for, as in Xenophon, so in Plato, Socrates never speaks of his disciples) delighted themselves in exposing, after his example, the ignorance of the many pretenders to superior knowledge. (23, \textit{c.}) And they were angry, not with themselves, but with the innocent occasion of their humiliation. Accordingly they began to call him a most impious fellow, a corrupter of youth, and the like. When asked how; what he did; what he taught; having nothing else to say, they took up and turned against him the prejudice and calumny which the multitude were so ready to entertain against philosophers in general. (23, \textit{d.}) They
confounded him with the very naturalists and sophists whom he had ever labored to confute, and thus sought to concentrate upon him the suspicion and indignation which they had incurred.

So much for the informal charges. And these prepared the way for the formal indictment for corrupting the youth and endeavoring to subvert the religion of his country. Of his three accusers, Socrates informs the judges that Meletus was angry with him for exposing, as above described, the poets, Anytus for the artisans and politicians, and Lycon for the orators. (23, ν.) They were all actuated by selfish and revengeful feelings. Anytus, it should be added, was a rich leather-seller, and a man of influence in the democracy; and when Socrates seeing signs of intellectual capacity in his son, endeavored to dissuade the father from bringing up his son to his own trade, Anytus was personally offended (Apol. Xen. 29), and was able easily to turn the passions of the populace against the reputed master of the tyrant Critias and the now hated Alcibiades. (Cf. Xen. Mem. I., 2, 12.)

In defence of himself against the charge of corrupting the youth, Socrates enters into a very characteristic dialogue with Meletus, asking, who it is that corrupts the youth, and who makes them wiser and better; whether the judges, senators, and members of the Assembly also corrupt them, or
whether he is their only corrupter, and whether it is likely to be the single individual that corrupts, and the multitude that instruct and reform, or quite the contrary, just as it is in the training of horses and the lower animals; and if he is such a corrup-
ter of the young, whether he does it voluntarily or involuntarily, of which alternatives the former is quite incredible, since he must know that he could not corrupt them without injuring himself, and in the latter alternative, he ought not to be impeach-
ed and punished, but to be instructed and made wiser. (24, B.; 26, A.) The conclusion of this very Socratic piece of extemporized dialectics is, that Socrates, if not too wise and good to corrupt the youth, must be too ignorant to deserve punish-
ment for it; and that Meletus, with all his assum-
ed superiority in wisdom and virtue, neither knows nor cares, how young men can be made either bet-
ter or worse. The argument, by which Socrates ex-
culpates himself, will probably strike most modern readers as more subtle than conclusive in its reason-
ing, and somewhat dangerous withal in its practical tendency, since, carried out to its legitimate result, it would seem to prove that all crimes must be involuntary, and all criminals proper objects of commiseration and instruction, rather than of punishment. And we see not how the objection can be answered. It lies, however, not only against
the argument here, but against the doctrine of Socrates, which, everywhere, in Xenophon and Plato alike, resolves all the virtues into knowledge, and, by consequence, all the vices into sins of ignorance.

Taking up the other point in the indictment, Socrates now asks, whether his accuser means to charge him only with denying the gods of the state, or with downright atheism; and on being distinctly charged with the latter, he shows that this is utterly inconsistent with the language of the indictment itself, which charges him with recognizing and teaching "other divine things," and if there are "divine things," then surely there must be divinities. Just as he who speaks of human affairs, must needs recognize the existence of human beings, so in teaching δαιμόνια, he must needs recognize δαιμονες; and if δαιμονες, then, according to the prevailing Greek idea, either gods or sons of gods; and if sons of gods, then of course gods. (26, β.; 27, ε.)

Having thus disposed of his principal accuser, Socrates boldly tells the Athenians, that he has to fear, not the indictment of Meletus, but the envy and jealousy of the multitude, which had destroyed many other good men, and would probably destroy him. "Why then persist in a course of conduct which you expect will occasion your death?"
"Because," such is the substance of the answer, "the great question for a man to ask, is not whether life or death will be the result of his conduct, but whether he is doing right or wrong, and acting the part of a good or bad man; as the heroes of the Trojan war, and all true heroes, have ever despised danger and death in the path of duty and glory." (28, B. C. D.) "I should behave strangely," he continues, "if when your commanders, Athenians, stationed me at Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I kept my post at the peril of my life, but when the God sets me down in Athens to spend my life in the pursuit of philosophy and in the examination of myself and others, then I should leave my post through fear of death. In that case, I might well and truly be charged with not believing in the gods, since I disobeyed the Oracle and feared death, and thought myself wise when I was not. For to fear death is to think one's self wise, when he is not; for it is to think one knows what he does not know. None know death. They do not know but it is the greatest good; yet they fear it, as if they knew it was the greatest of evils. I will never flee from what may be the greatest good, viz., death, into such base and criminal acts as must be the greatest evils." (28, E.; 29, A. B.)

"If you were to assure me of my acquittal in case I would pledge myself to abandon this philo-
sophizing and questioning manner of life, my reply would be, I respect and love you, but I will obey the God rather than you. While I live and breathe, I will never cease to proclaim the superiority of wisdom and virtue and the well-being of the soul, to riches and honor and the welfare of the body, to young and old, to citizens and foreigners, but especially to you, my fellow-citizens, as you are most nearly related to me, and because it especially becomes the honored name of Athenians. For this is the divine command, and this is for your highest interest. (29, c.; 30, c.) And if you put me to death, be assured you will not injure me so much as yourselves. Me none of my accusers could injure in the least; for I do not think it lawful, or possible, in the nature of things, for a better man to be injured by a worse man. I am therefore now defending, not so much myself as you; that you may not put me to death and so reject the gift of God to you, for you will not soon find another such. (30, d. e.) That I am the gift of God to the city, you will see from this. Does it seem merely human, that I have neglected my own affairs so many years and attended to your interests, persuading you like a father or an elder brother, to cultivate virtue? And all this without any pecuniary compensation; for among all their false accusations, they have not dared to accuse me
of receiving pay for my instruction; and if they had, my poverty would have been a sufficient witness against them." (30, e.; 31, c.)

If any were disposed to ask, why he went about and persuaded them privately and personally, instead of coming before the people and counselling them as a body, he had been kept back from the latter course by a certain divine monitor* which had attended him from his childhood—a sort of voice which always deterred him from doing what he should not do, and which had usually forbidden his participation in public affairs. And well it might, for if he had undertaken to act his part in public, he would have been put to death long ago, and that without having rendered any real service to them or to himself; for no man could be safe in publicly opposing the inclinations of the Athenian or any other popular assembly, and forbidding them to do wrong. (31.) In proof of this, he adverts to the imminent peril to which he was exposed in the only instance in which he had held an office, when, as senator and presiding officer in the popular assembly, he resisted the will of the demus, and defended the lives of the ten generals when they were intent on putting them to death by one sweeping and extra-judicial decree. (32, a. b.) He

* Touching the nature of this divine voice and monitor, see the discussion in the notes.
had also incurred a similar peril, and exhibited the same disregard for danger and death, in refusing to obey an unrighteous command of the oligarchy, when they possessed the government. (32, c. d.)

These were well-known facts, which might be proved by any number of witnesses. And such facts showed that he, or any one else who would contend strenuously for the right, must do it privately rather than politically, if he would preserve his life even for a short period. They proved also, that his influence over the young, by precept and especially by example, so far from corrupting, was suited to inspire them with an inflexible regard for justice. And if further proof was required, since his accusers had failed to bring forward the proper witnesses at the proper time, he would gladly yield the stand and let them bring forward now the fathers and elder brothers of the very young men who had been his most constant hearers and companions; for though the young men themselves might have some reason for withholding the truth, if he had corrupted them, certainly their fathers and elder brothers could have no such motive, and the judges ought to be put in possession of their testimony. (33, d.; 34, b.)

Having thus finished his defence, Socrates proceeds to excuse himself from any attempt to enlist the sympathies and excite the compassion of the
judges in his behalf. This practice had indeed become very common in the courts of justice—so common, that it might seem strange and even arrogant for him not to do likewise. He had a wife and children, and friends whom he tenderly loved, and whose grief at his death would doubtless be very great. But such weakness, worthy only of women, was especially unworthy of Athenian men; and if seen in their great men, particularly in one who, like himself, was reputed, whether justly or unjustly, to be a man of extraordinary virtue, it was not only dishonorable to him, but it would reflect dishonor on the whole people. (35, A. B. C.) Besides, it was doing a great wrong to the judges, who needed not entreaties, but instruction and persuasion, and whose duty it was, not to sacrifice justice to personal feelings and interests, but simply to execute the laws. And not justice, but piety also, forbade the offering of any inducements to them to violate their oath of office; and if he should hold out any such inducements, he would thereby teach them that there were no gods, and so convict himself of atheism in the very act of defending himself against the charge. They must therefore excuse him from resorting to such methods of securing his acquittal, which he could not but regard as at once dishonorable, unholy, and unjust. (35, D.)
With these noble sentiments, asking no favor of his judges, he submits himself to their sense of justice. They condemn him by a majority of only six votes. Resuming his address, he declares that he is neither grieved nor surprised by the result. He is only surprised by the smallness of the majority by which he was condemned. (36, A.) Pronounced guilty by his judges, the next question was, what should be the penalty. His accusers said, Death. In naming a counter-proposition, as the laws allowed him to do, if he looked simply at the justice and fitness of the thing, he should propose that he be supported in the Prytaneum (State-House) at the public expense, that he might devote himself without interruption to the instruction of the people. This was a suitable return for his disinterested devotion to their highest good in time past, and this would have been their highest welfare in time to come. If this honor was justly conferred on the victor at the Olympic Games, who did not need it and who ministered only to their seeming happiness, much more was it due to him, who needed it, and who had spent his life in promoting their real good. (36, B. C. D.) And with longer time, he might perhaps be able to persuade them of his innocence. (37, A.) He deserved only good at their hands. If he should suffer death, that would perhaps prove a good. Why then
should he propose an alternative penalty, which would be a certain evil? Should he propose imprisonment? That were to subject himself to the power and caprice of the Eleven, whoever they might chance to be. (37, b. c.) Exile? His countrymen could not endure his instruction and reproof, much less would strangers. (37, d.) And for him to keep silence, though they would not believe it, were to disobey the God, and for that reason it were quite impossible. (37, e.) To live without examining himself and others were no life to him—were a life not worthy to be lived by any human being. (38, a.) Should he then propose a fine? If he had property he would part with it cheerfully, for loss of property was no evil. But he had not property enough. If indeed a mina (about $17) would suffice, perhaps he could pay a mina. He would therefore propose a fine of one mina. And since his friends, Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus bade him propose thirty minæ, he would adjudge himself to pay a fine of thirty minæ, and give these friends as his security. (38, b.)

This high-toned vindication of his character and deserts, together with his virtual refusal to name any alternative punishment, sealed his death. He doubtless expected it would, and intended it should. The last chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia is devoted to a statement of the reasons, and those
for the most part assigned in a conversation by Socrates himself, why it was better, in his own view—better for his happiness and usefulness as well as for his fame—that he should die now, rather than live to a more advanced age. With this deliberate preference and in full view of the consequences, he made his defence so as almost to necessitate the desired result. By an increased majority he was condemned to death. And in resuming the thread of his discourse, he tells those who condemned him, that he did not regret the result—that death would have come soon in the course of nature, and he would much rather die uttering such a defence, than live by such ignoble means as many use. (38, c. d. e.) It is not difficult to escape death—he could readily have escaped it—but the difficulty is to escape sin, which is a swifter runner than even death, and has already overtaken his accusers, younger and swifter though they be than himself. (39, a. b.) And, as men are sometimes inspired with something like prophetic vision in their last hours, he warns his judges, who voted for his condemnation, that speedy vengeance will overtake them in the reproofs of their own conscience and of the numerous friends of virtue who would come after him; and the only

escape was not by cutting off their reprovers, but by reforming their own character and life. (39, c. d.)

Then turning to the judges who had voted for his acquittal, and who alone deserved the sacred name of judges, he labors to console them touching the issue, which they so much deplore, by giving them the true interpretation of it. (39, e.) He could not but argue that it was meant for good. For the prophetic voice—the voice of the divinity—which had often and always warned him heretofore when he was going to do wrong even in the smallest matters, now when life was at stake and he was exposed to what are commonly regarded as the extremest of evils, had given him no warning in the whole course of his trial. Hence he inferred that death was not, as it was commonly supposed to be, an evil, but a good. (40, a. b.)

The presumption thus suggested by the divine Providence towards himself, might be justified and confirmed by the following considerations: Death is either annihilation, or, which is essentially the same thing, a state of entire unconsciousness; or else it is a departure of the soul from this world to another. On the former supposition, death would be a wonderful gain; for how few of our days and nights are so happy as the hours we pass in sound sleep, undisturbed by so much as a dream; and in that case, all time would seem no more than one
such dreamless night. (40, C. D. E.) But if, on the other hand, death is a departure from this world to another, where dwell all the dead, what greater good could there be than this? There, freed from the power of judges falsely so called, he would find judges that deserved the name, such as Minos and Rhadamanthus; there he would associate with Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer; there he should meet with Palamedes, Ajax, and all who in past ages had fallen victims to perverted justice; and what was better than all the rest, there he should examine and put to the test Agamemnon, Ulysses, and a multitude of other men and other women, as he examined men here, to see if they were truly wise, or only supposed themselves to be so; and this would be immense happiness: nor would he be put to death there for the exercise of this prerogative, since besides their superior blessedness in other respects, the dwellers in that world are immortal. (41, A. B. C.) In conclusion, he assures his judges once more, that no evil can befall a good man in life or death, since the gods take care of his interests, and these events have not befallen him by chance, but have been ordered by a wise and kind Providence; tells them that he harbors no resentment against them, since, though they meant it for evil, they had done him good; entreats them to take vengeance on his sons, by inflicting on them
the same pains he had inflicted on his pleasure-loving countrymen, if they are ever seen caring more for riches or any thing else than for virtue, or thinking more highly of themselves than they ought to think, for this, and this only, will be a just recompense for what he has done for the Athenian people; and then he takes leave of them, saying, Now it is time that we depart—I to die, you to live; and which of us is going to the better destiny is known only to the Deity.

Such, in substance, is the Defence of Socrates. So far from believing that we are indebted to the imagination of Plato for the lofty character of Socrates, as he appears in this Apology, we cannot but feel that we owe the elevation and eloquence of the Apology to the real greatness and heroism of its subject. The form and the words may be Plato's; but the substance and the spirit must be Socrates's; and we need only to have heard it from his lips to perfect the moral sublime. Profane literature has nowhere furnished a better delineation of the spiritual hero, rising superior to the fear and the favor of man in the strength of his own conscious integrity and of a serene trust in God. Faith in God, which had been the controlling principle of his life, was the power that sustained him in view of approaching death, inspired him with more than human fortitude in his last days, and in-
vested his dying words with a moral grandeur that "has less of earth in it than heaven." The consciousness of a divine mission was the leading trait in his character and the main secret of his power. This directed his conversations, shaped his philosophy, imbued his very person, and controlled his life. This determined the time and manner of his death. And this abiding conviction—this "ruling passion strong in death," is the very life and breath and all-pervading atmosphere of the Apology.

Nor is the religious element less pervading and controlling in the Crito, though there social duty and political principle are also made prominent. This piece presents Socrates to us in prison awaiting the execution of his unjust sentence. There Crito—the friend and benefactor of his youth, the companion of his middle-life, and the stay and staff of his advanced years—calls upon him at break of day, and, finding him in sound sleep, sits down by his side in silent admiration of his calmness on the very eve of death. Socrates awakes, and a dialogue ensues, beginning in the natural and easy manner so characteristic of Plato, leading on easily to the discussion of the topic which lies nearest Crito's heart, viz., the release of his friend, and ending, like the Apology, in a strain of rapt and inspired

eloquence, before which Crito himself stands convinced, silenced, and overawed, as in the presence of some superior being.

After inquiring the hour, how Crito gained admission so early, and why he had not awaked him sooner, which leads him to remark upon the absurdity of shrinking from death, especially at his advanced age, Socrates asks the errand of his friend at that early hour. Crito replies, that the sacred ship (during whose voyage no one could be put to death at Athens) was drawing near on its return from Delos—that it would probably arrive that day, and on the day following, Socrates must die. (43, A. B. C. D.) Socrates expresses his readiness to die whenever it pleases the gods, but adds his belief that the ship would not arrive till the next day, and his execution would take place on the third day, assigning as the reason for that opinion a dream and vision, which he had just seen in sleep, and which it was well that Crito had not disturbed. A beautiful woman, dressed in white, had appeared to him, calling him and repeating the words of Homer touching the return of Achilles to his native land:

"On the third day, Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia," which he interpreted as a divine intimation, and therefore infallible proof, that on the third day he would reach his home in a better world. (44, A. B.) Beautiful fiction, if the dream
was the offspring of Plato's imagination! More beautiful fact, if the dream was real! And we know not why we should doubt it. What more natural, than that such a notorious dreamer, so familiar with all the poetry of his country, especially that of Homer, and meditating of his speedy departure with lively and joyful imaginings by day, should dream of it under so poetical and attractive a form by night!

Crito now proceeds to press him with various and urgent motives—justice to himself, duty to his wife and children, regard to the affection and reputation of his friends, and the like—to bribe his keepers, forfeit his bail, and make his escape, declaring that it can be done at a very small expense, and he and the other friends would gladly meet any losses or dangers which might befall them in such a course, rather than lose such a friend, and moreover, incur the disgrace with the multitude of sacrificing him to the love of money. (44, c. 46.) "But why, my dear Crito, why should we so much regard the opinion of the multitude? For the best men, whose opinion is most worthy of consideration, will believe that these things are, as they are in reality, and that not you, but myself, am responsible for my death."

"Nevertheless, you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude, for the present circumstances show that the
multitude can effect, not the smallest of evils only, but nearly the greatest, if one is calumniated among them." "I could wish, Crito, the multitude were able to effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good; for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man wise nor unwise." The same simple but sublime sentiment with which we have become familiar in the Apology: Character is the only thing pertaining to man that is of any account; and this his bitterest enemies cannot touch. "But they do just what they happen to do." (44, d. c.) That is, the conduct of the multitude, instead of being regulated by intelligent principle, is governed by blind chance; and such labors, however strenuous, are always fruitless. Accordingly, next to his great moral and religious mission, it was the perpetual study of Socrates's life to bring his countrymen, especially the young men of Athens, to a right understanding of themselves, their duties, and their pursuits, and thereby to an intelligent discharge of all the functions of proper manhood in the light of established rules and fixed principles.

The opinions of the multitude, he goes on to argue, are sometimes right and sometimes wrong; while the standard of rectitude is unchangeable and eternal. Our duty depends, not on the opinions of the multitude, nor does it change with the change
of our circumstances and interests. It has nothing to do with the consequences of our actions. Imprisonment, exile, death itself—these are bugbears to frighten children with, but they will not deter the true man from the performance of his duty, or swerve him in the least from adherence to principle. As to his escape from the prison without the consent of the rulers of the state, the great question, and the only question he can entertain is, whether it is right, since right reason is the only friend to whose solicitation he ever allowed himself to yield. The alacrity of his friends was very commendable, if rightly directed, but if not, the greater it was, by so much it was the more blameworthy. Against thedictates of reason and conscience, he could not be influenced in the least by a regard to the reputation of his friends or his own life. (46, b.; 47, a.)

A discussion ensues, in which Socrates proves to the conviction of Crito himself, that, in such a question, regard must be had, not to the opinions of the ignorant multitude, but of the truly wise, just as, in gymnastic exercises, the gymnast gives heed to the approbation or censure only of the physician or the master of the gymnasium (47, b. c. d.); that by acting unwisely and unjustly, the soul is corrupted and destroyed, which is a far greater evil than the disease or destruction of the body (47, e.; 48, b.); that it is not right to injure or retaliate an
injury in any case, least of all against one's country (49, A. seqq.) ; that the well-being of our country depends on the sacredness of the laws and the obedience of the citizens (50, b.), and our country should be obeyed and reverenced as a more sacred thing than father, or mother, or the dearest friends (51, A. b.) ; that a citizen by no means stands on an equal footing with his country, so as to have a right to treat her as she treats him, or to pronounce judgment on her acts as she does on his (50, e.) ; that every citizen who remains in a free country, which allows the inhabitants full liberty to emigrate when and where they please (especially if, like Socrates, he has remained during a long life, and never gone abroad at all, and never complained of the laws), has virtually assented to the justice of the laws, and has entered into a tacit compact to obey them, as interpreted and executed by their appointed guardians, unless he can persuade them to alter their decisions (52, A.; 53, A.); and that by escaping the penalty imposed upon him by the laws, he would convict himself of being a law-breaker, and make himself an object of suspicion as an enemy of law and justice, wherever he might go on earth, and even in Hades (53, b.; 54, b.). As the discussion proceeds, the laws seem to rise in dignity and sacredness, till they are seen embodied in a form more than human and enthroned in unearthly
majesty; and they are heard, in meek yet authoritative tones, expostulating with Socrates on the injustice, folly, and pernicious tendency of the course which his friends are recommending. Socrates, too, catches the spirit of the laws, becomes instinct, as it were, with their life, and, like the Pythian priestess or an inspired corybant, deaf to every other voice, can do only as the voice of law (which is the voice of God) commands him: "The voice of these expostulations rings in my ears, and I am unable to hear other arguments. Be assured, if you urge anything of a contrary tenor, you will labor in vain. This way God leads; and in this way let us follow."

The Crito, like the Apology and the other dialogues that were written soon after the death of Socrates, has a twofold object—the one practical and personal, the vindication of Socrates from the charge of impiety, and corrupting the youth—the other ideal and universal, to exhibit the true idea of the good citizen, or the good man in his relation to the state. And, it is not too much to say, it accomplishes both these objects perfectly. It is a triumphant vindication of the character of Socrates, setting his patriotism in the strongest light, and showing that he sacrificed his life to what most men would deem an overscrupulous regard for the constituted authorities, even in an unjust and unright-
eous exercise of the power intrusted to them. At the same time, it sets forth a perfect pattern of the patriotic and loyal citizen, submitting to an unrighteous sentence (so long as it was according to the form of law, and since it concerned only himself, while no usurped authority of oligarchy or democracy could force him to do wrong to others), and with heroic, nay, religious devotion, laying himself a willing victim before the laws and on the altar of his country.

As a work of art, the Crito ranks very high—higher than the Apology; though, we think, the latter is capable of full vindication in this light, and stands on higher ground, simply as a work of art, than is commonly supposed. But the Crito, though the plot is exceedingly simple, and the moral of the dialogue is everywhere conspicuous, yet it is conformed to the most rigid rules of the drama. The unities of time, place and impression, are perfectly preserved. The scene is laid wholly in the prison—perhaps the same cell hewn out of the solid rock, near the Pnyx and the Agora, which now bears the name of "The Prison of Socrates." The hour is the morn of his anticipated execution, when he is awaked out of sound sleep by a visit of his most intimate personal friend, who comes, if possible, to persuade him to escape, as he easily may, the execution of his unjust sentence. The characters are
of the highest dignity and interest in themselves, and most intimately related to each other—Athens' wisest and best philosopher, and one of her wealthiest and most deserving citizens. The subject of discussion, as stated in the traditional caption of the dialogue, and in the dialogue itself, is ἐπὶ πρακτέον, or, What ought to be done, involving the whole duty of the citizen to the laws of his country, and, more remotely, the fundamental theory of government and society. On the result hang the life of the philosopher, the reputation and happiness of his numerous friends, and the interests of good order and good government, not only in Athens, but wherever Athenian influence shall be felt to the end of time. The persons, the principles, the interests involved, all awaken the liveliest sympathy. The affectionate solicitations, the persuasive arguments, the pathetic appeals, the generous friendship and self-sacrificing devotion of Crito, go to our hearts. While he speaks, we are more than half inclined to think, that not the desirable and the expedient only, but the true and the right, are on his side. But Socrates, forgetting himself, overlooking his family and friends, and looking beyond the mere reputation of Athens, and even the right and wrong of the present case in itself considered, holds us sternly to the consideration of the great principles of law and order which it involves, and
compels the assent of our reason and conscience, though against all our inclinations, and against the first dictates of our understandings. The conflict enters the breast of the reader. His judgment is perplexed with doubts and difficulties. His heart alternately hopes and fears the success of either party in the argument. As he feels constrained to assent more and more to the reasoning of Socrates, he wishes he could have decided otherwise. In the felicitous language of Stallbaum: "Etenim generosa Critonis amicitia æque afficiat et commoveat legentium animos ncessæ est, atque Socratis in virtute constantia et pia adversus leges publicas reverentia, ut velis idem et cum Socrate noluisse et cum Critone voluisse." And when, at the conclusion, Socrates, transported with veneration for the purity and dignity of the law, not of men only but of God also, and rapt with the vision of what awaited him beyond the grave, rises into something more than human, we sit looking on, by the side of his friend Crito and in the same state of mind, silenced, convinced against our will, no longer pitying, still less censuring, but admiring, envying, almost worshipping him, as he looks upward and longs to take his flight.

The Apology and the Crito bear unequivocal evidence of proceeding from the same author; and that author, Ast to the contrary notwithstanding, Plato, and Plato under the same hallowing and in-
spiring influence, and in the same happy state of mind. The language, the style, the constructions, the idioms, are all Platonic. The sentiments and the spirit are those of Plato under the immediate inspiration of the life and death of Socrates. They are both dramatic, and this marks them both as of Platonic origin. True, the one is a monologue, and the other is a dialogue. But thus only could he act his proper part in the different circumstances in which he is placed. In the one, he pleads his cause in open court before his judges; in the other, he argues his case in prison with his friend. But in both, we see him, we hear him, we sit at his feet, we drink in his words, we catch his spirit. In the one, he stands before us the impersonation of the true orator; in the other, the model of the good citizen. But in both, the man rises far above his relations; the spirit overmasters the body and triumphs over all its outward circumstances. In both, we feel a spontaneous and irresistible conviction, that we see and hear the real Socrates uttering essentially his own sentiments, in essentially his own language, in two of the most real and most critical emergencies of his life. But in both we see him dramatized and idealized, at the same time that he is made real and represented as he is, with that inimitable skill and grace, which, together with his high spirituality, are the undisputed prerogatives of the divine Plato.
The present edition is, in the main, an exact reprint of Stallbaum's third edition, 1846. The few exceptions are specified in the notes, and the reasons given for the choice of a different reading. The notes of Stallbaum are so felicitous, especially in the illustration of Plato's peculiar idioms and constructions, that any one who has read them bears the results almost unconsciously with him in all his subsequent reading of the same author. Wherever I have consciously borrowed from him, I have given him credit in the notes. I have also had before me the editions of Bekker, Fischer, Forster, Heindorf, Ast, Schleiermacher, Buttmann, Nüsslin, Elberling, etc., together with versions in German, French, and English, too numerous to mention; and have used them whenever they could be of use, though most of them have been of very little service. In conclusion, I can hardly leave a better wish for the student of these pages than that, with far less labor than they have cost me, he may receive some small portion of the pleasure and profit which I have derived from them. He must be more or less than human, who can rise from the study of these immortal works of Plato, without higher ideas of the authority of law, the sacredness of duty, the power of faith, and the dignity of man's rational, moral, and immortal nature.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

17 O τι μέν ύμείς, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πε-πόωθατε ὅπο τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγώ δ' οὖν καὶ οὗτος ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὁ λόγον ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανώς ἔλεγον. καίτων ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα ἐὰν αὐτῶν ἐν ἑαυτ-μασα τῶν πολλῶν ὠν ἐψεύσαστο, τούτο, ἐν φ' ἔλεγον, Β' ὧς χρήν ύμᾶς εὐλαβείσασθαι, μη ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατη-θήτε, ὡς δεινὸν ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μη αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἡργά, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὅπως τινὰς φαίνομαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τούτο μοι ἔδοξαν αὐτῶν ἀναακυκτότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρα δεινὸν καλοῦν αὐτοὶ λέγειν τὰν τάληδὴ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοῦν ἀν ἔγειρε οὐ κατὰ τούτοις εἶναι ρήτωρ. οὕτως μὲν οὖν, ὃσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθές εἰρήκασιν· ύμείς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκού-σεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δι', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπήσαντες γε λόγους, ὃσπερ οἱ τούτων, ἰῆμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὔδὲ κεκοσμημέ-ονος, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι τὸ λέγω, καὶ μη- δεὶς ύμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. οὔδὲ γὰρ ἀν δήστου
πρέποι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, τῇ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, ὀσπερ μειρακίφι, πλάττοντι λόγον εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰςινεαί. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνω, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητε μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι᾽ ὧσπερ εἰσάει τέχνης καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἢν ὑμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἀλλοθε, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε ἱορυβεῖν τοῦτον ἔνεκα. Θέλει γὰρ οὕτωσι. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαιϊστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἄνεγαν ὑπελο ἐβδομήκοντα γιανηκως οὐν ἔτινος ἔχω τῆς ἐνδοὺτε λέξεως. ὧσπερ οὖν ἂν, ἤ τῳ ὄντι ἔτινος ἐτύγχανον ἂν, ἔννεπες ὑποκείτε ὁτιπο ἂν ἢ μοι, ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν ὦσπερ ἐπεδράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γε ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἂν— ἰσως μὲν γὰρ τὶ χειρῶν, ἰσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν ἢ— αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω, ἢ μὴ· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀμή ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ ταληθῆ λέγειν.

ΟΑΡ. ΠΙ. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιοι εἴμι ἀπολογησάσθαι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου ψευδή κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ύστερα καὶ τοὺς ύστερους. 'Εμοὶ γὰρ θυμοκόλλησατι κατηγορημένα γεγονόσι πρὸς υμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλα ἦδη ἢ τη καὶ οὔδεν ἄλλητες λέγουτες· οὔς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ "Ἀντωνι, καὶπερ ὄντας καὶ τοῦτος ψυχος. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, οἱ υμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παῖδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειδὴ τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοὶ οὔδεν ἄλλητες, ὡς ἐστὶ τῆς Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς,
ΑΠΟЛОΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντὰ ἀνεξητηκός, καὶ τὸν ἦττῳ
Οἶλογον κρείττῳ ποιῶν. οὖτοι, ὁ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦ-
την τὴν φήμην κατασκεῦαντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν
κατηγοροῖοι: οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἐχοῦσαν τὰ ταύτα
ζητοῦσας οὖδὲ δεόντως νομίζειν. ἔπειτα εἰςον οὖτοι οἱ
catáγοροι πολλοί καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ἔθηκαν κατηγορη-
tεσ, οἳ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμερίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς,
ἐν ὧν καὶ μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὑμεῖς, ἔνοι δὲ
ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνώδες ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες,
ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι
οὐδὲ τὰ ὠνόματα οἶλον τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν,

Πλὴν εἰ τοὺς κομφοδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὁμ. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνοι
καὶ διαβολὴ χρόμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπελθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
πεπεισμένοι ἅλλους πείθοντες, οὖτοι πάντως ἀπορώ-
tατοι εἰσίν. οὖδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάζοιν οἴδαν τῇ ἐστὶν
αὐτῶν ἐνταυθὸς οὖδ' ἐλέγχει οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη
ἀτεχνώδες ὁσπέρ σκιαμαχίαιν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ
ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. Ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ
ὑμεῖς, ὁσπέρ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοῖς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους
γεγονέναι, ἔτερος μὲν τοὺς ἀρτὶ κατηγορήσαντας,
Εὐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πᾶλαι, οὖς ἐγὼ λέγω. καὶ οἶνθητε δεῖν
πρὸς ἐκεῖνον πρῶτον με ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ γὰρ
ὑμεῖς ἐκείνον πρῶτον ἤκουσατε κατηγοροῦντων, καὶ
πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἑστερον.

19 Εἰςεν. ἀπολογητέος δὴ, ὁ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ
ἐπιχειρητέος ὑμῶν ἐξελέσατε τὴν διαβολὴν, ἤδε υμεῖς
ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταῦτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ
χρόνῳ. Βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἄν τούτῳ οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἰ
ti ἁμεῖνον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἠμαί, καὶ πλέον τι με ποίησαι
ἀπολογούμενον· οίματι δὲ αὐτῷ χαλεπῶν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνω με λαυθάνει οἷον ἔστιν. δμως τοῦτο μὲν ἵτω ὅτι τῷ Σεφί φίλου, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον, καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

ΟΠ. ΙII. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἢς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ πιστεύουν Μήλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. Β Εἰεν. τι δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγιναί αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ξητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἐτω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταύτα ταύτα διδάσκειν. Τοιαύτης τίς ἐστιν· ταὐτα γὰρ ἐωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ Ἀριστοφάνου κωμῳδία. Σωκράτης τινὰ ἑκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντα τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλοιάριαν φλαμαροῦντα, ὅν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν ὀυτε μέγα οὐτε σμικρὸν περὶ ἑπατῶ. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάξου λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστῆμην, ἐὰν τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς ἔστι. μὴ πως ἐγὼ ἦπο Μήλητον τοσαύτας δίκας φύγομι! ἄλλα γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτοις, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοῖς ύμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἄξιω ύμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκεις τε καὶ φράζεις, ὅσοι ἐμοὶ πόστε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ύμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰσὶ. φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πώς τοις ἄμικροι ἢ μέγα ἥκουσέ τις ύμῶν ἐμοὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε, ὅτι τοιαύτης ἐστι καὶ τάλα περὶ ἑμοὶ ὁ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

ΟΠ. IV. ἄλλα γὰρ οὐτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστιν,
οὐδὲ ἡ εἰ τινὸς ἄκηκατε, ὡς ἐγὼ παυδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ Εὐάνδρωτος καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τούτο ἀληθές, ἐπειδή καὶ τούτο γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶος τῷ εἰν παυδεύειν ἄνδρωτος, ὡσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Δεοντίνος, καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος, καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστός, ὁ ἄνδρες, οἶος τῷ ἐστὶν ὅσον εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, ὦς ἔξεστι τῶν ἐαυτῶν πολιτῶν προϊκα ξυνείναι ὃ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτων πελεοῦσι τὸς ἔκεινων ἐνυποσίας ἀπολυπόντας 20 σφίσι ξυνείναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδόντας ἔπει τι ἀλλος ἀνήρ ἔστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, 2 οἰδ. ὅτι ἐγὼ ἡσύχων ἐπιδημοῦνται· ἐτυχοῦ γὰρ προσελθὼν ἄνδρι, ὅσοι τετελεκεί χρήματα σοφιστάς πλείω ἢ ἐξυππαντές οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία ὁ Ἰππούκου. τούτων οὖν ἀνηρίμων—ἐστών γὰρ αὐτῶν δύο νιής—Ω Καλλία, ἢν ὁ ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου τῷ νιή τῶλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενεύεται, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτῶν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ Βμισθώσαςθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῶ καλῶ τέ καγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ἢν ὁ ἄν οὕτω ἢ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν νῦν ὁ ἐπείδη ἄνδρωτω ἑστῶν, τίνα αὐτῶν ἐν νῆ ξείως ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνδρωτίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἑστῶν; οἷοι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν νιῶν κτῆσιν. ἐστὶ τις, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὔ; Πάνω γε, ἢ δ᾽ ὡς. Τίς, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ποδιστός; καὶ πόσον διδάσκει; Εὐήνος, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνών. Καὶ ἐγὼ τῶν Εὐήνου ἐμακάρισα, ἐι ὁ ἄλλως τχεὶ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμφα- Σώς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτῶς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ
ἐβρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ἣπιστάμην ταύτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἔπισταμαι, ὁ άνδρες ᾿Αθηναίοι.

ΚΑΡ. Β. 'Τενολάβοι οὖν ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἰσως, ἀλλ', ὁ Σόκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστί πράγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβο- 
λαί σοι αὕτη γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου, σοῦ γε ὀὐδὲν 
tῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου, ἐπείτα 
τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τί ἔπραττε 
ἄλλοις ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ. λέγε ὦν ἢμῖν, τί ἐστιν, ἢν μὴ 
ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζομεν. Ταυτὶ μοι δοκεῖ 
δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἂν ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεί-
ξαι, τί πορ' ἐστι τούτο, δέ ἐμοι πεποίηκε τὸ τε ὄνομα 
καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἰσως μὲν δόξω 
tιαν ὑμῶν παλικείν, εὖ μέντοι ἵστε, τάσαν ὑμῖν τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν ἐρώ. 'Εγὼ γὰρ, ὁ άνδρες ᾿Αθηναίοι, δι' 
οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐσχήκα 
pολαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἦπερ ἐστὶν ἰσως ἀνθρωπίνη 
σοφία. τῷ δ' ὅτι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφος· 
οὔτοι δὲ τὰχ' ἂν, οὐς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μεῖξο τινά ἢ κατ' 
ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφολ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔλεος τῇ λέγων· οὗ 
ἔγαρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτήν ἐπιστάμαι, ἀλλ' ὡστε φησιν ψεύ-

dεταὶ τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῆ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὁ 
άνδρες ᾿Αθηναίοι, μὴ ἀδυνατήσῃτε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξῳ τι 
ὑμῶν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἔρω τὸν λόγον, ὅν ἂν 
λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἄξιόχρεον ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. 
τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τῆς ἐστὶ σοφία καὶ οὔα, μάρτυρα 
ὑμῶν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Ἀείφοις. Χαίρε-21 
φώνη γὰρ ἱστε σου. οὔτος ἐμὸς τε ἐταίρος ἢν ἐκ νέου, 
καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταίρος τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν 
φυγήν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ,
οἶος ἦν Χαίρεφδον, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ᾽ ὃ τι ορμήσειε. καὶ
dὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἔλθων ἐτόλμησε τούτῳ μαν-
teύσασθαι,—καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὡς ἄν-
dρες. ἦπετο γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἰς σοφότερος. ἀνεῖλεν
οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφότερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι
ὅ ἄδελφος ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ ὀντοῦ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖ-
νος τετελεύτηκε.

Β ΚΑΠ. VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὃν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω·
mέλλω γὰρ ὡμᾶς διδάξειν, ὡδὲν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν.
tαῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνευμομοῦν ὀντοσί. Τί ποτε
λέγει ο Θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίστεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ ὡδὲ
μέγα ὄντε συμκρόνερ ξύπωδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὁν· τί ὄν
ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφότατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ-
πον ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θεμίς αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν
χρόνον ἡπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει, ἐπειτὰ μόνης πάνω ἐπὶ
ξῆνηςιν αὐτοῦ τουαίτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἢλθον ἐπ᾽
οτια τῶν δοκοῦντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταύθα, εἴπερ
πον, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ,
ὅτι Οὐντοσί έμοῦ σοφοτερός ἔστι, σὺ δ᾽ ἐμὲ ἐφήσασθα.
διασκοτῶν οὖν τοῖνοι—ἀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι
λέγειν, ἢν δὲ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὑν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν
τοιοῦτον τι ἔπαιδον, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἁθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλε-
γόμενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέ μοι οὕτος ὁ ἄνηρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι
σοφὸς ἀλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἁνδρώποις καὶ μᾶλλον
ἐνεπὶ, εἶναι δ᾽ οὐ. καπείνα έπειρόμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι,

ὅτι οὕτω μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ᾽ οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τοῦ—

το τε ἀπεκλήμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς
ἐμαυτῶν δ᾽ οὖν ἀπιῶν ἐλογιζόμην, ὅτι Τούτου μὲν τοῦ
ἀνδρόπου ἐγὼ σοφότερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ
hexwv oude bolster os remove kalon kaganidon eideinai, alla ou-
tos mou xestei ti eideinai ouk eidois, eno de, ostoper ouv
ouk oida, oude oimai. eouska goun touton ge smikrò
tris autò toytro sofoteros einai, oti a me oida oude
oimai eideinai. enuteivhen ep' allon yia twn ekéinou
dokountow sofeteron einai, kai moi taita taita
edoxe. kai entauðia kakeinu kai allous pollous apne-
E

Cap. VII. Metà taït' ouv xdn efeçèi xà, ai-
odiavomevos mou kai luponumenos kai deúwos, oti uphe-
χiavomev, òmos de anagkaion edókei einai to tov Theou
peri pleistou politefài. ıtéon ouv, skapounte tov
chrisma tì lêgei, epi apantaq tous ti dokouvntas
eideinai. kal ti tov kîna, o ándres Ï³taurai, — deì 22
ygar pros ymais talhèi lêgei - h mei ëgò épataqo tì
toioûtor. oì mou mâlasta eidoimouutes edoxan moí
ylngou dei tov pleistou edeides einai xhtounti kata
tov Theou, allou dei dokouvntes faulóteroi étpiekésteroi
einai ándres pros to fronîmas êxein. deì ùi ymián tìn
eh plânn epideixai, òstoper pónous tinàs pnonoitos,
ìna moí kai avnelegenou h maníela xénoito. Metà ygar
tous politikous xà epi tous poihtas toû tov trai-
gródion kai toû tov diuyrambôn kai toûs allous, òws Ï³
entauðia ep' autophóforo katallhremenos èmatov amas-
ôsteron ekelvon ynta. analambânov ouv autòv tâ
poimata, o moî edokei mâlasta peparaumatoushá
autòs, diýrîtos wv autous ti lêgoutes, òi 'ama ti kai
mavdnomoi par' autòvn. aisochnòmá oûv ymiâv eipetîn,
oi ándres, talhèi òmos de rhtov. òws ètopos ygar
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εἰπεῖν, ὅλως αὐτῶν ἀπαντεῖ οἱ παρόντες ἄν βελτιών ἔλεγον περὶ ὅν αὐτὸι ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ C περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὅλως τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποι- οῖεν, ἀ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὡσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοῖοι· καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔλγων μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἵσαν δὲ οὐδὲν ὄν λέ- γοντι. τοιούτων τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεποιθοῦσα· καὶ ἀμα ὡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν πολεισ- οιμένων καὶ τὰλλα σοφωτάτων εἰναι ἄνθρωποι, ἂ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἄρτια οὖν καὶ ἐντείθεν, τῷ αὐτῷ οἴμονος περιγεγογούναι ὁσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

_CAP. VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας

D ἡμα· ἐμαντῷ γὰρ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένοι, ὡς ἐπος εἰσεῖν, τούτους δὲ γ΄ ἢδεν ὅτι εὐρήσσωμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσδην, ἂλλο ἤπισταντο δὲ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη σοφωτέροι ἦσαν. ἄλλο, ἐν ἄνδρες 'Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτων μοι ἐδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγα- θοὶ δημοιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἐκαστος ἢξον καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφῶτατο εἰναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτῇ η πλημμέλεια ἐκεῖνη τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν· ὡστ' ἔμε ἐμαντῶν ἀνερωταν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην οὐ οὕτως ὡσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μὴτε τι σοφὸς ὅν τὴν ἐκείνην σοφίαν, μὴτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχοντων ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐµαντῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυ- σιστοι ὡσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

_CAP. IX. 'Εκ ταυτησι δή τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὡς ἂν-28 δρεσ 'Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθεια μοι γεγόνασι
καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὡστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὅνομα δὲ τούτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἶον ταῦτα ἕκαστο τῶν παρόντων τούτα αὐτῶν εἶναι σοφὸν, ὡς ἄλλον ἔξελέξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τῷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Θεοῦ σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνδρωπίνη σοφία ὅλους τινάς ἄξια ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φανεται τούτ’ οὖν λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτην, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὑνόμαι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὡστερ δὲν εἰ εἴηνος, ὑμῖν Οὐδενὸς ὑμῶν, ὁ ἄνδρω-Β ποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὡστερ δοκεῖ ποι ἰωκράτης ἐγνώκειν, ὅτι οὐδενός ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἄληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν, ταῦτ’ οὖν ἔγω μὲν ἐγέρθη καὶ νῦν περιών ξητῶ καὶ ἔρευνός κατὰ τὸν Θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ἕξων ἄν τινας ὁμοίας σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ Ἰερό φοντὶ ἔνδεικνύμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι σοφὸς. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξει μοι σχολὴ γένον ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκεῖων, ἀλλὰ εἰν πενία μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ λατρείαν.

Καρ. Χ. Πρὸς δὲ τούτων οἰ νέοι μοι ἐπακολούθοντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἔστιν, οἱ τῶν πλούσιωτατῶν, αὐτόματοι χαράσσον ἄκουστε ἐξετάζομεν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ αὐτὸι πολλάκις ἐμὲ μμούνται, εἰτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλοις ἐξετάζειν· κάπετα, οἰμαί, περισκούσι πολλήν ἀφθονίαν ὀισομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνδρώτων, εἰδότων δὲ ὅλγα ἡ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξετάζομενοι έμοὶ ὁργίζονται, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν, ὅσι Σωκράτης τῆς ἐστι μιαρώτατος διὰ διαφθείρει τῶν νέους. καὶ ἐπειδὰν τις αὐτοῦς
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ἐρωτῶ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὧ τι διδάσκον, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπείπε, ἀλλ’ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πράξεια ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοῦς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἢττον λόγον κρείττων ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἴμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἔθελον λέγειν, ὅτι κατάθηκοι γίγνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οἴδεν. ἀτε οὖν, οἴμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ Εἰ πολλοὶ, καὶ ξυντεταχμένοι καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ διὰ καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀντώνος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἀντώνος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδιομουργῶν 24 καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ρήτορων. ὡστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἦγος ἔλεγον, ἤαμάξοιμ’ ἂν, εἰ οἶδος τ’ εἰπ’ ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διάβολην ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλύμφ χρόνον, οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονῦν. Ταῦτ’ ἐστιν ὑμῖν, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάλης ἡ, καὶ ἤμας οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σκιαίρων ἀποκρυφάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ’ ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι. ὅ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι τάλης λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστιν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἑμὴ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα Β ἐστι. καὶ εὰν τὰ νῦν εὰν τε αὕτως ζητήσῃς ταῦτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.

ΣΑΡ. XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὅν οἱ πρῶτοι μου κατηγοροῦν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὅσ φησί, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεζόμενοι. αὕτως γὰρ δὴ, ὅσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων

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δυτων κατηγόρων, ἀλβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσθαν. ἔχει δὲ πως ὁδε. Σωκράτη φησιν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ δεοὺς οἷς ἡ πόλες νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καὶνά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα τοιοῦτον ἐστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἐξετάσεωμεν. Ψηφι γὰρ ὅτι τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὁ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπονδῇ χαρινετείται, βαδίσως εἰς ἀγαύνας καθιστᾶς ἄνθρωπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενοι σπονδάτειν καὶ κηδεσθαί, ὄν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὃς δὲ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

ΚΑΠ. ΧΙΙ. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὁ Μέλητε, εἰπὲ, "Ἀλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὃς βελτιστοὶ οἱ νεώτεροι δὲσουνται; Ἐγὼ γε. Ἡ δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτως, τὸς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δήλω γὰρ, ὅτι οἰς ἢ, μέλλων γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρόν, ὧς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰςάγεις τουτοις καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα Ἰδι εἰπὲ καὶ μὴν ὑμοῦ αὐτοῖς, τὶς ἐστὶν. ὅρας, ὁ Μέλητε, ὅτι σνήγες καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμηρίου οὖ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκέν; ἀλλὰ εἰπέ, ὁ γαδέ, τὶς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ' οὐ τούτῳ Ερατώ, ὁ βελτιστος, ἀλλὰ τὶς ἀνθρώπους, ὡσ πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τούτῳ οἴδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὕτω, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταῖ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Μέλητε; οἴδε τοὺς νέους παρείς οἴοι τέ εἶσι καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖς; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἀπαντες, ἂν ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ οὐ; 'Ἀπαντες. Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἁραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

δέ, οίδε οί ἀκροαταὶ βελτίων
25 ποιοῦσιν, ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δαλ οί βουλευταὶ; Καὶ
οί βουλευταί. Ἄλλ᾽ ἀρα, ὁ Μέλητε, μὴ οί ἐν τῇ ἐκ-
κλησίᾳ, οἵ ἐκκλησιασταὶ, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους;
ἤ κακέων βελτίων ποιοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κάκεωνοι.
Πάντες ἄρα, ὦσ ἐοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς
ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὗτοι λέ-
γεις; Πάνω σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν ἥ ἐμοῦ
κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν, καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ
Βίττους οὗτοι σοί δοκεῖ έχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίων ποι-
οῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνδροποι ἐλναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὁ
diαφθείρων; ἢ τοῦνατλιν τοῦτον πάν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ
βελτίων οἶός τ᾽ ἄν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλγοῦ, οἱ ἰππικοὶ·
οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνωσί καὶ χρῶται ἦπτους, δια-
φθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὗτος ἔχει, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἦπ-
τους καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων ἑώς; πάντως δὴ ποὺ,
ἐὰν τε σὺ καὶ "Διντος οὐ φήτε εάν τε φήτε· πολλὴ
gὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἰπ. περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν
ὁ μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ὀφελοῦσιν. ἄλλα
gὰρ, ὁ Μέλητε, ἰκανὸς ἐπίδεικνυσί, ὅτι οὐδεπώτερο
ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφάνεις τὴν σαυ-
tοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὁν ἐμὲ
eἰςάγεις. 5 α.α.

Cap. XIII. "Ετε δὲ ἦμιν εἰπέ, ὁ πρὸς Δίος Μέ-
λητε, πότερον ἦστιν οἰκείων ἁμευοῦ ἐν πολῖταις χρη-
στοῖς, ἢ ποιηροῖς; ὃ τάν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ τοι
χαλεπῶν ἑρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν ποιηροὶ κακῶν τι ἐργά-
ζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν δυναῖς, οἱ δ᾿ ἄγαθοι
δὲ ἄγαθον τι; Πάνυ γε. "Εστιν οὖν ὑστες βουλεύται ἀπὸ
τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ὀφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὁ γαθεῖ καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσοθ᾽ οὕτως βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὔ δὴ τα. Φέρε δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιούντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἀκοντα; Ἐκόντα ἔγγογε. Τι δὴ τα, ὁ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφότερος εἰ τηλικούτου ὁντος τηλικόσδε ὁν, ὡστε σὺ μὲν ἐγνωκας, ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακῶν τι ἐργάζονται ἂλ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἔαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ Ε ἀγαθοί ἀγαθῶν. ἐγώ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκω, ὡστε καὶ τούτ᾽ ἀγνοοῦ, ὅτι, ἑὰν τις μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κανδυνεύσω κακῶν τι λαβεῖν ἁπτ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φήσε σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πελθομαί, ὁ Μέλητε, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ᾽ ἦ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ, εἰ 20 διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὡστε σὺ γε κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα σειείδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσαγεῖν ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἰδίᾳ λαβόνται διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· ἤμον γὰρ, ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὁ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ἐνενόεσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἡθηνος, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστίν εἰσαγεῖν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μαθήσεως.

ΟΛΡ. ΧΙ. Ἀλλα γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ εἰστίν, ὁ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τοῦ· τῶν οὕτε μέγα οὕτε σμικρὸν πάοπτε ἐμέλησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἢμῖν, πῶς με φής διαφθείρειν, ὁ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν, ἢν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐς ἡ πόλις
νομίζει, έτερα δέ δαιμόνια καίνα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι
didáskōn diaphēíra; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα
λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοῖς, ὃς Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν
θεῶν, ὅν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἴπετε ἐτί σαφέστερον καὶ
ἐμοὶ καὶ τοὺς ἀνδράσι τούτοις. ἐγώ γὰρ οὐ
dύναμαι

ομαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι
tινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ ἐπαναγόμενος θεοὺς καὶ οὐκ
eἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι
οὕπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐτέρους, καὶ τούτ' ἐστιν ὃ μοι
ἐγκαλεῖς, ὃτι ἐτέρους· ἤ παντάπασι μὲ φής οὔτε αὐτῶν

νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἀλλοὺς ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταύ-
tα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοῦς. Ὅ θεο-

Δμᾶσι Μέλητε, ἵνα τι ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ήλιον οὐδὲ
σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοῦς εἶναι, οὕπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀν-

ἄρωποι; Μᾶ Δι', ὃς ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπει τὸν μὲν
ἡλιον λίθου φησίν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γην. Ὅ

Ἀναξαγόρου οἶει κατηγορεῖν, ὃ φίλε Μέλητε· καὶ οὕτω
καταφρονεῖς τὸν δὲ καὶ οἶει αὐτοὺς ἀπελροις γραμμα-

tων εἶναι, ὡς οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὃ τι β' Ἀναξαγόρου βι-

βλην, τοῦ Κλαξομενίου, γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων. καὶ

δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταύτα παρ' ἐμοὶ μανθάνουσιν, ἢ ἔξεστιν

Εὔνιοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοὺ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας

πριμοῦνος Σωκράτους κατωγελάν, ἐὰν προστούηται

ἔαντον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἀτοπα δυτα. ἀλλ' ὁ

πρὸς Διός, οὕτωσι ὁι δοκῶ οὖδένα νομίζειν θεοῦ εἶναι;

Οὐ μέντοι μᾶ Δι', οὐδ' ὅπωστοιν: Ὁ Ἀπιστός ὦ εἰ, ὃ

Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαντῷ.

ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεὶ οὕτωσι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἄθηναιοι, πάνω εἶναι

ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκολαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνὸς τὴν γραφὴν
ταύτην ὑβρεί τινι καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ νεκτητι γράψασθαι ἐσσαί. ἑοίκε γὰρ ὡσπερ αὐνγμα ξυντίθετι διαπείρω-27 μέν, Ἀρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεισερέμου καὶ ἐναντί’ ἐμαυτῷ λέγωντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὕτως γὰρ ἐμοὶ φανεραὶ τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ ἐποι’ Ἀδικεὶ Ἡσωκράτης θεοῖς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοῖς νομίζων. καίτοι τούτο ἐστὶ παλέοντος.

Σερ. ΧV. Ξυνεπικόνθασθε δὴ, ὡς ἄνδρες, ἡ μοι φανεραί ταύτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἢμιν ἀπόκριναι, ὡς Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὡσπερ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρηγησά-β μην, μέμνησθε μοι μὴ σοφίζειν, ἕως ἐν τῷ εἰσώθητι τρόπῳ τοῦς λόγους ποιῶμαι.

"Εστιν ὡς οὖ ἀνδρώπων, ὡς Μέλητε, ἀνδρώποιμα μὲν νομίζει πράγματ’ εἶναι, ἀνδρῶποις δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὡς ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα σοφίζειν. ἔσοι δὴ οὕτως ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ ἀνθρώπος μὲν οὐ νομίζει, αὐθητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρινάσθαι, ἐγὼ σοι λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι. ἔσοι δὴ οὕτως δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ’ εἶναι, δαιμονάς οὐ δὲ οὐ νομίζει; οὐκ ἔστων. ἢς ὁνήσασ, δητὶ μόνης ἀπεκρίνα τὸ τούτῳ ἀναγκαζόμενον. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φήσι με καὶ νομίζεις καὶ διδάσκεις, εἰτ’ οὐν καὶν δὲτε παλαιά· ἀλλ’ οὖν δαιμόνια γε νομίζων κατὰ τὸν σὺν λόγον, καὶ ταύτα καὶ διωμόσις ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαιμονάς ἄλητον πολλῇ
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μὲ ἐστὶν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ τὴν γὰρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἄποκρίνει. 

ὁ τούς δὲ δαλμόνας οὐχὶ ἦτοι δειοῦς γε ἡγούμενα ἡ δειοῦν παῖδας; φής ἢ οὔ; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαλμόνας ἡγούμαι, ὡς σὺ φής, εἰ μὲν ἐοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαλμόνες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη δ ἢ γὼ φημὶ σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριτέσθαι, δειοῦς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι εἰμὲ δειοὺς αὐ ἡγεῖσθαι πᾶλιν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ δαλμόνας ἡγούμαι· εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ δαλμόνες δειοῦν παῖδες εἰσὶ νῦν τινὲς ἢ ἢ ἡμικράνιοι καὶ τινῶν ἄλλων, ἢν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων δειοῦν μὲν παῖδας ἡγούτοι εἰναι, δειοὺς δὲ μὴ; ὡμολογῶ γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὡς περὶ ἂν εἰ τὸν ἵππων 

Ε μὲν παῖδας ἡγούτοι ἢ καὶ ὅνων τοὺς ἑμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὅνους μὴ ἡγούτοι εἰναι. ἀλλ', ὁ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστων ὅπως σοὶ ταύτα σοὺ ἀποπειράμενος ἴδον ἠγράψῃ τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἢ ἀπορῶν δ' τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σοῦ τινα πείθοις ἄν καὶ συμερὸν νοῦν ἔχουτα ἀνθρώπους, ὡς [οὗ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ [ἄνδρος] ἔστι καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ τεία ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαλμόνας μήτε δειοὺς μήτε ἤρων, οὐδεμία μηχανῆ 

28 ἐστὶν.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΩΝ. Ἀλλ' γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἄθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ ὅπως ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μέλητον γραφὴν, οὐ πολλὴς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἰκανὰ καὶ ταύτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλῆ 

μοι ἀπέχεισα γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὐ ἰστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἔστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν δ' ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάντερ 

αἰρῆ, οὐ Μέλητος, οὐδ' Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ' ἂν τῶν πολλῶν 

diaβολὴ τε καὶ φθόνος; ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἐλλοὺς καὶ
ἀγαθὸς ἄνδρας Ἰρήκεν, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· οὐδὲν
dὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ.

"Ἰσως δ’ ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις, Εἰτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὁ
Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον εἰπτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, εἴ σὲ
κινδυνεύεις νυν ἀποθανεῖν; Ἕγῳ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δικαιοῦ
λόγον ἀντεκτομῆ, ὅτι ὦ καλῶς λέγεις, ὁ ἄνδροςε, ἐς
ὁλεὶ δὲν κινδύνου ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ἥν ἢ τεθνάναι
ἀνδρα, ὦτοι τι καὶ σμικρῶν ὁφελὸς ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ τι, πότερον δίκαια
ἂν δίκαια πράττει, καὶ ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ.

φαίλει γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σφό λόγο ἐπὶ πῶς τῶν ἡμῶν ὅσοι
ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, οὐ ταῖς ἤπειρον καὶ ὅ τῆς Θέης
ὅσοι, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ
τὰ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομείναι, ὡστε ἐπεὶ ἐπεισὶ ἢ μὴ ῃ

αὐτῷ προδημομένῳ "Εκτόρα ἀποκτείναι, θεὸς ὁ σοῦ,
οὐτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ μοι," Ο παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρό-
κλῆ τῷ ἔταφρῳ τῶν φόνων καὶ "Εκτόρα ἀποκτείνεις,
αὐτῷ ἀποθανεῖται οὔτε συγκρίνεις τῷ φonte, φησὶ, μεδ' "Εκτόρα
πότμος ἐτοίμασιος· ὁ δὲ ταῖτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν ἰάνατον
καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὁλυγόρχησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δεῖσας

D τὸ ἦν κακὸς ὄν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, Ἀὐτίκα,
φησὶ, τεθωμῆ καὶ ἐτελεῖς ἀπυλής τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἦν μὴ
ἔνθαδε μὲν καταγέλαστος παρὰ ἦνοι κορωνίσευν,

ἄχθος ἀροῦρησ. μὴ αὐτοῖς οὐεὶ φροντίσαι ἰάνατον καὶ
κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὁ ἄνδρας τὴν ἐλεί-

νία: οὐ ἂν τὸ ἀντον τάξις ἢ ἀργοσάμους βίλτοιν

ἐναι ἢ ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος ταχῇ, ἐν الطύχα δεῖ, ὡς ἔμοι
dokei, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογίζομενον μήτε

ἰάνατον μὴτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.
CAP. XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἀν εἶναι εἰργασμένος, ἐδὲ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με ὑμεῖς ἀρχοντες ἔταττον, ὥς ἴμεῖς εἶλες. τῷ ἀρχεῖν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαιᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Αἰγίᾳ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον, δὲστερ καὶ ἄλλοις τοις, καὶ ἐκεῖνος ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοτος, ὥσ ἐγὼ φήμην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντα με δεῖν ξῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἔμοι τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁσίον πρᾶγμα ληπτομε τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν μὲν ἄν εἴη, καὶ ὥσ ἄλλος τότε ἀν με δικαίως εἰσάγω τοὺς εἰς δικαστήριον, οὕτω οὖν νομίζω θεοῦ εἶναι, ἀπετάθων τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδώκω θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι, οὐκ ἄν. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ θάνατον δεδόμα, ἢ ἀνδρεία, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἶδέναι ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἴδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τοῦ θάνατον οὐδὲ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὅν τῶν ἄνθρωπον, δεδίκασι δὲ ὡς εὐειδότες, οὕτω μεγίστου τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν καὶ τούτῳ τῶς ὃν ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὐτή ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἶκα αἰ αἰδέναι δὲ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δὲ, ἢ ἀνδρεία, τοῦτοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἰσως διαφέροι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ ἄθι τῷ σοφότερῷ τοῦ φαινε εἶναι, τοῦτο ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἰκανός περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἐδου οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι. τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπετάθειν τῷ βελτίων, καὶ ἰδεῖ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, οὐ οἴδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶ, ἢ μὴ οἴδα εἰ ἁγαθὰ οὕτα τυγχάνει, οὐδέποτε φοβηθήσομαι οὐδὲ ἐφεξομαι. ὅστε οὐδὲ εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε, Ἀνύπτη άπιστήσατες, ὅσ πὴ ὑπ’ τὴν ἀρχήν οὕτω δεῖν ἐμὲ δεύτερο
eiσελθείν, ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσήλθον, οὐχ οἶνον τε εἶναι τὸ μῆ
ἀποκτείναι με, λέγον πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὡς, εἰ διαφευγόμην,
ἥδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νείς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἡ Σωκράτης διδά-
σκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται,—εἰ μοι
πρὸς ταῦτα εἴπουτε, ὩΣ Σωκράτης, νῦν μὲν Ἀντίφων ὑμῶν
πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφιμένω σε, ἐπὶ τούτω μέντοι, ἐφ'
δὲ μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡγησείς διατρίβεις μηδὲ φιλο-
σοφεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἂν ὑμῶν ἐτί τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποδανεῖ· εἰ
οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφῆνε, εἶπομί' ἂν ὑμῖ
ν, ὅτι Ἐγώ ὑμᾶς, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι
μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ Ἰδὼν ὑμῖν, καὶ
ἐωςπέρ ἄν ἐμπνεό καὶ οἷς τε ὃ, οὐ μὴ παῦσωμαι
φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῶν παρακελεύομένους τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύ-
μενος ὅτι ἄν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγον οἰάπερ εἷς-
θα, ὅτι, ὩΣ ἄριστε ἁνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖοι ὑμῖν, τόδε ἔν
τῷ μεγάλτῳ καὶ εὐδοκιμοτάτῃ εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἱσχῦν,
χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενον, ὅποις σοι
ἔσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονίσεως δὲ Ε
καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὦσ βελτίωτη ἔσται,
οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φρονίζεις; καὶ ἐὰν τις ὑμῶν ἀμ-
φιβαθτήσῃ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελείσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφῆσο
αὐτὸν οὕτ' ἀπειμ, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω
καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν,
φάναι δὲ, ὅνειδώ, ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐπαχι-
στον ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα 30
καὶ νεωτέρο καὶ πρεσβυτέρο, ὅτι ὅλων ἐντυγχάνω,
τούτω, καὶ ἕνω καὶ ἀστῶ, μάλλον δὲ τοῖς ἁστοῖς,
οἷς μοι ἐγγυντέρω ἔστε γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ
ὁ Ἰδόν, εὖ ἔστε. καὶ ἐγὼ οἶκομαι οὐδὲν ποι ὑμῶν μείζων
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ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγώ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων υμῶν καὶ νεώτεροις καὶ πρεσβυτέροις μὴτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελείσθαι μὴτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ Β οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥστε ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρῆματα καὶ τάλα τὰς ἀγάθα τοὺς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντά καὶ ἐκ μετοχια. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταύτα λέγων διαφανέρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἰδί βλαβερά. εἰ

• δὲ τίς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταύτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταύτα, φαίνει ἂν, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἢ πείθεν 

• οὖν Ἀντών, ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἄφιετε, ἢ μή ἄφιετε, ὥς εἰμοί

• οὖν ἂν ποιήσωντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τε 

• νώναι.

• ΚΑΡ. ΧVIII. Μὴ δορυφορείτε, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμελεύστε μοι. ὡς ἐδείχθην υμῶν, μὴ δορυφορείν εφ' ὃς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγώ οἴμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄτα ὑμῶν ἐρείν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' ὃς ὦνομος οἰκόσεσθε· ἄλλα μηδαμός ποιείτε τούτο. ἐσ' ἄρα ἵστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιούτον ὅτα, οἷον ἐγώ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζον βλάψετε ἢ υμῶς αὐτοῦς. ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειν οὔτε Μέλπτος ὀὔτε Ἀντώνος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνατο· οὐ γὰρ

• ὁ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνοι ἄνδρι ὑπὸ χελόνοις 

• βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνει μὲν· ἂν ἢς, ἢ ἐξελάσειν, ἢ ἀνιμάσειν. ἀλλὰ ταύτα οὕτως μὲν ἢς ὦται καὶ ἄλλος τὶς τούς μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶμαι, ἄλλα 

• πολὺ μάλλον ποιεῖν ἀ οὕτως νυν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἄδικος 

• ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνων. νῦν οὖν, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι,
πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ υπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, διὸ τις ἀν οἶνοτο, ἀλλ᾽ υπὲρ ὑμῶν, μὴ τι ἔξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐδὲ γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ βραδίως ἀλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, ἐι καὶ γελωστέρον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενου τῇ πόλει ἕπο τοῦ θεοῦ, ωσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναλῷ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθεστέρῳ καὶ δειμένης ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύστης τινος· οἶνον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεος ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι, τοιοῦτον τινα, δι᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πειθῶν καὶ ὁνειδίζων ἔνα ἔκαστον· οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν δλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθέ-ει ζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ βραδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πειθησθε, φείσεσθε μοι. ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ὑσως τάχει αν ἄχομενοι, ωσπερ οἱ νυστάξοντες εγείρεμενοι, κρούσαντες αν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, βραδίως αν ἀποκτείνατε, ἐπὶ τὸν λοιπὸν βίων καθεύ- δοντες διατελοῦτ᾽ αν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεος ὑμῖν ἐπιτυμήσει εκθέμενοι υμῶν. ὅτι δ᾽ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἃν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόθαι, ἐν Ἰέων ἀν κατανυσάστε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνδρωπινῷ εὐκεῖ τὸ Β ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέ- χεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἁμελομένων τοσαύτη ἡδη ἐπὶ τῷ δὲ ὑμετέρων πράττειν ἂν, ἵδισ ἐκάστῳ προσίνωτα, ὡσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν προσβύτερον, πειθοῦντα ἐπι- μελείον ἄρετής. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἄπο τοῦτων ἀπε- λάνον καὶ μνημῶν λαμβάνον τάυτα παρεκδεικνύμην, εἰχον ἂν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὅρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι, τάλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγο- ροῦντες τούτῳ γε οὐχ οἷοι τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντή-
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Ο σαί, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, όσ εγώ ποτέ τίνα τή ἐπειρα-
ξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἠτησα. ικανῶν γάρ, οἷμαι, εγώ παρέχο-
μαι τόν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τήν πενίαν.

8.2.1

CAP. XIX. "Ἰσως ἂν οὖν δόξειν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦτι
dῆ ἐγώ ἴδια μὲν ταύτα ξυμβουλεύω περίων καὶ ποιν-
πραγματών, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τῇ
tὴ πλῆθος τῷ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. Τούτῳ
dὲ αὐτίκων ἐστιν ὁ ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε
πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὃτι μοι θείων τι καὶ δαμάσκων

D γύνεται [φωνῇ], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικο-
μορδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράφατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ ἐστιν ἐκ
παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνῇ τις γυνομένη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται,
ἀι ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, δὲν μέλλω πράττειν, προ-
τρέπει δὲ οὕποτε. τούτῳ ἐστιν δὲ μοι ἐναντίοντα τὰ
πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκόσμος γε μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντι-
ούσαι: εὐ γὰρ ἤστε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναιοὶ, εἰ ἐγὼ
πάλαι ἐπεχειρήσασα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα,

Επάλαι ἄν ἀπολώλῃ καὶ οὔτ' ἄν ἴμασι ὕφελήχη σύδεν
οὔτ' ἄν ἔμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἀχθεσθῇ λέγοντί τάλητῃ
οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν όστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσαται οὔτε ὑμῶν
οὔτε ἄλλου πλῆθει οὔδενι γησίσως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ

diakolówν πολλά ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει.
82 γύνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίων ἐστι τῶν τῷ ὑμῖν μαχο-
μενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαιοῦ, καὶ εἰ μέλλει δίλογον χρόνον
σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεῖεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

CAP. XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἦγογκε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέ-
ξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὁ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἐργα.
ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵν' εἰδῆτε, ὅτι
οὔτ' ἄν ἐν ἑνὶ ὑπεκάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δικαίον δελτας Ἰάνα-
τον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἀμα καὶ ἀμ' ἀν ἀπολόμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῶν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δὲ. Ὁ ἐγὼ γάρ, ὁ άνδρες Ἄθηναιοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε θῆκα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δὲ καὶ ἐπεκεχ ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς προτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους, τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλευσε άθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν προτανεὼν ἡματικόδῃ̣ ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμοις, καὶ ἐναντία ἐψήφισαμεν καὶ ἐτοιμῶν ὅτου τὸν ἱον ἐνδείκνυναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελεύοντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἡμῶν μᾶλλον μὲ δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν οὐ γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμῶν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἤν ἐτὶ δημοκρατομένης τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὅληγρα ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκonta αὐτ̣ μεταπεμφάμενοι με πέμπτον αὐτόν εἰς τὴν Ἡλόν προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Δέοντα τὸν Σαλαμινίου, ἢ ἀποθάνον· οἰα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἑκεῖνοι πολλοὶ πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλήμενοι ὅσ πλεούσως ἄναπλησαί αὐτῶν. τότε μεντοὶ ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὐτ ἐνεδείξαμι, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ δ' ἡμὴ ἀγροκότερον ἦν εἰπείν, οὐδ' ὅτιον, τοῦ δὲ μηδέν ἀδικον μὴν ἀνάσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν τὸν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔκειν ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἔξεπτηξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὐσα, ὡστ' ἀδικον τι ἐργάζασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς Ἡλόν ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρτες φίλοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἦγαγον Δέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὄρχύμην ἄπων οἴκαδε. καὶ ἵσως ἂν διὰ ταύτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ
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Ε διδ ταχέως κατελύθη. καὶ τοῦτων ὢμῶν ἔσυνται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΙ. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἂν μὲ οὐεσθε τοῦδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραγγεν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἄξιος ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ ἔβοηδον τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὁσπέρ χρή, τούτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοὶ γε δεῖ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνδρῶπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς του βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἰ πού τι ἐπράξα, τοιούτοις φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ο οὗτος οὐτος, οὐδὲν πῶπτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε τούτων οὐδεὶς, οὐδεὶς οἱ διαβάλλοντες μὲ φασιν ἡμῶν μαθήτας εἰναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὔδενος πῶπτον ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοιτο καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπισκεψις ἀκούει, εἰτε νεώτερος εἰτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδεὶς πῶπτε ἐφθόνησα. οὐδὲ Βάρημα τοῦ λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δ’ οὐ, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίωρ καὶ πένητα παρέχω ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρωτάν, καὶ ἐὰν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὅπως ἂν λέγω, καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ, εἰτε τις χρηστὸς γίνεται εἰτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχωμι, δὲν μὴς ὑπεσχύμην μὴ δεν πῶπτο τὸ δημήμα μήτε ἐδίδαξα. εἰ δὲ τίς φησιν παρ’ ἐμοὶ πῶπτε τὶ μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούειτε ἢδα ἢ τί μή καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ίστη, ὅτι οὐκ ἀλήθη λέγει.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΙΙ. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τὶ δὴ ποτὲ μετ’ ἐμοῦ χαίρουσι τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; Ἀκηκόατε, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὡμῶν τὴν ἀληθείαν ἐγὼ εἰπον, ὅτι ἄκουοντες χαίρουσιν ἔξεταξομένους τοὺς οἰκομένους μὲν εἰναι σοφοῖς, οὕτι δ’ οὐ’ ἐστι γὰρ οὐκ
άπες. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥστε τὰ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλῃ θελᾳ μοιρὰ ἀνδρῶτρι καὶ ὑποτιν προσέταξε πράττειν. Ταῦτα, ὥστε ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἠστὶ καὶ εὐθέλεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἤγγισε σώζων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρωσε, τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίους, κρῆν δηποῦ, εἴτε τίνες αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι θεονομικοὶ ἐγνώσαν, δι’ τὰς νέους οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἔγνω κακῶν πόσποτε τι ξυνεβούλευσα, γνώ οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοὶ καθηγορείν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ θέλουν, τῶν οἰκεῖων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πάτερας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴτε ὑπὸ ἐμοῦ τι κακῶν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι, πάντως δὲ πάρεις πολλοὶ ἐνταῦθα, οὖς ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, προῖτον μὲν Κρήτην οὖσιν, ἐμὸς ἐμὸς ἡλικίας καὶ δημότης, Κρήτης οὖσιν τούθε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Δυσανίας ὁ Σφήντης, Ἀἰσχύλου τούθε πατὴρ· ἐτὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισινεύς οὖσιν, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ. ἄλλοι τοῦτοι πολλοὶ, δὲν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγοναί, Νικόστρατος, ὁ Θεοδοτίδος, ἀδελφὸς Θεόδωτος — καὶ οἱ μὲν Θεόδωτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὡστε οὐκ ἄν ἐκείνος γε αὐτοῦ καταδεικνυθείη —, καὶ Πάραλος ὑπὲρ, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεόγις ἀδελφὸς· ὅδε τε 84 Ἀδελμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, ὁ Ἀδελφὸς οὖσιν Πλάτων, καὶ Διαντόδωρος, ὁ Ἀπολλόνως ὑπὲρ ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ἔγκει ἑαυτῶν ἐπειδὴ, δὲν τινὰ ἔχον καλίστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀντιστὸ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μένητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθαι, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγόμενοι, εἰ τί ἐχει τοιούτων.
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τον. ἄλλα τούτου πάν τούναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὁ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτολμοῦσι τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακῷ ἐργαζόμενῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασι Μέ-Βλητός καὶ 'Αντος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάξιν ἄν λόγον ἔχουσι βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ διὰ διάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἡδὲ ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τῶν ἄλλων ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἰλλα ἦ τῶν ὄρθων τε καὶ δίκαιων, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτωρ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

ΧΑΡ. ΥΓ. Π. Ἔλεν δή, ὁ ἄνδρες· ὁ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχωμι ἀν ἀπολογείοις, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἰσος τοιαῦτα. Τάξα δ’ ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανάκτησειν ἀναμη-Οοσθέος ἐαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τοντοῦ τοῦ ἀγώνος ἀγώνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδείχθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστάς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παίδια τε αὐτοῦ ἀνα-βιβασάμενος, ἵνα δ’ τι μάλιστα ἐλέηθειν, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσας, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἄν δόξαν, τὸν ἐσχάτον κίνδυνον. τάξιν ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐνοίκας αὐθαδεστερὸν ἄν πρὸς μὲ σχοῖν, καὶ ὅργιος αὐτοῖς τούτως Ἰείτο ἂν μετ’ ὀργὴς τὴν ψηφιν. εἰ δ’ τις ὑμῶν

D οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἄξιοι μὲν γὰρ ἔγνωε, εἰ δ’ οὖν, ἐπιει-κῆ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τούτον λέγειν λόγων, ὅτι 'Εμοι, ὁ ἀριστε, εἰδι μὲν ποῦ τινες καὶ οἰκείοι. καὶ γὰρ τούτο ἀυτὸ τὸ τοῦ ′Ομήρου, οὐδ’ ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρῦσι οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τέρπης σέφυκα, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἄνδρῶπων, ὡστε καὶ οἰκείοι μοι εἰσὶ καὶ νιεῖσ γε, δ’ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναίων, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ήδη, δύο δὲ παιδία. ἀλλ’ οὗσι οὐδεν’ αὐτῶν δεύτ’ ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι υμῶν ἀποψή-
φίλους ὑμᾶς. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; Ὅδε ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲ ὑμᾶς ἀντιμάζοντες ἀλλὰ εἰ μὲν ἀνδρέας ἔγω ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἡ ζωὴ, ἀλλὰς λόγους· πρὸς δὲ οὖν δὸξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῶν καὶ δή τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλείων ὅντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦτονα ἐχοντα, εἰτ' οὖν ἀληθεῖς εἰτ' ὑμῖν ψεύδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τῶν Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τωι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἀληθῆ σοφιαν ἀρετὴν τούτοις ἐχονται, αἰσχρὸν ἀν εἰ, ἀλλ' ἄλλω πολλάκις ἀρνεῖται, δειναί τινας, ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, ἀναμάζοις δὲ ἐργαζόμενους, ὅς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι, εἰ ἀπωδανοῦνται, ἀφεῖς Ἀθηναίων ἐσόμενων, ἕνων οὐκ αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτεῖνῃ· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιπατεῖν, ὅτε ἂν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὐδ' αὐτοί ἑαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. καὶ Β ταῖς ἀλλαίς τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὕτως ἁπαξαίων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες. ταῦτα γὰρ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, οὗτοί ἡμᾶς ἀρνεῖται ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶναι, οὔτ', ἐν ἡμῶν ποιῶμεν, ἡμῶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυόμεθα, ὅτι πολὺ μάλλον καταψηφίσθηθε τοῦ τα ἑλεινα ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγωντο καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖντος ἢ τοῦ ἑσχύναι ἄγοντος.

ΧΑΡ. ΞΧΒ. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς, οὐδὲ δικαιὸν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεὶσεν ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πελάτειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστὴς, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχρη-
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ξεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὀμώμοικον ὁ χαριείςθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικασθεὶς κατὰ τοὺς νόμους· οὐκοιν χρῆ ὦστε ἡμᾶς ἑξίειν ἡμᾶς ἑπιορκθέν, οὐδ’ ἡμᾶς ἑξεσθαί· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτε με, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πράττειν, ἐπὶ ἡγουμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε δόσι, ἀλλὰς τε πάντως ἡ Δία, μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ ἄσβεσθαι φεύγοντα ἕποθεν Μελήτου τοις τοις. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείδοιμι ἡμᾶς καὶ τῷ δείσθαι βιαζόμην ὀμωμοκότας, Ἡσίους ἂν διδάκομι μὴ ἡγείσθαι ἡμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἄσβεσθαι ἀπολογούμενοι καθηγοροῦν ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς Ἡσίους οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δεἰ ὡστοῖς ἕχειν νομίζω τε γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἔμων καθηγοροῦν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέπει καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὡστοι μέλλει έμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν.

Ε ΑΡ. ΧΧV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὡς μοῦ κατεψεφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπηστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τούτο, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν μᾶλλον Ἡσιάμαξι ἐκατέρω τῶν ψήφων τῶν γεγονότα ἀριθμῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔγονεν οὕτω παρ’ ἄλλων ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ. νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔδει, εἰ τρεῖς μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποτεφευγή ἂν. Μέ λητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποτεφευγα. καὶ οὗ μόνον ἀποτεφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ ὅλου τούτῳ γε, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ἄνεβη "Ἀντως καὶ Δύκων καθηγοροῦντες. Β ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὀφλε χιλίας δραχμᾶς, οὐ μεταλαβόν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων."
Τιμάται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἄνηρ Ἑλιάτου. Εἴειν. ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῶν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ὄ. ἦδον, ὅτι τῆς ἄξιας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὁ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἔσχιαν ἔγγον ἄλλῃ ἀμελήσας ὁπερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμὸν τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημογοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐναντίων καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γυνομένων, ἢγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ οὖτι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὅστε εἰς ταύτ’ ἱόντα σώζεσθαι, εὐταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦτα, οἱ ἐλθὼν μὴτε ὑμῶν οὐκ ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὀμφελὸς εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἴδια ἐκαστὸν ἰδὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγάλην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, εὐταῦθα ἦτα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελείσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν, ὡς ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἐσούτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτής τῆς πόλεως· τῶν τε ἄλλων οὖν κατὰ τὸν αὐτόν τρότον ἐπιμελείσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος πατεῖν τοιούτος ὄν; ἀγαθῶν τι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ὅ. ἦδον τι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ὅ. ἦδον, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν τῇ ἄληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθῶν τοιοῦτον, ὁ τι ἄν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρι πένητι εὐεργήτη, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ υμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἐσδ’ ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ὁ ἄνδρες Ὅ. ἦδον, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανεῖφι συνεισθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τίς ὑμῶν ὦπορ ἢ ἕνωριδι ἢ ἕνωριδι νεώνηκεν Ὁλυμπιάδικιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εἰδαλμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς Βούδεν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ
Δίκαιον τῆς ἄξιας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν
87 πρωτανείφω συνήσεως.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΠ. Ἡσυς οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων
παραπλησίας δοκῶ λέγειν ὀσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ
τῆς ἀντιβολῆσεως, ἀπανδαδιξήμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν,
ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον.
πεπείμασμαι ἔγω ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων,
ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τούτο οὐ πείδω· ὁλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλή-
λοις διελέγεμεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος,
ὡςπερ καὶ ἀλλοις ἀνθρώπωις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μιαν
Βήμεραν μονόν κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπεισδὴτε ἄν
νῦν δὲ οὐ βάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὁλίγο μεγάλας διαβολὰς
ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπείμασμοι δὴ ἔγω μηδένα ἀδικεῖν
πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτῶν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ᾽ ἐμαυτὸ
ἐρείν αὐτός, ὡς ἄξιος εἰμὶ του κακοῦ, καὶ τιμήσεσθαι
toiootou tivos emautof. ti deias; ἡ μὴ πάδω τοῦτο,
οὐ Μέλητὸς μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημε οὐκ εἰδέναι οὐτ' εἰ
ἀγαθὸν οὐτ' εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; αὐτὶ τοῖτον δὴ ἠλαμέι
ἂν εὖ ἄλ οὐτὶ κακῶν ὑμῶν, τοῖτον τιμησάμενος; τὸ-
Οτέρων δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζην ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δου-
λεύοντα τῇ αἰει καλισταμένῃ ἁρχῇ, τοῖς ἑνδεκα; ἀλλὰ
χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἔσω αὖν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταύτων
μοὶ ἔστιν, ὃπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρή-
ματα, ὅποιον ἐκτίσω. Αὐλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσομαι;
Ησυς γὰρ αὖ μοι τοῖτον τιμῆσαι τε πολλὴ μὲντ' αὖ
με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ οὕτως
ἀλλογιστός εἰμι, ὃστε μὴ δύναισθαι λογίζεσθαι; ὃτι
ὑμεῖς μὲν ὑμεῖς πολλάτιν μοι οὖχ οἶοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐν-
D εγκεῖν τὰς ἑμᾶς διαιρεῖς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν
βαρύτεραι γεγονασί καὶ ἐπιφθονοτεραι, ὡστε ἔρευτε 
αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγῆναι, ἀλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτῶς οὐσον 
ῥάδιως. τολλοῦ γε δεὶ, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν 
ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἰς ἐξελθόντι τηλικόθε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην 
ἐξ ἀλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένη καὶ ἐξελαυνομένη 
ζην. εὖ γὰρ οὐδὲ ὡμια, ὡποικ ἐν ἐλθὼν, λέγοντος ἐμοὶ 
ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὡσπερ ἐνδάδε. καὶ μὲν τούτους 
ἀπελαῦνω, οὕτωι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πεἰδουτει τοὺς 
πρεσβυτέρους: εὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαῦνω, οὗ τούτων πατέ- 
enerima te kai oi keinai di' autouk toui toukou.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΧΧΙ. Ἡσὺς οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι, Συγγόν δὲ 
καὶ ἤσυχιαν ἄγων, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὗ χαὶ οἷς τ' ἔσει ήμῶν 
ἐξελθόν ζην; Τούτω δὲ ἔστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον 
πείσαν τινας ύμῶν. εὰν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὡτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπει- 
θείων τούτω 'ἔστι καὶ διά τούτω' ἀδύνατον ἦσυχαν ἄγων, 
οὐ πείσετε. Ὁμιαδοὶ δὲ μοι ὡς εἰρογνομένον: εάν τ' αὖ λέγω, ὡς τι 
καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ, 
ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοῦς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ δὲ ύμεῖς ἐμοὶ ἀκούετε διαλεγο- 
μένου καὶ ἐμαυτόν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξ- 
ηστάτος βίος οὐ βιωτός ἀνθρώπῳ, ταύτα δ' ἔτι ἦττον 
πείσετε. μοι λέγοντι τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτωσι, ὡς ἐγὼ 
φημι, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς, πεῖρεσθε δὲ οὐ ράδιον. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἄρϊ 
οὐκ ἐξισμαί ἐμαυτόν ἅξιοιν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ 
ἂν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησμόν ἄν χρημάτων δοσα ἐμελ- 
 λον ἐκτίσεων, οὔδεν γὰρ ἐν ἐξισμάτων: νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ 
ἔστω, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὀσον ἄν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι τοσού- 
του βουλεσθε. τοι τιμήσατε. Ἡσύς δ' ἄν δυναίμην ἐκτι- 
σαι ὕμιν μνὰν ἄργυρου τοσούτω ὄν τιμώμαι.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΙΣ.

Πλάτων δὲ οἴε, ὁ ἀνδρέσ 'Αθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλάδωρος κελεύουσι με τριάκοντα μὲν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυάσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτον· ἐγγυήταλ δ᾽ ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἄργυρίου οὗτοι ἄξιοχρευ.

Ο ΤΑΦΕΩΝ. Οὔ τολοῦ ἡ ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὡς ἀνδρές Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄνωμα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαιν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφὸν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ μὲ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ἄνειδίησεν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείναι ὁ λόγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου δὲν ὑμῖν τούτῳ ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἥλικιαν, ὅτι πόρρῳ ἤδη ἦστι τοῦ βίου, Θάνατου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τούτῳ οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμού.

Ο Καταψηφισμένους Θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τότε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. Ἰσαὶς μὲ οἶκεῖο, ὡς ἀνδρές, ἀπορία λόγον ἐδωκέναι τοιοῦτοι, οὓς ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ἴμην δεῖν ἀπαίτα τοιούτων καὶ λέγειν, ὡς ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. τολοῦ γε δεὶ. ἀλλὰ ἀπορία μὲν εἰλοκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγους, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἑθελειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οὐ δὲν ὑμῖν μὲν ἤδιστ' ἢν ἄκοιν, ἀρνούντος τῇ μοι καὶ ὀδυρομένου.

Ε καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἰδωθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἄκοιν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φήσθην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πράξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε τῶν μοι μεταμέλειν οὖτος ἀπολογησάμενος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὁδὸ ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζήν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίση οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλων
οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανασθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ὁνομαίαν ἔπειτα καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δή- λοις γίγνεται, οτι τὸ γε ἀποδανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετεῖαν τραπόμενοι τῶν διοικόν- των· καὶ ἀλλαὶ μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσὶν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κυνικοῖς, οὕτω διαφεύγειν ἔπειτα, ἓν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν πολεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπόν, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς, ἔπειτα ἐκφύγειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πουνηράν. ἔπειτα γὰρ ἔπειτα ἔτι. καὶ νῦν ἐγώ μὲν ἄτε βραδύς ὁν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου Β ἔδωκα, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ἄβεβεις οντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττου, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγώ μὲν ἄπειμι υφ' ὑμῶν ἔπειτα δίκην ὄψεως, οὔτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὀψήλεπτος μοχρὴραν καὶ ἄδικλαν. καὶ ἔγογε οὗ τοῦ τιμῆματι ἐμμένως, καὶ οὔτοι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ποι ἐγώ σου καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπελευμένῳ ὑμῖν χρησιμοδησι, ὃ καταψηφισάμενοι μου· καὶ γὰρ εἴμι ὁ ἡμὴ ἐνταῦθα, ἐν οἷς μάλλον ἄνθρωποι χρησιμοδουσίν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποδανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γὰρ, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς, οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἥξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τῶν ἔμον ἔπειτα πολὺ χαλεπώτεραν νῦ Ἀλ' ἤ ὄλαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε. νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργασθὲ οἴγμενοι ἀπαλλά- ξοθαὶ τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεήμονα τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν ποιῶ ἐννυστικὸν ἀποβήσεται, ὅσ' ἐγὼ φημὶ. τελεόν ἔσωντα ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλεήμονες, οὐδ' ὑμῖν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἤσθανεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσωνται οὐρ οἰκοτε- δροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἷς-
APOLLOGIA SOCRATIS.

σὺς ἀποκτείνοντες ἀπ הולדת ἐπισχῆσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὕμιν, ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως ἦτε, οὐκ ὄρθως διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἔστ' αὐτή ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὗτε πάνυ δυνατή οὗτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλιστή καὶ βάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ἔσται ὃς βέλτιστος. Ταύτα μὲν οὖν ὕμιν τοῖς καταψυφισμένοις μαντευσάμενοι ἀπαλλάττομαι.

Ε Καπ. ΧΧΧΙ. Τοίς δὲ ἀποψιφισμένοις ἤδεως ἀν διαλεγεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν δὲ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολιᾶν ἀγονούς καὶ οὕτω ἔρχομαι οὐ ἐλθόντα με δεὶ τεθήκαι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὃς ἄνδρες, παραμένωτε ὑποστὸν χρόνων· αὐτὲν γὰρ καλύπτει διαμνήθαι πρὸς ἄλλους, ἔστω ἔξεστιν. ὕμιν γὰρ ὡς φίλους οὕσιν ἐπιδείξει ἐξέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ἔξυμβεβηκός τι ποτε νοεῖ. Ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὃς ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὅρθως ἀν καλοίν.—Ἀυσμάτισον τι γέγονεν. ἢ γὰρ εἰσανεῖν μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνῇ ἄει ἢν καὶ πάνυ ἕπι σμικροῖς ἐναντιομενή, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὅρθως πράξεων· νυνὶ δὲ ἔξυμβεβηκέ μοι, ἀπερ ὅποτε καὶ αὐτὸι, ταύτη, ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθεῖ τὴν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐξοχάτα κακῶν εἶναι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕτως ἔξιστα ἐξέδειν ὄκον.

Β Θεν ἡπαντιώσῃ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημείον, οὐτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαιν ἐνταυθῶι ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἔρειν· καὶ τοῖ ἐν ἄλλως λόγῳ πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε ψευτὰ μεταξύ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτη τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἡπαντιώσατα μοι. τὶ οὖν αὐτὶν εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὕμιν ἐρώτε, κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ ἔξυμβεβηκέν.
κόσ τούτο ἀγαθὸν ἰσορροπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἔσῳ ὡς ἡμεῖς ὅρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνωμεν, ὅσοι οἴδομεν κακόν εἶναι τὸ τεῦχαναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσῳ ὡς οὐκ ἰσορροπεῖ ἂν μοι τὸ εἰσώρασι σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμελλον ἐγὼ ἄγαθὸν πράξειν.

ΚΑΡ. ΞΧΧ.Ι. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐπὶ δε ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυόν γὰρ θάτερον ἐστι τὸ τεῦχαναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ’ ἀληθεῖσιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεῦχετα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυχάναι οὕτα καὶ μετοικήσεις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνδεικτεὶ ἀλλον τόπον. καὶ εἰτε δὴ μηδεμία ἀληθείσις ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ οἶον ὑπὸς, ἐπειδ’ δὰν τις καθεύδων μηδ’ ὄντως ὥρα, ἴσαμοις κέρδος ἢ ἐμ’ ὁ Ξάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν ὁμαί, εἰ τινὰ ἐκλεξάμενον δεὸς ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἢ οὔτω κατέδαφεν, ὃς τε μηδ’ ὄντως ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα νυκταὶ τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτη τῇ νυκτὶ δεός σκέψαμεν εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἁμείστου καὶ ἡμᾶς ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωσεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, ὁμαί ἂν μηδ’ ὑπότις τεῦχα, ἀλλὰ τὰν μέγαν βασιλέα ἐναρκαὶμήτως αὐτὸς ἐνεργέων αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ Ξάνατος ἑμ’ ἀκόρδος ἔγνωκεν λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλεῖον ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὖτω δὴ εἰναι ἡ μία νύξ. εἰ δ’ αὐτὸν ἀποδημήσας ἔστιν ὁ Ξάνατος ἐνδεικτεὶ ἀλλον τόπον, καὶ ἄληθε ἑμ’ τὰ τῆς λεγόμενα, ὡς ἂρα ἔκει εἰσὶν ἀπαντεῖς τα τεῦχετα, τι μείζον ἄγαθον τοῦτον εἴη ἂν, δὸ ἀνδρείς δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τὰς ἀδικόμενος εἰς Ἰδίου, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτων.
τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν, εἶναι, εὐθὺς οὖσα ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡ δικαστάς, οὕτε καὶ λέγονται ἐκεί δικαίως. Μένως τε καὶ Ραδάμανδος καὶ Δικός καὶ Τριππόλεμος, καὶ ἄλλοι, ὁσοὶ τῶν ἡμῶν δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἀρα φαύλη ἂν εἰη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὐτὸς Ὁρθεὶς ἥξισθέ σοι καὶ Μουσάλη καὶ Ἡσιώδης καὶ ὁμήρῳ ὑπὸ πόσφι ἂν τις δεξιῶτα ἂν ὑμῶν.; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἔθελον τελεῖνα, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἁληθῆ.; ἐπεὶ ἐμονε, καὶ αὐτῷ ἑαυτῷ ἀνευμαστῇ ἂν εἰη ἡ διατριβή Βαύτος, ὅποτε ἐντύχωνι Παλαμήτης καὶ Ἀλαντίς τῷ Τελαμόνῳ καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἀδικοῦν τέλεσθε.; ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἔμαυτον τάτη πρὸς τὰ ἑκείνων, ὃς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀνδρὶς εἰη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἔξεταζοντα καὶ ἔρευνωντα ὅπερ τοὺς ἑνταῦθα διάγεναι, τὸς αὐτῶν σοφὸς ἔστι καὶ τὸς οἴεται μὲν, ἔστι δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσφι δ' ἂν τις, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταλ, δέξατο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τρολαν ἁγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν, ἢ Ὑδυσσέα, ἢ Σίλανθος, ὁ ἄλλος μυρλός ἂν τις εἶτο καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας.; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἠγείρει καὶ ἔξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἰη εὐδαιμονίας πάντως. οὐ δήπου τούτων γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσιν.; τὰ τε γὰρ άλλα εὐδαιμονεστέροι εἰσίν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνφάνατε, καὶ ἢδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνων ἀδάνατοι εἰσίν, εἰπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἁληθῆ ἐστίν.

CAP. XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρῆ, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταλ, εὐθείας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ διὸ τοῦτο διανοεῖς ἂληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἄνδρὶς ἁγαθοὶ κακῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὔδὲ ἁμε-
λείται ὑπὸ Θεῶν τὰ τοῦτον πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δηλοῦ ἔστι τούτο, ὅτι ἡ δεινάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάξαναι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τούτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγογγε τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάντως χαλεπαίνω. καὶ τούτω ἐναντίον καταψηφιστοῦ μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι ἑλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἀξίον μέμφεσθαι. 

Τοσόνδε μὲν τούτων αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς νικεῖ μου, ἐπεὶ δαν ἡμήσσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ἰ ἀνδρεῖς, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἀπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελείον ἢ ἀρετής, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι ἐναι μηδὲν δικαίον, ὅπερ δικαίον αὐτῶς, ὃσπερ ἐγώ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὅπως ἔπει, καὶ οἰονται τι ἐναι δικαίως οὐδενῶς ἄξιον. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιήτε, δίκαια πεποίησά ἐγώ ἑσομαι ὅφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός 

τε καὶ οἱ νικεῖς.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ δή ὡρα ἀπείναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποδίδανον, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσόμενοι· ὅπως ὅτε ἡμῖν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἀμαινόν πράγμα, ἀδηλὴ καὶ παντὶ πλὴν ἡ τῷ Θεῷ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

43 ὩΑΡ. Ι. Τῷ τηρικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὡ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρὶ ἐτί ἐστίν; ΚΡ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα; ΚΡ. Ὠρδρός βαθύς. ΣΩ. Θαυμάξω, ὅπως ἥξελθε σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσματηρίου φύλαξ ἔπαγοσαι. ΚΡ. Ἑπιφάνης ἤδη μοὶ ἐστίν, ὡ Σόκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεύτερο φοιτᾶν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ’ ἑμοῦ. ΣΩ. Ἀρτι δὲ ἥκεις ἢ πάλαι; ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς B πάλαι. ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εἰδῆς ἐπηγείρασε μὲ, ἀλλὰ συνὴ παρακάθησα; ΚΡ. Οὐ μᾶ τῶν Δί’, ὡ Σόκρατες, οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτὸς ἥξελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τῇ ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύτῃ εἶναι. ἄλλα καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάξω αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς ἥδεως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπιτήδες σε οὐκ ἤγερον, ἵνα ὡς ἤδιστα διάγγεις. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εἰδαμόσιν τοῦ τρόπου, πολύ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυν παρεστώσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτῷ καὶ πράσως φέρεαι. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὡ Κρίτων, πλημμελές εἰς ἄγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον οὐτα, C οἰ δὲ ἤδη τελευτῶν. ΚΡ. Καὶ ἂλλοι, ὡ Σόκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἄλλ’ οὖσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὖχ ἄγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ. ΣΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ἄλλα
τί δή οὗτος προφ. ἀφίζαι; ΚΡ. Ἀγγελλών, ὁ Σώκρατες, φέρουν χαλεπῆς, όυ σοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτρέποντο πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπῆς καὶ βαρ- ρείας, ἂν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατο ἄν ἐν- ἐγκαίμι. ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίζεται ἐκ Ἀήλου, οὗ δὲι ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡ. Ὅθ' ὁι δὴ ἀφίζεται, ἄλλα δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἡξεῖν τήμερον ἐξ ἄν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἡκουστές τινες ἀπὸ Συμίων καὶ κατα- λυπόντες ἐκεί αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἄγγελων, ὅτι ἡξεῖ τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὐριον ἔσται, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν βλου τε σελευτάν.

ΣΑΡ. Π. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὁ Κρίτων, τύχη ἀγαθή. εἷς ταύτη τοῖς δεόντος φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω. οὗ μέντοι οἰμαί ἡξεῖν αὐτὸ τήμερον. ΚΡ. Πάντων τούτων τεκμαίρει; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἄρω. τῇ γὰρ που ὑστεραλὰ δεῖ με ἀπὸ- ἄρη σκείν ἢ ἦν ἐλήθ τὸ πλοῖον. ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δή οἱ τούτων κύριοι. ΣΩ. Οὐ τούτων τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἰμαί αὐτὸ ἡξεῖν, ἄλλα τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρο- μαι δὲ ἐκ τίνος ἐνυπνίου, δ' ἐώρακα ὅλην πρότερον ταῦτης τῆς νυκτος· καὶ εἰσδυσαίες εἰς καρφί των οὐκ ἐγείρατ με. ΚΡ. Ἡν δὲ δὴ τὶ τὸ ἐνυπνίον; ΣΩ. Ἐσόκει τίς μοι γινὴ προσέλθοισα καλῆ καὶ εὐειδῆς, λευκαί ἠμαίντε ἠχοῦσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν, Ὁ Σώ-Β κρατες, ἦματι κεν τριτάτῳ Φιλήν ἐρίζωλον ξεκιν. ΚΡ. Ὅς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνυπνίον, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐναργήσει μὲν οὖν, ὅσ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

ΣΑΡ. Π. ΚΡ. Διὰν γε, ὡς ἐοικέν. Ἀλλ', ὁ δαμοῦ- ντε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθοι καὶ σῶσιτι ὡς ἐμοί, ἓν σι ἀποδάνης, οὐ μία ἔμφορα ἔστιν,
ἄλλα χωρίς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερήσθαι τοιοῦτον ἐπιστηδεύον, οἷον ἐγὼ οὔδένα μή ποτε εὐρήσω, έτι δέ καὶ πολλοῖς ὃ δέξω, οἱ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μη' σαφῶς ἱσασίν, ὡς οἷός τ' ὄν σε σώζειν, εἰ ἤδελον ἀνάλογοις χρήματα, ἀμελήςαί 
καίτοι τίς ἄν αἰσχρῶν εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πεί 
σονται οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἤδεληςας ἀπίέναι ἐνθένδε, ἦμοι προ嘣ομενὸν. Σ.Ο. Ἀλλὰ τι ἦμων, ὃ μακάριε 
Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέ 
λει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπισκευάστοι, δὲν μάλλον ἀξίων φροντίζειν, ἠγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπράχθαι, ὡσπερ ἄν πραξῆθ. 

D KΡ. 'Ἀλλ' ὁρᾶς δή, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς 
τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δήλα τὰ παρόντα 
νυν ὅτι οἶοι τ' εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὔ τά σμικρότατα τῶν 
κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἄλλα τὰ μέγιστα σχεδὸν, ἕως τις 
ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβιλημένος ἦ. Σ.Ο. Εἰ γὰρ ἄφελον, ὃ 
Κρίτων, οἶοι τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξερ 
γάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἶοι τε ἦσαν αὕτα καὶ ἄγαθα τὰ μέγιστα, 
καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἴξῃ. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἶοι τε· οὕτε γὰρ 
φρόνιμον οὕτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ 
τούτο, δι τὸ αὔ τύχωσιν. 

Ε ΚΑΠ. IV. KΡ. Ταύτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες 
τάδε 
δὲ, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἄρα γε μῆ ἐμοῦ προμηθε 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστηδεύον, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνδέχετε ἐξελ 
θης, οἱ συκοφάνται ἦμι πράγματα παρέχοσιν ὡς σὲ 
ἐνδέχετε ἐκκλήσασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν 
τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συγκά χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα τι 
45 πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, εἰσφ 
αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ πον δίκαιοι ἐσμέν σώσαντές
σὲ κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τοῦ κινδυνοῦ καὶ, ἐὰν δέη, ἔτι τοῦτον μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλος ποίει. ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθεύματι, ὁ Κρῖτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. ΚΡ. Μήτη τοῖς ταύτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ ὦδὲ πολὺ τὰργύριν ἔστιν, ὃ ἥλουσα λαβόντες τινὲς σωστὰ σὲ καὶ ἔφαγαγεῖν εὑντεύδη. ἔπειτα όυχ ὅρας τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εἰπελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτῶν πολλοί ἁγγυρίοι; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἃ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὃς ἔγορμαι, ἰκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοὶ κεφόμενοι οὐκ ἢν δεῖν ἀναλίσκεσιν τὰμα, ξένοι συντοι ἐνθάδε ἐτοιμοὶ ἀναλίσκεσιν. εἰς δὲ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἁγγυρίον ἰκανῶν, Συμμίλας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἐτοιμὸς δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνω. ὡστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβοῦμενος ἀποκάμης σαυτὸν σώσαι, μήτε ἐλεγεῖς ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὃτι οὐκ ἄν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὃ τι χρώ σαυτῷ, πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσσε ὅποι ἄν ἀφίη ἀγαπήσουσι σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετταλίαν ἴναι, εἰσὶν ὁ ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένου, οὐ σε περὶ πολλοὶ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται, ὡστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν. 

ΚΑΡ. Β. "Ἐτὶ δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιοι μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτὸν προδούναι, ἔξον σωθήμαι· καὶ τοιαύτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἀπερ ἄν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαις τε καὶ ἐσπευσάνσε σε διαφθείραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτους καὶ τοὺς υἱές τοὺς σαυτὸν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδοῦναι, οὕς σοι ἔξον καὶ ἐκδρέψας καὶ ἐκπαιδεύσαι οἰχήσει τὸ καταλυτῶν, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, δ' τι ἄν τύχωσίν, τούτο
πράξοντι τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιοῦτον, ο领导干部 εἶχεν ἑγνεοῦναι ἐν ταῖς ορθοπολίων περὶ τοὺς ορθο-

πας. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρή ποιεῖται παράδος, ἢ ἐνδιαταλα-

περεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σύ δέ μοι δοκεῖς
tὰ ραθμοῦντα αἱρεῖσθαι. χρῆ δὲ, ἀπερὶ ἂν ἄν

η ἁγάθος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἔλεος, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φά-

σκοντά γε ἤδη ἀρετὴς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βλου ἐπιμελεῖ-

ὡς ἤγογε καὶ ὑπὲρ σου καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δέχῃ ἄπαν τὸ πρόγμα τὸ

περὶ σὲ ἀνανθράκλω τῷ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράξαι, καὶ ἢ

εἰςοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς εἰσῆλθε, ἐξὸν

μὴ εἰσελθὼν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγων τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο,

καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τοῦτο, ὡς περὶ κατάγελως τῆς

πράξεως, καὶ τῷ καὶ ἀνανθράκλῳ τῇ ἡμετέρῃ διαπε-

φευγέναι ἡμῶν δοκεῖν, οὕτως οὐκ οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν, οὐδὲ

σὺ σαυτόν, οὐν τε ὅποι καὶ δυνατόν, εἶ τι καὶ σμικρὸν

ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἢν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄρα, μὴ ἀμα

τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἢ σοι τε καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλεῦ-

ον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύονται ἐτι ἄρα, ἀλλὰ βεβου-

λεύονται. μία δὲ βουλὴ τῆς γὰρ ἐπιοῦσας νυκτὸς

ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ πεπράξαι. εἰ δὲ τι περιμενοὺμεν,

ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οὐν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὁ

Σώκρατες, πείθον μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλοις πολεῖ.

Β ΟΡ. VI. ΣΩ. Ὁ Φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προσνύμια σου

πολλοῦ ἐξία, εἰ μέτα τινος ὀρθότητος εἶ. εἰ δὲ μὴ,

ὅσοι μελζόν, τοσοῦτοι χαλεπώτερα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν

χρῆ ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταύτα πρακτέον εἴτε μὴ· ὡς ἕγω ὦ

μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕλ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μη-

dενι ἄλλοι πείθοθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅς ἂν μοι λογιζομέν.
νῦν βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἐμπρόσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἦδε δὴ τούχῃ γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ὁμοίως φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς προσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ, οὔς-Ο περ καὶ πρότερον· διὸ ἔδω μὴ βελτίω ἔχομεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἵσθι, ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ἕγχορήσω, οὐδὲ ἀν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὅσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορφολύττηται, δεσμούς καὶ Σανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποῦμεν αὐτά; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸ λόγον ἀναλάβουμεν, διὸ νῦν λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἔλεγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὅταν ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τῶν νυν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἔλεγεν· δὲ τὸ, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἦν ἡ λόγου ἔλεγετο, ἢ δὲ παιδία καὶ φλυαρία ὃς ἄληθώς; ἐπιλυμῷ δὲ ἔγγυον ἐπισκέφασθαι, διὸ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἄλλως ἐφη, ἐπειδὴ ὅπερ ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς, καὶ ἐσόμεν χαίρειν, ἢ πεισόμελα αὐτῷ. ἔλεγετο δὲ πως, ὅς ἐγὼμαι, ἐκάστοτε ὅπερ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰσμῶν τι λέγειν, ὅσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔγω ἔλεγον, ότι τῶν δοξῶν, ὅς οἱ ἀνθρώποι δοξάζουσι, δέοι τὰς μὲν ἐπερὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μη. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, διὸ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖς καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; ὥσπερ γε ταῦτα πολλαὶ ἅπας ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἄλλοις μέν, τὰς μὲν, τὰς δὲ οὔ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ'
οὗ; τί φής; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται; ΚΡ. Καλῶς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή; ΚΡ. Ναλ. ΣΩ. Χρηστὰς δὲ οὐχ ἂ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηρὰ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; ΚΡ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ΣΑΡ. VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐλέβητο; γυμναζόμενος ἄνηρ καὶ τούτῳ πράσσων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνησε καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τοῦ νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, δὲ ἄν τυχικῆς ἱερᾶς η λειτουργίας ἀν; ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβείον ἐκεῖνον χρῆ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζοντας τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν. ΚΡ. Δῆλα δῆ. ΣΩ. Ταύτη ἀρά αὐτὸ πρακτέων καὶ γυμναστέων καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι γε καὶ ποτέοι, ἢ αὖ τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπισταύρωτε μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ἐξεπαινεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους. ΚΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Εἰπὲν.

Ὁ ἀπεδήμησας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀπειθήσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἐπαίνων ἄρα ψόγῳ καὶ πρακτέων καὶ ἀδικωτὸς συνεχῶς καὶ ποτέοις ΚΡ. Εἰπὲν.

Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Τί δ’ ἐστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος; ΚΡ. Δῆλον, δὲτι εἰς τὸ σώμα τοῦτο γὰρ διόλυσέν. ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ Τάλλα, ὁ Κρίτων, οὖς, ἦν μὴ πάντα διώκειν. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ δὲν νῦν ἡ βουλή ἢ μὴν ἑπεί, πότερον τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δὲ ἢ μᾶς ἐπεσθαί καὶ φοβείον ταύτῃ, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς, εἴ τις ἑστιν ἐπαίνων, δὲν δὲ καὶ αἰσχρῶς καὶ φοβείσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐξεπαινεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους.
λοις; δὲ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσωμεν, διαφθειρόμεθα εἰκένο
καὶ λαθησόμεθα, δὲ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγγέρνετο,
τῷ δὲ ἄδικῷ ἀπώλλυτο. ἡ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τούτο; ΚΡ. ὁ
μαι ἐγὼγε, ὁ Σώκρατες. 5 αἰ

ΚΑΠ. Β. ΣΩ. Φήσε δὴ, ἕαν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γυγάμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσῶν δὲ δια-
φθειρόμενον διολόσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐκατο-
όντων δόξῃ, ἃρα βιωτὸν ἦμῖν ἐστὶ, διεφθαρμένου
αὐτοῦ; ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦ τούτο τὸ σῶμα. ἡ οὐχὶ; ΚΡ.
ΝΑΙ. ΣΩ. Ἄρϑ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἦμῖν ἐστὶ μετὰ μοχθηροῦ
καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ.
Ἀλλὰ μὲν ἐκείνον ἃρα ἦμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου,
δὲ τὸ ἅδικον μὲν λαβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δικαίαν ὀνύσησιν; ἡ
φαιλότερον ἴγουμενα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνο, δὲ τι
πότ' ἐστι τῶν ἱμετέρων, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἅδικα καὶ δὴ-48
καυσόνη ἐστὶν; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμώτε-
ρον; ΚΡ. Πολὺ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂρα, ὁ βέλτιστος,
πάνυ ἦμῖν οὐτω φροντιστέον, τὶ ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ
ἡμῶς, ἄλλα δὲ τὶ τὸ ἐπαθών περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἅδικων,
ὁ ἔλεγε, καὶ αὐτή ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὡστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ
οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσῆγει, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δό-
ξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν
καὶ ἁγιῶν καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ' 
ἀν τις, οἷοι τ' εἰσών ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινώναι.
ΚΡ. Αἴθαλ δὴ καὶ ταύτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Σώκρατες. Β
ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἄλλα, ὁ δ' ἤλθες, οὐτός τε ὁ
λόγος, ὅ ἐφελλόθαμεν, ἐμοῦνε δοκεῖ ἐτί ὁμοιὸς εἶναι
τῷ καὶ πρῶτον· καὶ τόνδε αὐτῷ κατά, εἰ ἔτι μὲν ἡμῖν
ἡ οὐ, διὸ οὐ τὸ ζητὶ περὶ πλείοντος ποιητέων, ἀλλὰ
τὸ εὖ ζῷν. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ
καλὸς καὶ δικαίος ὅτι ταύτον ἔστι, μένει, ἢ οὐ μένει;
ΚΡ. Μένει.

ΚΑΡ. IX. ΣΩ. Οὗκοιν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων
tαῦτο σκέπτεσθαν, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ εὑρήκατε πειράματα ἐξεδέδωκα, μὴ ἀφίστων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιων καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαντάζεσθαν δίκαιον, πειράματα εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἴῳ, ἐς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τὴ ἀναλφαβητικῆς χρηματῆς καὶ δοξῆς καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀλόγως ταῦτα, ὡς Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδιῶν ἀποκτηνώντων καὶ ἀναβουσικομένων γὰρ, εἶ οἶοι τε ἡσαν, οὐδεὶς ξυν νῦν, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἤμων δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὗτος αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκέπτεσθαι ἢ ἢ ὡς πρὶν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξεμεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦμεν τοῦτοι τοῖς οἷς ἔμε εὑρήκατε εξάφυστοι δὲ καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσουμεν ταῦτα πάντα ποιῶμεν· καὶ...
τομενον, ἦ ἐν μᾶλλον ὀτι. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειρά-49
σομαι.  

ΟΑΡ. Χ. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόμης ἀδικι-
τέου εἶναι, ἢ τινι μὲν ἀδικητέου τρόπῳ, τινι δὲ οὐ; ἢ
οὐδαμὸς τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλὸν, ὡς
πολλάκις ἦμιν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὠμολογη-
θῇ; ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο. ἢ τάσαι ἦμιν ἐκεῖναι αἱ
πρόσθεν ὠμολογίαι ἐν ταῖς ταῖς ὀλγαῖς ἡμέραις
ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰς, καὶ πάλαι, ὢν Κρίτων, ἀρα τηλικοὶ
γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδὴ διαλεγόμενοι
ἐς ἄνθρωποι ἦμια αὐτοῖς παιδών οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ Ἐ
παντὸς μᾶλλον οὗτος ἔχει, ὅπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἦμιν;
εἴτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεὶ ἦμις ἔτι
τῶν διὰ χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα, ὅμως
tὸ γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν
τυχόντοι ἐν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Φαμέν).
ΣΩ. Οὐδαμὸς ἄρα δεὶ ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ δήτα. ΣΩ.
Οὐδὲ ἀδικοῦμεν ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴο
ται, ἐπειδή ἡ ὁνταμοῦ δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ φάνε-ο
τα. ΣΩ. Ἐ το δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεὶ, ὢ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ; 
ΚΡ. Οὐ δεὶ δή που, ὡν Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐ το δὲ; ἀντι-
κακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασί,
δίκαιον, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ
ποι κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν δια-
φέρει. ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐτε ἄρα ἀνταδι-
κεῖν δεὶ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπουν, οὔτ' ἀν
ἀντιοῦν πάσχη ἐπ' ἄντιόν. καὶ ἄρα, ὢ Κρίτων, ταῦτα
καθομολογῆν, ὅπως μὴ ταῦτα δόξαν ὠμολογήσῃ. Οἴνο
γάρ, ὃτι ὀλγαῖς τοι ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἶ
σὺν οὕτω δεδοκταιν· καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτωσιν οὐκ ἔστι καυνὴ
βουλῆ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτωσιν ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν,
ὅρωντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπησε δὴ οὖν καὶ
σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι· καὶ
ἀρχόμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλεύομενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὅρθως
ἐχοντος οὕτε τοῦ ἁδικεῖν οὕτε τοῦ ἀντιδικεῖν οὕτε
κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμένεσθαι ἀντιδρόντα κακῶς· ή
ἀφίστασαι καὶ καίνοινεῖς τῆς ἁρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ
εἰ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δ' εἶ πη τῆς ἄλλη
δεδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμένεις τοῖς πρό-
σθεν, τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ ἄκουε. ΚΡ. Ἄλλα ἐμένω τε
καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἄλλα λέγε. Σ.Ω. Δέγω δὴ αὐ τὸ
μετὰ τούτῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶ· πότερον δ' ἂν τοῖς ὁμο-
λογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ δύνα ποιητέον ἢ ἔξαπατητέον; ΚΡ.
Pοιητέον.

ΣΑΡ. XI. Σ.Ω. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἀθρεί. ἀπιόντες ἐν

50Θένδε ἢμεῖς μὴ πελαταντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς
τυχαὶ ποιούμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὖς ἦκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ; καὶ
ἐμμένουμεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δικαίως οὕτων, ἢ οὐ;
ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, δ᾽ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνομαι πρὸς δὲ
ἐρωτὸς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλ᾽ ὅδε σκόπησε. εἰ
ἐδιαλέγοιτο ἢμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδόςκειν, εἰδ' ὅπως
δεῖ ὁμολάβας τούτῳ, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν
tῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔρουστο· Εἰτέ μοι, δὲ Σώκρα-
tες, τί ἐν νῦ ἐχεῖς ποιεῖν; ἀλλὰ τί ἡ τοῦτο τῷ ἔργῳ,
οὔτι νεικερεία, διανοεῖς τοὺς τῷ νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι
Β καὶ ἐξίμπασαι τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι
θὰν τε ἄκεινην τὴν πόλιν εἰμι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετρά-
φθαι, ἐν ἦ δὲ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύωσιν,
ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ ἰδιώτῶν ἄκυροι τε γέγρωνται καὶ διαφημοῦνται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὅ Ἐκλέκτων, μῆνες ταύτη καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; τολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχω, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ρήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὡς τὰς δῖκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάτευε. Κυρίας εἶναι, ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις τοῖς οἷς ὑπὸ όρθως τὴν δίκην ἐκρώμεν; Ταύτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

Κρ. Ταύτα νῦν Ἰλί, ὁ Σώκρατες. \[6\] εἶλα

Σαπ. XII. Σ. Ο. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἰπώσων οἱ νόμοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταύτα ὁμολογητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δικαίαις ἅς ἢ πόλις δικαίη; εἰ σοι αὐτῶν ταύτης ἀναμένειν λεγόντων, ἵνας δὲν εἰπτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ Σώκρατες, μὴ δαύμαξε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἄλλα ἀποκρίνοι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴσοδας ἁράθαι τῷ ἐρωτών τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γὰρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει τὸι ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλώναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σὲ ἑγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσε σε; φράσας οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμψει τι ὥς οὖ καλῶς ἔχοντες; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίνην ἄν. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἢ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύεις; ἢ οὐ καλῶς προςετάτω ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μονικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδείᾳ; Καλῶς, φαίνην ἄν. Εἰσε. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἔξεσταράς καὶ ἐπαιδεύεις, ἢ χους ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν, ὥς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἔστα καὶ ἐκογνος καὶ δούλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοι πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθν ὀφείλει.
ἀρ' ἐξ ἵσον ολεὶ εἰναι σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἀττ.
ἀν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταύτα ἀντι-
ποιεῖν ολεὶ δίκαιον εἰναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πα-
tέρα σοὶ ἐξ ἵσον ἢ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην,
εἰ σοὶ ἰδί ἐτύγχανεν, ὡστε, ἀπερ πάσχοις, ταύτα καὶ
ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυ-
51 πτόμενον ἀντιτύπτεις οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς
dὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἑξέσται σοι, ὡστε,
εὰν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμε-
νοι εἰναι, καὶ σοὶ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα
cαὶ ὄσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ
φήσεις ταύτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὃ τῇ ἁληθείᾳ
τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελήμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφός, ὡστε
λέγεις σε, ὅτι μητρὸς τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερον ἔστι πατρὶς καὶ σεμνό-

Βτερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μελίον μόλρα καὶ παρὰ
Θεοὺς καὶ παρ' ἀνδρώποις τοὺς νοῦν ἄχουσι, καὶ σέβε-
σθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ δωπείσειν πατρίδα
χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείδευν; ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ ἀν
κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχεις, εὰν τι προστάτη παθέω, ἡμι-
χιλαν ἄγοντα, εάν τε τύπτεσθαι εάν τε δειοθαι, εάν τε
eis τόλμην ἀγγε τραβηδομένον ἢ ἀποδανούμενον,
ποιητέον ταύτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχ
ὑπεικτείν, οὐδὲ ἀναχαρητέον, οὐδὲ λευτέον τὴν τά-
exin, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πόλεμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ
πανταχοῦ ποιητῶν ἢ ἀν κελεύῃ ἢ πόλις καὶ ἢ πα-
τρὶς, ἢ πείδευν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε· βιάζεσθαι
δ' οὐχ ὅσον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τοῦ-
τον ἐπὶ ἥττον τὴν πατρίδα. Τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΟΑΡ. Χ.Π. Σ.Ω. Σκόπει τοῖνυν, ὁ Σωκράτης, φαίνειν ἂν ἵσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιθεοῦμεν δρᾶν ἢ νῦν ἐπιθεοῦμεν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκδρέσαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ὃν οἶοι τ' ἦμεν καλῶν σοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ δὲ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ δ᾽ Βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμαζόμην καὶ ἦδη τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὃ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς, ἔξειναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπίέναι ὅποιο ἄν βουληταῖ. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδοῦν ἐστὶν οὐδ᾽ ἀπαγορεύει, εάν τὲ τις βουληταῖ ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποκλαῖν ἴησα, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εὰν τὲ μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσε τοῖς ἑλληνοῖς, ἴησα ἐκεῖσα, ὅποι ἄν βουληταῖ, ἐχοῦται τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅτι ὃ ἂν ὑμῶν παραμελής, ὅρων ἄν τὸ τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τέ δικαίας δικαζομένες καὶ τὰλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἔδεε φαμέν τοῦτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργα ἡμῶν ἢ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύσωμεν ποιήσειν τὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενν τρίχη φαμέν ἄδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννήταις οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐ πειθεῖται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεύσει, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴ πειθέσθαι οὐτε πειθεῖται οὐτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τε ποιούμεν, προτίθεντοι ἡμῶν, ὃς καὶ οὐκ ἄρροις ἐπιτυπατοῦντος ποιεῖν ἢ ἀν κελεύωμεν, ἅλλα ἐφιάντων διεῖν θάτερα, ἢ πειθεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

ΟΑΡ. Χ.Π. Ταῦτας ὃς φαμεν καὶ σέ, ὁ Σωκρα-
τες, ταῖς αὐτίας ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴτε ποιήσεις ἡ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἦκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μᾶλλοντ. Εἰ οὖν ἐγώ εἴποιμι, διὰ τί δή; ἵσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθώπτουτο, ἑγουντε, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μᾶλλοντ Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογήκως τυχχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίην γὰρ ἂν ὅτι Ὡ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα
Βήμαν τούτων τεκμηρία ἔστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἁρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἀλλῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπάνων διαφερόντων ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἠρρέσκε, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπὶ διερών πάσποτε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὅ τι μὴ ἀπάξ eis Ἰσθμόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημιαν ἐποιήσας πάσποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνδροι τοι, οὔτ' ἐπιθυμία εἰς ἄλλης πόλεως οὔτ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἄλλα ἡμεῖς σοι ἴκανολ
Οἱ μὲν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὔτω σφάδρα ἡμᾶς ἤροτ, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς καὶ ἠμᾶς πολειτεύομαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσας, ὡς ἄρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοῖνυν ἐν αὐτῇ δικῇ ἢξην σοι φυγής τιμίασατι εἴ ἐβούλουν, καὶ οὔτε νῦν ἀκούσας τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσας ποιήσαι, οὐ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκλαύσασθαν ὡς οὐκ ἄγανακτῶν εἴ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἄλλ' ἥροτ, ὡς ἐφήσας, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς Σάναταν νῦν δὲ οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀντέτει, ἐπιχειροῦν διαφθείραι, πράττεις τε
Δάπερ ἂν δοῦλος φαυλότατος πράξεις, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ἑλείκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καὶ ἠμῶν ἐπικόλου πολειτεύομαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῶν τούτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἴ ἄληθῆ λέγομεν, φάσκον-
τές σε ὁμολογηθέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἔργα, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγοι, ἢ οὐκ ἄλλης. Τι φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Κρίτων; ἀλλ' τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν; ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες. Σ.Ω. Ὅλλο τι οὐν ἂν φαίην ἢ ἐξήνηκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραξείνεις, οὔχ Εὐνομίας ἡμεῖς ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἔβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἔξην σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μονὸς δίκαιον ἐφαίνοντο σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. οὐ δὲ οὔτε Δακεδαιμονῆ προηγοῦ οὔτε Κρίτην, ὅς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμᾶς τῶν Ἐλληνῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐλαττῶν ἐς αὐτὸς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ 58 καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι οὕτω σοι διαφέροντος τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκες ἢ πόλις τε καὶ ἠμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δήλον ὅτι τίνι γὰρ ἄν πόλις ἄρέσκοι ἀνεύ νόμων; νῦν δὲ ἔδει οὐκ ἐμμενεῖσας τῶν ὁμολογημένων; ἐὰν ἡμῶν γε πείθη, ὁ Σώκρατες καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἐσεὶ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἕξελθων.

ΣΑΡ. ΧV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβάς καὶ ἐξεμπράς τι τοῦτον τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτόν, ἢ τους ἐπιτυγχάνεις τοὺς σαυτού. οὕτως μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύως συναντήσῃ γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτυγχάνοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγει καὶ στερηθήσεται τῆς πόλεως, ἢ τὴν ὑπάλληλον ἀπολέσῃ, σχεδὸν τι δήλον· αὐτῶς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἔγχρωμα ἐν τινά πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θῆβας ἢ Μέγαρας. — εὐνομοῦσθαι γὰρ ἀμφότεροι πολέμιοι ἤξεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὡσπερ κινοῦται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψαται σε διαφθορά ἡγούμε
νοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικαιοταῖς τὴν Ὀδόξαν, ὧστε δοκεῖν ὁδόως τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστε γάρ νόμων διαφθορέως ἐστιν, σφόδρα ποῦ δύχειν ἀν νέων γε καὶ ἀνωτάτων ἀνδρῶπων διαφθορέως εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εἰνομομομένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιοτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦτι ἀρα ἄξιον σου ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησίασες τούτοις καὶ ἀνασχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἢ ὅσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὥς ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστον ἄξιον τοὺς ἀνδρῶποι καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἀσχημόν αὐν φανερῶν τὸ τοῦ ΔΣώκρατος πράγμα; οἶεσθαί γε χρῆ. Ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρέως, ἤξεις δὲ εἰς Θεταλλαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλειοτήτι ἀτάξια καὶ ἀκολούθη, καὶ ἱσως δὲ ἢδεως σου ἀκοὐων ὃς γελοῖως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδιδότοκες, σκευήν τε τινα περιδέμενος, ἡ διφθέραν λαβόν ἡ ἀλλα οἷα δὴ εἰσάγαγεν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδόσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἂν ἑρ Σωμάρκου χρόνου τῆς βίω λαυτοῦ δυτος, ὡς τὲ εἰκός, ἐτύλμησας οὕτω γλυκρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβᾶς, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐρεῖ; ἵσως, ἀν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, ὁ Σώκρατες, τολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχώμενος δὴ βιώσει πρήματι ἀνδρῶποι καὶ δουλεύον—τὶ ποὺ ἡ εὐοχούμενος ἐν Θεταλλα, ὥσπερ ἑπὶ δειπνου ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θεταλλαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ 54 τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; Ἀλλα δὴ τῶν παιδὼν ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοῦς ἔκδρέψης καὶ
παιδεύσης; τι δει; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοῦ ἀγαγων ἤρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τούτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σου ζῶντος βέλτιον ἤρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σου αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοι ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον εὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται· εὰν δὲ εἰς Ἄιδου ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εὐπερ γέ τι ὀφέλος αὐτῶν ἐστι τῶν σοι φασικῶν ἐπιτηδείων εἰναι, οἷς ἔσχατι Β γε χρή.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΩΝ. Ὅ Σώκρατε, πειδώμενος ἡμῶν τοὺς σοις τροφεύσι μήτε παίδας περὶ πλεῖονοι ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μὴτε ἀλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἄιδου ἔλθων ἐχθρὸς ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσῃσαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἀρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνδὰδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἁμείνον εἰναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὀσίωτερον, οὐδὲ ἀλλο τῶν σῶν οὐδείς, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἁμείνον ἑσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικημένος ἀπει, ἐὰν ἀπῆς, οὐχ ὑπ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων· εὰν δὲ εξέλθης οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσῃς τοῖς καὶ ἀντικακουργήσῃς, τὸς σαυτὸς ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνήθης τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβάς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους, οὗς ἡκιστὰ ἐδει, σαυτὸν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τε σοι χαλεπανομένοι ζῶντε, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοί οἱ ἐν Ἄιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ἢποδέξονται, εἰδότες, ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σοῦ μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πεῖσῃ Κρήτην σοιεὶν ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἡ ἡμεῖς.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΩΝ. Ταῦτα, ὁ φίλε ἐταῦρε Κρήτων, εἴ
Ὁδὲ ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὅσπερ οἱ κορυφαϊῶτες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἀυτῇ ἡ ἡχή τούτων τῶν λόγων βούμβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἄλλα Ὁδὲ, διὰ γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐάν τι λέγης παρὰ ταῦτα, μάθην ἑρεῖς. ὅμως μέντοι εἰ τὶ οἰεὶ πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε. ΚΡ. Ἄλλῳ, ὥσπερ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ἔστω τὸις, ὥσπερ Κρίτες, καὶ πράττομεν ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα ὃ Σεῦς ὑφηγεῖται.
NOTES.
NOTES.

APOLOGIA SOCRATIS.

A. "Ων ... κατηγόρων. In what manner you have been 17 affected by my accusers, i.e. by their harangues, which had immediately preceded the defence of Socrates. Since περιοδάω denotes the receiving of an action, it is followed by ἑτέρα, as if it were a passive verb. C. 556; K. 249, 3; Mt. 496, 3.* So ὅτε αὐτῶν just below; and in like manner ab in Latin. The accusers or prosecutors of Socrates were three, Anytus, 18 B., Meletus, 19 B., and Lycon, 23 E.—ὅ άνδρες Ἀνθραῖοι. The trial of Socrates took place before the Helima, the most numerous and popular, and, at that time, by far the most important court at Athens, which consisting in all of 6,000 Athenian citizens (though they usually administered justice in sections of 500 each), and being also often thronged by spectators from the populace, its members might well be addressed by the same honorable title as the members of the popular assembly, ὅ άνδρες Ἀνθραῖοι, instead of the more distinctive title ὅ άνδρες δικασταί. The 6,000 Heliasts were a majority of the adult citizens of Athens. Cf. Wachsmuth's His. Ant. Sec. 47. On the constitution of this court see, besides Wachsmuth, Meier's Attic Process, Smith's Dict. of Antiqu., and

* C. stands for Crosby's Grammar; K. for Kühner's Middle Grammar; and Mt. for Matthias's, second edition.
Grote’s Hist. of Greece, vol. iv. chap. 31. On the compliment implied in the title Αστυναίος, cf. 29 D.—δ’ ὄν. But then, however that may be.—ὁδήγου, sc. δεῖν, literally, to want little = almost. C. 622; Mt. 355, obs. 2. Cf. ὁδήγου δεῖν, 22, Α.—ιμαναύτης ἐπελαζόμην, forgot myself; i.e. my true character.—οὐ ζησεοι εἰς ἔνειν limits οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι, and is designed to qualify, or apologize for, that otherwise absolute negation of all truth in his accusers: they have said, so to speak, nothing that is true at least. Cf. Stallbaum in loc., and Gorg. 450 B, also Woolsepy, ibid.—ἀφρών ἤς ἐπαύμασα, etc. One thing of theirs I most wondered at of the many falsehoods which they stated, viz. this. ἀφρών relates to persons and is the gen. of the possessor, while ὅν ὁλλῶν is the partitive gen. after the same word ἤν. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.

B. χρήν. Al. χρή. But the imperf. ind. implies the non-performance of the duty: you ought to have been on your guard, as you have not been. Mt. 505, obs.; K. 260, R. 3. —διακατηγὼν. The subj. follows the past tense of the ind. (χρήν) to denote that the danger of being deceived still continued: you ought to have been on your guard, and ought still to be, lest you be deceived. C. 602; K. 345, 5; Mt. 518, 1. —μὴ αἰτεχύωνθαν. μὴ rather than οὐ regularly accompanies the inf., because the inf. from its very nature, usually denotes a mere conception: that they should not be ashamed. C. 647; K. 318, 4; Mt. 608, 5.—ὅτι = because.—τριγόφω, by the fact, the actual trial.—μὴ δ’ ὁπωσοῦν. Observe the emphasis: not even in any way whatever.—ἀφρών, of them, or in them. ei μὴ ἀπα = nisi forte, unless perchance. Often used ironically: unless forsooth. K. 324, a.—λέγεων depends on δεῖν = powerful (literally, terrible) to speak.—ei . . . λέγοντων may be rendered, if they mean this.—οὐ κατὰ γρόνους, not after their example. He would acknowledge, that he was an orator according to that definition, but not according to their exempli-
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Figuration of it, since they, as he proceeds to say, had spoken little or nothing that was true.—ἡ τι η ὁδὸν = little or nothing, next to nothing. Mt. 487, 8.—πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 9: τὴν δικὴν ἀληθείαν εἰπών.—οὗ μίντω μὰ ΔΛ, κ.τ.λ. Note, however, by any means, Athenians, speeches rhetorically decked out as theirs were in choice words and phrases, nor carefully arranged in ornate periods, but you shall hear facts, stated without premeditation in the words which chance to occur to me.—διπέρ οἱ τοὺς, sc. λόγους ἤσον. In such comparative clauses, the noun may take the case of the preceding noun, or may be put in the nominative. λόγους is the object of ακούσας, which is expressed in the last instead of the first clause, in order to declare emphatically and affirmatively what they shall hear. According to Stallbaum, ἄρματα = singula nomina, βήματα = nomina una cum predicato. In the technical language of Greek grammar, ἄρματα = nouns, βήματα = verbs.

C. πιστεύω γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. in this connection implies, that just sentiments do not need rhetorical ornaments.—βῆμαν, as usual, is somewhat playful = methinks, to be sure.—τῇ δὲ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, est: mihi homini id statis—verbum abstractum loco verbi concreti postum. Stallb. Socrates was 70 years old at the time of his trial. Cf. D.—πλάστων takes the gender of μετακις, and usually implies more or less of fictitious and false ornament.—ἐλα αὕτα εἰσὶν, to come into your presence, your dicastery, or your assembly.—παρισμα. Ruhnken, as cited and approved by Stallbaum, says: παρίσμα = admissio, παρισμα = ad me admetti volo, i.e. precor, deprecor.—Καὶ ἐν ἄγορῷ, κ.τ.λ. Both in the agora at the counters, and elsewhere. Cf. Mat. 21, 12: τὰς τραπεζας τῶν κολλυβιστῶν.

D. ἢ χεί γὰρ οὕτως. For the fact is thus, sc. as follows. Then follows the explanatory clause, which, as usual, is without any connective (asyneton).—ἀναβάθηκα, sc. the βήμα, or stand of the accused. The accuser also had his βήμα or elevat-
ed stand in the court. — τὴς ἐν αὐτῷ λέγεσι. The language of judicial proceedings. For the gen. see Mt. 337; K. 274, 3; C. 395. — διαπερ αὐτῷ. This αὐτῷ belongs to the apodosis with Ἐννεγυγνάσκετε, where it is repeated (διαπερ αὐτῷ). It stands with διαπερ to intimate at the outset (by way of anticipation), that the example is a mere supposition, and then, after the intervening protasis with εἰ, it is repeated with the verb or some other important word of the apodosis. K. 261, 3. Cf. Gorg. 447, D, and other examples cited by Stallb. in loc. — τῷ δοτι — in fact. So very often, especially in Plato. — ξίνος, not an Athenian but still a Greek, who might be understood in the Athenian courts, but would speak in the dialect, tone, and manner of his native country. Compare Schleiermacher's note ad loc. — διαπερ. C. 446; K. 242, γ; Mt. 441, 2, α.

18. Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, and indeed now also. The construction is irregular. We should expect οὕτω καὶ νῦν, so also now, answering to διαπερ. — δικαίος, being just, i.e. a reasonable request. It is in apposition with τοῦτο, which is further explained by the infinitives ἰάν and ἀκούειν, the demonstrative preparing the way for the infinitives and calling attention to them. — Mt. 472, β; K. 304, 2. — ὡς ... δοκῶ, as it appears to me at least; literally, as I appear. The Greeks are fond of changing the impersonal construction into the personal. K. 307, R. 6 and 7; C. 551; Mt. 264, 5. — ἐσω τιν ... εἰ. It is difficult to see in this harmless parenthesis the un-Platonic self-praise which Ast finds in it. — αὐτὶ τοῦτο, this very thing, i.e. this single point, viz. whether I speak what is just or not. Here the demonstrative (enforced by the reflexive, of which combination Plato is particularly fond) prepares the way for a clause, as it does above for an infinitive. K. 304, 2; Mt. 472, c. — ἰπρή — the virtue, being in the predicate, omits the article in Greek, but requires it in English. — K. 244, R. 1; C. 487, 4; Mt. 264, 5. — δικαίος εἶμι instead of δικαίον ὑμῖν with the acc. and inf.;
another example of the personal for the impersonal construction. Cf. note on δοκῶ, above. It is treated as a species of attraction by Mt. 297, and C. 551.—τὰ πρῶτα μου ψευδή κατ-
ηγορήματα, those things which have been first falsely charged
upon me, or charged upon me being false. Cf. δικαύω, above.

B. πολλὰ ηῷη ἔτη explains πάλαι, which is altogether in-
definite: for some time, many years now.—τοῖς ἄμφι Ἀντων.
Anytus and his associates, sc. Meletus and Lycon. Anytus is
named, as being the most popular and at the same time the
most hostile of the three prosecutors of Socrates. He was a
man of large fortune but loose principles. He gained the favor
of the people as a leader of the exiles at Phyle in the time of
the Thirty Tyrants, and having taken offence at Socrates partly
on personal and partly on professional grounds (cf. 23, E), in-
duced Meletus and Lycon to join with him in a prosecution.
According to Diogenes Laertius (2, 38, 39), the Athenians re-
pented of their condemnation of Socrates and put Meletus to
death, and sent Anytus and Lycon into banishment. Grote
disbelieves and denies this. His. of Gr. Vol. 8, ch. 68. Cf.
Stallb. and Smith's Dict. of Biog. and Mythol., Anytus.—οмедицин
... παραλαμβάνοντες, who taking the mass of you from your
boyhood, sc. as it were, under their instruction.—ὦς ήττι,
κ.τ.λ., saying, there is one Socrates, etc. The introductory
particle appropriate to an indirect quotation is here, and often
in Greek, followed by a direct quotation, and must be omitted
in English. C. 609; K. 329, R. 3.—σοφός ἀνὴρ, a philoso-
pher. Compare the Latin sapiens. σοφός, as well as σοφιστής
and φιλόσοφος, was more or less a term of reproach with the
Eng. ed.—τὰ τε μετίωρα φρονιστῆς. φρονιστῆς governs
the acc. as retaining the active force of φρονιστῆν. Mt. 422;
C. 424.—τῶν ἣττω ... ποιῶν, making the weaker the stronger
argument, or, as it is often expressed, making the worse appear
the better reason. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8: docere quemadmodum caussa inferior dicendo fieri superior possit. Schleiermacher renders, making wrong right, and cites Aristotle as saying (Rhet. 2, 24) that it was done by bringing up against the truth, in some one view perhaps improbable, an opposite probability or apparent truth. The Sophists were open to this charge, as the physical philosophers were to that of inquiring into everything in the heavens above and in the earth beneath; and the art of the enemies of Socrates consisted in arraying against him the prejudices which the public mind already cherished, with greater or less reason, against them—in short, in confounding him with them, though he was, in fact, diametrically opposed to them both in faith and in philosophy. Cf. below, 23, D: τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφῶν πρόχερα ταύτα λέγουσιν.

Ο. Κατακεδάσαντες denotes the manner or means of their power and formidableness; hence it is without the article.—οὐδὲ ἰσεόως νομίζειν, do not even believe in the existence of the gods. This, it is well known, was one point in the indictment against Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1; also below, 24 B. The physical philosophers of the age afforded a plausible, not to say just, occasion for this charge, since they, for the most part, dispensed with all efficient causes, and either failed to recognize the Deity, or else confounded him with his works. The systems, if not the men, were chargeable with atheism or pantheism. Cicero ascribes to Anaxagoras the first distinct recognition of the divine existence and agency, as an intelligent cause, in the universe.—ἐπετα... ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ = then... still further also; or in the second place... in the third place also.—ταύτα τῇ ἱλικίᾳ. Explained by ἵστατε ὅταν, κ.τ.λ.—ἀν... ἵστατε. Observe the peculiar force of the past tense of the ind. with ἀν: you would have believed, so. had it been possible, as it was not. Ο. 603 and 604; K. 339, r. 6, cf. 340
NOTES.

1. — ἰρήνην κατηγοροῦντες, accusing me in my absence. The form of expression (ἰρήνη, sc. δικαίωσις) is derived from a suit at law, in which one of the parties does not appear.—ἀνεχωρέως = altogether. Previous to Forster's, the editions connected ἀνεχωρέω with μειράκια. But as Schleiermacher well says, ἀνεχωρέω almost always connects itself with what follows, and it would not properly attach to μειράκια, since μειράκια, lads, are older than ραίδες, small boys.—εἰ... τυχώμεν ἂν implies no uncertainty: εἰ = in case, or when. The allusion is particularly to Aristophanes, who is named below, 19, 0; though Cratinus, Amphisias, Eupolis, and other comic poets, ridiculed Socrates. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

D. φανόμενοι διαβολή χρώμενοι = φανονοῦντες καὶ διαβολοῦντες, in the spirit of envy and calumny.—οἶ δὲ introduces another class of persuaders, as if οἶ μὲν had preceded with φανόμενοι... χρώμενοι, the one being the envious and calumnious, the other those who were really persuaded in their own minds of the guilt of Socrates.—ἀπορώσατο, most inaccessible (ἀ and πόσος), most difficult to approach and convince. Cf. Lydus, 223, B: ἀποροῦσα προσφέρεσθαι.—ἀναμέλοιτα... ἐναντιοὶ, to make... come up hither, i.e. summon him to appear in court. Observe the force of the middle voice: for my benefit, cf. ἰζελίσκαι, 19, A.—ἀπόν is partitive genitive = any of them.—ἀσπερ... ἀποκρομοῖν, to fight with shadows, as it were, in defending myself, and also to confuse while no one replies. The participle and the infinitive in each part form a complex idea, and then the two parts or ideas are connected together by τε καί. Thus is the apparent confusion of participles and infinitives explained by Fischer. See his note ad loc.

E. Ἀξιώσατε = estimize. So rendered by Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, &c.—εἰκίνου, those, sc. earlier and more remote accusers. εἰκίνος refers to the more remote idea, though, as in this instance, it be to the latter word or clause.
19 A. Elev. Well, be it so. Schleiermacher: ωολη. It marks the establishment and completion of what goes before and the transition to another topic.—ἐξελίσσαι. Cf. note on ἀνασκήσασαι, 18, D.—τὴν διαβολὴν . . . χρόνοι. The calumny (misconception produced by calumny) which you have entertained a long time, this to eradicate in so short a time.—νοῦν οὖν γενίσσαν, sc. the eradication of false impressions from the minds of his judges. It is still further explained by καὶ πλιῶν . . . ἀπολογούμενον, and to accomplish something by my defence. On πλιῶν τι ποιεῖν = proficere aliquid, to get on or forward with a thing, to gain something by it, see Lexicon.—ελ τι ἐμεῖνον, κ.τ.λ. The sequel shows, that he not only doubted whether it was best for him to be acquitted, but that he did not desire to live by any such means as were likely to influence his judges to acquit him. He makes his defence rather as a matter of form in obedience to the laws, than with the expectation or desire of success.—Ἀνανέωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Let us take up anew, from the beginning. He has adverted to the charge in general terms before (18, B); but here he would resume its examination from the first, as if he had not before mentioned it.—ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ, the false opinion of me. Cf. εἰνοικα τῇ σῇ, good will to you, Gorg. 486, A; C. 503; K. 302, R. 2; Mt. 466, 2.—με ἱγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. For the force of the middle voice, see C. 559, d; K. 250, R. 2; Mt. 492, c. For the double acc. (of the cognate signification γραφήν, and the direct object με), see C. 435; K. 280, 1. Render: has preferred against me this indictment. γραφή is a public indictment for a criminal offence; δίκη is applicable either to public or private causes, but when used in contradistinction to γραφή, it denotes a private suit.

B. ὄσπερ οὖν, κ.τ.λ. Therefore just as it is customary to read the bill of indictment presented by formal accusers, so must we read theirs. ἀναμνοσία is primarily the oath of a
party at saw, and then the bill or form of indictment.—περι-
εργάζεται, is over-busy, excessively curious.

C. τουαίτη τίς, something like this. He does not profess
to give it exactly. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1.—ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφά-
νου καμφίδι. The Clouds, perhaps the master-piece of Aris-
tophanes, in which he introduces Socrates, as the principal
character, sitting in a basket in the air (as the gods were rep-
resented in the machinery of the Attic drama), and uttering
declamations as windy as his position. Very different expla-
nations are given of the motives which induced the poet to treat
the moral philosopher with such palpable injustice. Some
have supposed that he was influenced by personal hostility,
and further instigated and suborned by the enemies of Socra-
tes. But this supposition does not accord either with the
comparatively respectful tone in which Aristophanes elsewhere
alludes to Socrates (cf. Birds, 1280, 1554; Frogs, 1487), or
with the mild and even complimentary terms in which Plato
speaks of Aristophanes here and elsewhere. If Plato re-
garded Aristophanes as a bitter personal enemy of Socrates, or
as having occasioned his master's death, he never would have
introduced the poet and the philosopher conversing on such
friendly terms as in the Symposium, still less furnished for the
poet's tomb such an epitaph as the following: "Jupiter, wish-
ing to find an asylum for all the graces, found the soul of
Aristophanes." Others have thought that Aristophanes really
mistook the true character of Socrates, confounded his teach-
ings with those of the Sophists, whom he opposed, and so in
sober earnest visited upon his head the storm of indignation
which was merited by the class, and by him as its leader and
ablest representative. But, to say nothing of the want of
discernment which is thus imputed to Aristophanes, the mat-
ter was not viewed in so serious a light either by Plato (as
the considerations just mentioned suffice to show), or by Soc-
rates, who was present when the piece was performed, and stood forth before the audience that he might be recognized as “a host who furnished a large company an agreeable entertainment.” There was enough of general resemblance between him and them in their talkative habits, the subjects on which they conversed, and the manner in which they reasoned (especially as he often met the Sophists on their own ground, and refuted them with their own weapons), to give plausibility to the representation of him as an arch-sophist. Doubtless also the ultra conservative poet viewed the speculating and revolutionizing spirit of the Socratic philosophy with not a little of the same fear and aversion with which he regarded the demoralizing instructions of the Sophists. Moreover, Socrates stood in the most friendly relations to Alcibiades and Euripides, both of whom, as arch-innovators though in different spheres, were subjects of unsparing ridicule and reproach in the comedies of Aristophanes. So much of objective reality we may suppose lay at the basis of the representation which is made of Socrates in the Clouds. The rest is comic exaggeration and extravagance got up purposely, but not maliciously, for the amusement of the πολυγέλου Ἀριστοφάνου. And surely never was comedian furnished with a more fruitful theme for inextinguishable laughter than the grotesque person, outlandish dress, and singular gait of Socrates, with which friend and foe, Athenian and stranger, all had become familiar as he stood and stared or started and ran through the streets, or fascinated some and bored and vexed others, in the shops and the market-places. The intent of the piece and its author may have been misunderstood by some, and it may have had some effect in preparing the way for the prosecution, which it suggests. But it is referred to in the Apology as an illustration of popular prejudices of long standing, rather than as a cause of the present indictment. And the utter failure of the Clouds to
make any serious impression on the popular mind against Socrates is seen, not only in its want of success at the time (for it gained no favor and won no prize), but also in the fact that a period of twenty-four years intervened between its exhibition and the condemnation of the Moral Philosopher. Cf. Stalh. ad loc.; Smith's Dict. of Biog.—περιφερόμενον, sc. in a basket (κρεμάστρα), cf. the Clouds, 225 seq. —ἀεροβατέων. When asked what he is doing, Socrates replies in the play: ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονό τῶν ἠλιον. Cf. the Clouds, ibid. —ἐν . . . περὶ ἑπαίν. Observe the anastrophe and the position of περὶ, as in English: which I know nothing about.—λέγω, sc. the foregoing = I say this. ἀνιμάζω governs ἐπιστήμην. The Socratic irony is manifest in this clause, and in the following, which is parenthetical: let me not, by any means, be prosecuted by Meletus on so weighty a charge! sc. as undervaluing this kind of knowledge.—ἀλλὰ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. But I must speak, for, &c.

D. αὐτοὺς ἵμαν τῶν πολλῶν. The greater part of yourselves.—ἐπὶ τούτων, Al. τούτων. The Greeks very often employ the plural of the demonstrative in reference to a foregoing clause or single idea, where we should use the singular. Render: from this. Cf. K. 241, R. 3; Mt. 472, 5.—περὶ ἰμοῦ is placed before ἃ for emphasis = which the many say about me. —τούτων, the charges in the foregoing context—inquiring into things above, making the worse the better reason, &c.—οὐδὲ γεῖ, κ.τ.λ. We should expect οὕτω answering to the οὕτω in the previous clause, but οὐδὲ γε is more emphatic and therefore more appropriate to introduce a new topic of special importance. It is made still more emphatic by being repeated before τούτῳ ἀληθείᾳ. —χρήματα πράττομαι. This charge also confounded Socrates with the Sophists, who amassed large sums of money for tuition. It is denied also by Xenophon, Mem. 1, 2, 60.
E. ἐμεῖναι τοῖς ἕνεκες, κ.τ.λ. The Attics use ἐμεῖναι often like γὰρ = for, and sometimes, like quum in Latin, it may be well rendered although. Socrates treats this charge, just as he did the other, ironically, representing it as a very beautiful and honorable thing, if one were only wise and capable of doing it; and yet he feels constrained to deny it simply because it is not true.—Γοργυλας τοῦ Λεοντίνος, κ.τ.λ. He enumerates several of the most popular Sophists and rhetoricians who had enriched themselves by teaching the sons of the wealthy at Athens. They were all foreigners. For Gorgias of Leontini, a city of Sicily, cf. Diog. Laer. 9, 52; Cic. de Orat. 1, 22; Brut. 8; Plat. Gorg., Hip., and Protag. For Prodicus of Ceos, one of the Cyclades Islands, cf. Cic. Brut. 8; Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 21 seqq.; Plat., Protag. and Cratyl. For Hippias of Elis, a city of the Peloponnesus, cf. Cic. de Orat. 32, Brut. 8; Plat. Hip. and Minos. See also Smith’s Dict. Biog. and Mythol., and Grote’s His. Gr. vol. 8, chap. 67. Grote defends the Sophists as a class with great learning and eloquence. Doubtless they have been condemned too much in the gross—with too indiscriminate severity. But though there were doubtless wise and good men among them, it can hardly be doubted that, for the most part, their influence was hostile to morals and religion, and they deserved the censure which Plato everywhere attaches to them.—τούς νίους would regularly be the object of πεῖσκει, depending on εἷς τίσιν, instead of which, however, by a singular anacoluthon, we have πεῖσκεις. It should be observed, that Plato abounds in such irregular constructions and unexpected changes, doubtless to keep up the appearance of a colloquial style appropriate to the dialogue, and which is no less appropriate to the plain talk which Socrates promises to hold with his judges in this Apology.—πολίτῶν is partitive genitive after ὃ: who have the opportunity to associate gratuitously with whomsoever they please of their fellow-citizens.
προσεδίνασ: and besides (paying them money) to feel under obligation to them.

A. ἐνεῖ = γὰρ, for, cf. note, 19, E. Schlegelma cher renders it by the German ja.—δὲ ... ἐπὶδημοῦρα, of whose sojourning here I lately became aware. The reference is to Evenus, the poet and Sophist, as appears below, B. He was a native of the island Paros. He is mentioned in the Phædo, 60, D, and Phædrus, 267, A. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, who informed Socrates of Evenus's stay in the city, was proverbially rich (ὁ πλούσιος, Plutarch), and his lavish expenditure upon the Sophists is often referred to. Protag. 314, B, C; Xen. Symp. 1, 5; Aristoph., Birds, 285. See also Boeck's Pub. Econ. Athens, vol. 2, p. 242.

B. ἁρμην. Acc. of specification: in the virtue (or excellence) becoming them. So, in a similar illustration, Xenophon makes Socrates use the word δίκαιος of a horse and an ox, that is obedient to his proper law and trained for his appropriate work. Socrates used such illustrations, drawn from the lower animals and the common affairs of life, till they were threadbare and almost offensive, at least to those who could not but feel their force as directed against themselves. The "Great Teacher" abounded in this method of instruction.—ἡ δ’ ὁ δὲ ὀτρος. And this (overseer) would have been, etc. The past tense of the indicative with ἂν is appropriate to a conclusion preceded by a supposition contrary to fact. C. 603; K. 329, 6; Mt. 508, b.—τῆς ἀνδρώπινης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, that which is appropriate to man and also to the state.—πίνει μὲν ὡν = some §83. This was a small sum in comparison with the tuition fees which Protagoras, Gorgias, and some others exacted, who received 100 minae. With the Greek μνα compare the Latin mina and our word money.—ἰμπελῶς, according to Stallbaum, has a double application to the style of teaching and to the price of tuition = so properly (literally, in tune),
so excellently in both respects. He says, there is great urbani-
ty in the expression. If Socrates had said, οὐτος εὐρεθέως, he
would have too clearly ridiculed Evenus and so Callias. He
used therefore a word, by which, while he seemed to praise
Evenus, he yet severely censured both his levity and the ava-
rice of the other Sophists. Forster renders it by concinne,
Ast, commode, Schleiermacher, vortrefflich, Cousin, a bon
marché. It is used of a moderate or reasonable price in the
Laws, 776, B, 760, A.

C. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. The ellipsis is obvious: but I can-
not thus pride myself, for etc. γὰρ in such conjection may
be rendered really, certainly: but I really do not know. Cf.
K. 324, R. 1; C. 661, 2.—ιπολάβοι. Compare our take up.
—τὸ σον τὶ ἐστι πρᾶγμα, your business, what is it? The em-
phasis is on your: you deny any acquaintance with the pro-
fession of the naturalist who inquires into the secrets of the
universe, or of the Sophist who teaches, and is well paid for
teaching, the art of persuasion; what then, Socrates, is your
business, profession, or pursuit?—οὐδεὶς περιττότερον, nothing
more or other, nihil aliud. Cousin: rien de plus ou autre-
ment. Schleiermacher: nichts besonders. Stallbaum renders:
nihil curiosius.—ἀείων, then, in that case, I suppose so much
talk and discussion would not have arisen, as has arisen. γεγο-
νευ stands where ἂν εἰγήνο το would regularly have been used, to
denote that this bruit has actually arisen. The next clause,
ἐλ μὴ τε ἔπαρτες, κ.τ.λ., is a repetition of the condition already
expressed in the first clause, σοῦ γς οὐδὲν . . . πρᾶγματευομένον,
for the sake of greater clearness and emphasis. The style is
manifestly colloquial.

D. τι πορ', quid tandem. In questions, pori, like tandem,
indicates surprise, wonder, impatience, or some other lively
emotion. It is here retained in the indirect question, just as it
would have been used in the direct, as expressive of the won-
der of the inquirer.—τὸ τε δούμα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, both the name, sc. of a wise man, and the calumny connected with it.
—οὐ μένων ἰστε, κ.τ.λ. Be assured, however, I will tell you the whole truth. Observe the omission of ὅστι. So in Crit. 54, D, ἀλλὰ ἰστε, ἄσω γε, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere after οὐ ἰστε.—ἀλλ’ ἦ. It has been usual in this grammar to explain this combination of particles (which occurs after a preceding negative or after a question implying a negative), as equivalent to ἄλλα ἦ, with the accent changed (ἄλλα ἦ) and then lost (ἄλλ’ ἦ). Cf. C. 671, 2; K. 322, R. 10. But no sufficient reason is given for the change of the accent. Besides it is often preceded by ἄλλα, cf. infra, 34, B: τίνα ἄλλουν ἔχουσι λόγον . . . ἄλλ’ ἦ, κ.τ.λ. Perhaps it is better to adopt the explanation of Stallbaum, Phæd. 81, B, viz., that it is a combination of two different constructions into one. It being allowable to say either οὐκ ἄλλα ἄλλα, or οὐκ ἄλλo ἄλλo ἦ; these two constructions are combined in this, οὐκ ἄλλα ἄλλ’ ἦ.—ποιαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην, pray what sort of wisdom this. The clause takes the construction of σοφίαν in the preceding (acc. after διὰ). The omission of the preposition is especially frequent in the questions and answers of the dialogue, cf. C. 651, E; K. 300, C.—ἡANNEL ἰστιν ἰσως, κ.τ.λ. Just that, perhaps, which is, etc.—τὸ δέντι, in reality. ταύτην, in this, acc. of specification. So σοφίαν in the next clause.

E. ἦ καὶ ἄνθρωπον, than pertains to man, quam pro homine, cf. Mt. 449.—ἡ oὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω, or else I know not what to call it—certainly it is not human wisdom—it is not any such wisdom as I possess. The irony of the passage is evident.
—ἐνὶ διαβολῇ τῇ έυμῆ, for the sake of calumniating me. For this sense of ἐνι, cf. K. 296, π. c.; Mt. 585. For τῇ έυμῆ, instead of the objective gen., έυμοι, cf. note, 19, Α.—μὴ ζορμῆσομεν. Do not raise a tumult against me, or as a speaker would say to a modern assembly, do not kiss me = ne ostrepatis. The
reader will remember the popular constitution of the court, cf. note, 17, A. For the aor. subj. in prohibitions with μὴ and its compounds, cf. C. 598; K. 259, 5; Mt. 511, 3.—μηδὲ ἂν, not even if.—ἀξιόχρεων, responsible, primarily in regard to money, secondarily in regard to testimony. Cf. 38, B.—μέγα λέγειν, properly denotes boasting, as μέγα φρονεῖν does pride. In the later Greek, it meant to say something marvelous. But it was the seeming pride and arrogance of what he said, which, he feared, would give offence, and which did actually give offence to the judges. Cf. Xen. Apol. Soc. as cited below, 21, A; also Xen. Apol. Soc. 1, where he speaks of the μεγάλεγωρία, which all the Apologies ascribe to Socrates in his defence.—τὴν γὰρ ἐμήν, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οίκα, for of my wisdom, whether now I have any, and of what sort it is, &c.

By a somewhat peculiar attraction, σοφία is drawn from the principal into the subordinate clause.

21 A. ποῦ = I suppose.—ἐμὸς ἐναῖρος. Hence often attacked by Aristophanes in the Clouds and elsewhere.—εὐνέφυγε . . . κατῆλθε, he went with you in your recent exile and with you returned. The allusion is to the exile of the principal men of the Athenian democracy under the Thirty Tyrants, which having taken place quite recently, is called τὴν φυγήν ταῖτην. This allusion was calculated to recommend Chaerephon to popular favor. Words compounded with κατά (κατεκάθισα, κατέρχομαι, &c.) often denote a return home to one’s country, town, harbor, as words compounded with ἀνά signify the departure from such a resting place. Away from home is ὕπ, return is down.—ἐσ τοιχοδός. Cf. Aristoph. Clouds, 104, 501, seq., Birds, 1570; Xen. Mem. 2, 3; Plat. Gorg., Charm., &c.—καὶ, ἐπερ λέγειν, μὴ σαυροβεῖναι, and, I repeat it, do not be raising a tumult. It will be observed, that the aor. subj. is used in the first request (μὴ σαυροβεῖναι above), but in the repetition the pres. imp. The former is a general request
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not to do it at all; the latter is more definite, and means: don't be doing it, as you are doing and will be very liable to do while I proceed, especially with this to you most surprising and perhaps offensive part of my narrative. C. 570, seq.; K. 257, 1; Mt. 501. The Apology, which bears the name of Xenophon, declares expressly, that this part of Socrates' Defence did call forth repeated expressions of displeasure from the judges. Xen. Apol. Soc. 15.—ἡπετο γὰρ δή. The Greeks use the particles, γὰρ, δή, οὖν, in resuming a sentence after a parenthesis, where we use I say. Mt. 615, 616.—ἀνέλεν, responded, literally, took up, sc. her response. This famous response is worded differently in different authorities. Cf. Xen. Apol. Socr. 14; Diog. Laert. 2, 37; Schol. Aristoph. Clouds, 144.—δ άκολουθος, sc. Chærecreates, Xen. Mem. ii. 3.

—οὐσοι . . . ἱκίνως. Cf. note, 18, E.

B. τί πορε, what in the world. Cf. note, 20, D.—ξύνοια ἐμαυτῷ σοφός ὦν. After ξύνοια, συγγυνώσκω, &c., the particle expresses that of which one is conscious, and may either agree with the subject of the verb in the nom. or with the reflexive which follows the verb and refers to the same person, in the dative. Here we have the former construction; below, 22, D, we have the other: ἐμαυτῷ ξύνηδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένω. C. 614, 615; K. 310, R. 2; Mt. 548, 2. μέγα and συμβόλον are adverbial accusatives. C. 440, 441; K. 278, R. 1; Mt. 425, 1.

—τί οὖν πορε λέγει, what in the world then, I say, does he mean? οὖν is resumptive like γὰρ, above, 21, A; and λέγει is best rendered, as it often is, by the English mean. Below the same form of expression follows ἦπαρον, instead of the oratio obliqua, δ τί . . . λέγοι. C. 610; 345, 5; Mt. 529, 5.—ἐπεφέρα . . . ἑρωπόμην, but at length, with much labor, I betook myself to an examination of it (sc. the oracle or the meaning of the god, τί πορε λέγει) somewhat as follows. ταύτωσι usually refers to the foregoing, τουósde to the following (cf. note, 37, A)
but not always. C. 513, 516. Cf. τοιαύτη τοις, 19, C, and note, ibid.—ὁλοκληρωμένος stands without a connective, because this clause is in opposition as it were with the preceding, being a fuller and more exact statement of the examination there mentioned. Cf. 17, D, and note, ibid. The reader will observe that all such clauses or sentences are asyndetic; while, with the exception of such, each clause and sentence of connected discourse in Greek begins with some connective particle, δέ, καὶ, γάρ, οὖν, &c.

C. ὡς . . . Ἀγαθός, supposing, that there, if anywhere, I should confute, etc. C. 640; K. 312, 6; Mt. 568.—ὅτι οὐκροή. Cf. note on ὡς ἔστη, 18, B.—οὖν δὲ ἦτε ἐφησαία, but you (sc. the oracle) said I (sc. was wiser).—πρὸς ὑμ. . . ἔκατος, in looking to whom I met with such an experience.—καὶ διάλειψαμενος. Καὶ connects διάλειψαμενος to διασκορέα (the intervening clause being parenthetical), and the participle belonging to the principal subject of the discourse (Socrates) is in the nominative, though, to agree with what follows, it should be in the dative with μοι. It is a species of anacoluthon. C. 344; Mt. 311.

D. ἐνεί̔πον is both temporal and causal —from that time and for that reason.—πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν . . . Ἐλεγξόμην, I reasoned with myself.—τοῦτον μὲν τού ἄνθρωπον. The μὲν implies, that something else may be said or found to be true in reference to some other man. It has no δὲ or other particle correlative to it, but prepares the mind for the further examinations which follow. The μὲν after καθωσπεσι is correlative to ἄλλο, after which follows again the more usual correlative ὁτος μὲν . . . ἔγω δὲ. After δισερ ὁν ὁδια, ὁτος is understood.—οὖν denotes not an inference but a correspondence with what he has before said of the ignorance of himself and others: while I, just as in fact, and as I have already said, I do not know, so I do not even suppose that I know.—συμμετείχισεν δὲ
notes the *degree,* and *ἀυτῷ* the *respect* in which he is wiser. C. 418, 3, 419; K. 285, 3; Mt. 400, 6, 8. The *tyrō* will observe the difference between *μη* and *οὖδέ,* the contingent and the absolute negative, well illustrated in the clause *δὲ μη* ὀλίγα, κ.τ.λ.: *what I chance not to know, I do not even suppose that I know.*

E. *δὲ* ἀνηχανόμην. These words connect with each of the preceding participles, but in the different relations of the *fact* and the *cause*—with αλογηνόμενος, *δὲ* would strictly require to be rendered *that;* with λυποῦμενος and δεδομένη, *because.*

—τὸ τοῦ Ἑσοῦ. C. 477; Mt. 284.—ἱερὸν ὁμείρον, ἱεροποιήσατε. Socrates here passes suddenly from the indirect to the direct narration, and gives us the *very language* of his heart at the *time* when he made this examination: *I must go then* (thought I), *in investigating the oracle what it means, to all,* etc. *ἱεροποιήσατε* agrees with *μείρα* implied as the dative of the agent after *ἱερόν.* For ἁρπαγμὸν, put as the object of *ἱεροποιήσατε* instead of the subject of *λέγει,* see C. 425, 4.

A. *νὴ τὸν κύνα.* A very common oath in the mouth of 22 Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 460, B; 482, B, and Prof. Woolsey’s notes, ibid. In the last cited passage, Socrates adds: *τὸν Ἀλυστριῶν Σεόν,* which perhaps shows that the oath was of Egyptian origin. See Mitchell’s note, D, App. to Aristoph. Wasps. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, Cousin, &c., refers the origin of such oaths to Rhadamanthus, who is said, in order to avoid swearing always by the gods, to have invented several other formulae as substitutes, such as by the dog, by the oak, by the goose, &c. In Xenophon, as well as Plato, Socrates is represented as swearing (somewhat singularly) by Juno, infra, 24, E; Gorg. 449, D; Hip. Maj. 291, 9; Xen. Mem. 1.5, 5, 11.10, 9. iv. 2, 9, et al.—οἵ μὲν μάλιστα, κ.τ.λ. An explanatory clause, hence without a connective. Cf. notes, 17, D; 21, B.—*ἀλίου δεῖν.* Cf. note 17, A.—*τοῦ πλαίστου* is governed by
The reader will observe the juxtaposition of the two contrasted words, φαυλότεροι and ἐπικείστεροι.—πλάνη, wandering, sc. to visit and examine the reputed wise men.—ποιοῖνεσος agrees with μὲν implied in ἔμην.—πάνως alludes to labors like those of Hercules.—ἀν ... γίνοντα: that after all the oracle might in the end prove irrefutable, i.e. in addition to all his labors, also (καὶ) to bring about a result the opposite of what he set out to accomplish, which was to show that the oracle must be false. Such seems to be the true interpretation of this much disputed passage. Cf. Fischer’s Defence of Platonic Passages against the Amendments of Stephens; also the notes of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum ad loc.

B. ὡς ... καταληψάμενος. Cf. note 21, C. ἐν ἄνωφορῳ καταληψάμενος contains an allusion to the detection of a criminal in the very act.—μάλιστα πεπαγματευόμενος: to have been most carefully composed.—διερώτων ἄν. The imperfect with ἄν denotes repetition according to the circumstances in each case: I would ask them in each instance, what they meant to say. C. 594; K. 260, B; Mt. 599, a. So below, ἄν βιλτιον ἔλεγον: almost all who were present would speak better (i.e. give a better account) than they (the poets) of the poems which they themselves had composed. Wolf renders οἱ τρόποις, qui hic adsum, sc. the judges of Socrates! and Smith, with a total misapprehension of Stallbaum, whom he professes to translate, renders ἄν βιλτιον ἔλεγον, used to think best of those poems which they themselves had composed!

C. οὐ σοφία, κ.τ.λ. So in Ion 533, E, Socrates says, that poets and musicians, like prophets and soothsayers, compose their productions, not by art, but by an inspiration which displaces reason. The fundamental difference between real science or art, as based on established rules and understood reasons, and mere unintelligent knack, or unconscious instinct or inspira-
tion, is an idea, on which Socrates often and earnestly insists. Cf. Gorgias pass. ; Grote's His. Gr. vol. viii. p. 579, Eng. ed. — oλομένων. C. 633; K. 310; Mt. 549, 4.—εἶναι ἀναφόρων. C. 627, a; K. 307, 5; Mt. 536.—δι᾽, like its antecedent τᾶλα, is acc. of specification, and σοφοτάτου is understood in the predicate after ἦσαν: in which they were not, sc. the wisest.—τῷ αὐτῷ οἱμῆνον περιγγεγομένης: supposing that I surpassed them in the same respect in which I surpassed also the politicians. Cf. 21, D.

D. ταλεύτων, lastly. C. 632; 312, R. 3; Mt. 557.— ἰμανυφ... ἐνταμαίνω. Cf. note, 21, B.—ὡς ἔτοις εἰσείν. Cf. note, 17, A.—τοὺς: in respect to this. C. 395; K. 273, R. 20; Mt. 336.—δημοσιογοι is subject of ἐπολει. Besides its emphatic position, it is also made emphatic by καί, which is likewise repeated before the other subject of comparison of τοιούτων, where it is superfluous in English, though very often so used in Greek. See above, C: καὶ ἐντεῦθεν... διηκόρο καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.—τᾶλα τὰ μέγιστα, e. g. the administration of the government, to which, as understood by Forster, Stallbaum, and others, Socrates particularly refers.—ἄνεροτάν, to ask again, as in the case of the poets and the politicians.—ἐπὶ τὸν χρήσμον: nomine oraculi. Stallb.

E. διδασκαλία, in the sense of prefer, is very frequent in Plato. Cf. Gorg. 468, E; 471, C, et passim.—ἀμφότερα is neuter, though it refers to the feminine nouns σοφίαν and ἀμαθίαν = both the things. C. 450; K. 241, 2; Mt. 437.

A. σοφὸς εἶναι explains δύομα τοῦρο = called this name, sc. 28 to be wise. To be is superfluous in English, but εἶναι often follows verbs of calling. C. 434, N; K. 269, R. 1; 420, 1. σοφὸς is nom. instead of acc. because in the mind of the speaker, himself is the main subject of the sentence, as having become odious—as if he had said ἀπελευθηρέων γένος instead of ἀπελευθεριάσας μοι γέγονας. On the popular prejudice against this name, see note 18, B, and Grote as there cited.—ἀν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω:
in which I may chance to confute another, or in whatever I may confute another. The ἄν makes the expression indefinite and general, and may be expressed either in connection with the relative (whatever), which it usually follows, and with which it often combines, or in connection with the verb (may chance). Cf. C. 606; K. 260, c; Mt. 527.—τὸ δὲ: but as to the matter of fact. It is strengthened by τὸ ὅτι: in reality. The article with δὲ indicates that which is so opposed to something else, that it ought to be regarded as true. So Ast ad Pol. 363, and approved by Stallbaum. The fuller formula, τὸ δὲ ἁμαρτίας, is often used in the same way. See examples in Stallbaum.—ἄλλοι τινὲς ... καὶ οὐδέν: a little and indeed nothing. So often μικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν = little or nothing. So atque in Latin sometimes adds a clause, which corrects, and at the same time increases the force of, the foregoing. For the force of τινὲς, cf. if τι οὐ οὐδέν, 17, B, and note ibid.—καὶ φαινεῖται ... ἡκράτη: and he seems to say this (sc. that he is wise) not of Socrates. Instead of τοῦτο οὖ, most of the early editions have τούτου. For two acc. after a verb of saying, cf. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.—προσκεκρήσατο: made use of my name besides, i. e. incidentally, for another purpose.

B. ἄκουσε ἄν εἶπον: as if he would say. There is an ellipsis of ποιήσεως or some such verb, constituting an implied apodosis, with which the ἄν belongs. Cf. note, 17, D: ἄκουσε ἄν ἂν.——καὶ τῶν σεόν: according to the god, i. e. in accordance with his oracle, or out of regard to his authority. So in Rom. viii. 27, and elsewhere in the New Testament.—καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ξίνων, κ.τ.λ.: both of the citizens and of the foreigners if I suppose any to be wise. Partitive gen. after τινὲς.——τοῦ τῶν τῆς πόλεως. Socrates apologizes elsewhere in Plato (e. g. below, 31, 32) and in Xenophon (e. g. Mem. i. 6, 15) for not participating in the affairs of the state. His was a higher mission, viz., to educate the individual citizens.—πε-
νίκα μυρία: the greatest poverty. πενία = paupertas, poverty; πτωχεία = egestas, destitution. The former is the usual condition of the poorer and laboring classes; the latter, of mendicants. As to the pecuniary circumstances of Socrates, cf. Xen. Ο Econ. 2, 3, where it appears he was commonly called πενία, and where it is said his house and all his property were worth five minae; cf. also 38, B.

C. οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων. This is no unimportant circumstance to show how the prejudices and passions of the multitude were awakened against him.—είτα instead of καὶ εἰτά, as we often use then for and then between two verbs.

D. δὲ λ' όιχ αὐτοῖς, but not with themselves, as they might well be angry with themselves for their own ignorance, instead of being angry with him who exposed it. Al. αὐτοῖς, sc. the young men, but this would require ἐκεῖνος.—τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων, κ.τ.λ. Cf. notes, 18, B.—ὅτι τὰ μετέώρα, κ.τ.λ., sc. διαφείρει τοὺς νέους διδάσκαλους; that he corrupts the young by teaching things in heaven and things under the earth, and not to believe in the gods, &c.

E. Μίλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν. Al. Μίλητος. This man is ridiculed by Aristophanes as well as Plato for his person, his character, and his bad tragic poetry. We learn from the Euthyphron (2, B, C), that his share in the prosecution of Socrates was to bring the indictment before the Archon Basileus, at which time he is described as still young and obscure, but vain and conceited. Besides his professional resentment in common with his brother poets, he had a personal grudge against Socrates for having refused to participate in, and severely animadverted upon, the arrest and "rendition" of Leon of Salamis by Meletus and three others at the command of the Thirty Tyrants. Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 3; Andoc. De Myster.—"Αννος ὑπὲρ τῶν δημούργων. He was a leather dresser, and, besides sharing with other "mechanics" in the resentment
provoked by Socrates's exposure of their ignorance as above described, he had, very likely, taken offence at his constant reference to shoemakers and other mechanics in the familiar illustration of his sentiments. He was also a popular demagogue, and had received the highest honors of the Athenian democracy. Hence in the text, \( \text{ιπερ των πολιτικων.} \) See note, 18, B. In Plato's Men. (91, A–C), we find him warning Socrates against a too free use of his tongue, lest he should get himself into trouble.—\( \text{Δυκαων ιπερ των ρητορων.} \) Lycon was an orator and demagogue, probably the same who is held up as a drunken brawler by Aristophanes, Wasps, 1301. It was his part to prepare the accusation against Socrates. On all these accusers, see further in Stallbaum ad loc., and Smith's Dict. Ant.

2a A. \( \text{αρχομενος.} \) C. 632; K. 312, R. 3; Mt. 557.—\( \text{ταιρ' ισων υμιν . . . ταληση.} \) This is the truth for you, sc. which I promised to tell you, cf. 17, B.—\( \text{τοις δυτοις απεχθανουα.} \) I incur hatred by the same, sc. \( \text{ταληση.} \) On the sentiments of this and the following clause, cf. John viii. 46, v. 43; Gal. iv. 16.

B. \( \text{των θαγαδων τε και φιλοσολιν.} \) These epithets are applied in accordance with polite usage, and yet not without irony. \( \text{φιλοσολις} \) differs from \( \text{φιλόπατρις,} \) according to Stallb., as friend of Athens from friend of Greece.—\( \text{αθις γαρ δη . . . λαβωμεν αυ.} \) for now again let us take up on the other hand. The language implies some formality and gravity in the examination of this, as also of the former accusation.—\( \text{δοπερ ιτινων των θαγων κατηγορων: inasmuch as these are different accusers, i.e. another class, a second, in contradistinction to the first, whom he has just disposed of.—απωμοιαν.} \) Cf. note, 19, B.—\( \text{πως ηδη, nearly as follows.} \) Cf. \( \text{τουατη τις,} \) 19, C, and note ibid. The order of the points in the indictment is inverted, as it is given by Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 1. Diogenes Laertius gives
it on the authority of Phavorinus, as still existing in due form in the second century, in these words: "Socrates is guilty in not recognizing the gods that the state recognizes, but introducing other new divinities; and he is guilty also of corrupting the youth. Penalty death."

C. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, but I for my part. The γε is omitted in the earlier editions, but inserted by Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, &c., on the authority of the best MSS.—σοβινὰς χαρακτηρας, serio ludit; literally, jokes in earnest. It is an example of the figure called oxymoron. It is explained by the following participial clauses. Meletus, seemed as if he must be merely joking, playing a part, when he pretended to feel so much concern about matters (such as the education of the youth and the worship of the gods) on which he never had bestowed an anxious thought; and yet he made a serious business of it when he rashly (μαθιως) brought men to trial (εἰς ἐγὼν κατοντας ἀλλοπονος).

D. δεῦρα, kither, ἄγε being understood, or instead of ἕρχον. So in Iliad and Odyssey sometimes, and elsewhere in Plato. The law allowed the parties in a suit to question each other, and obliged the party questioned to answer. Cf. below, note, 25, D. Few probably ever turned the law to so good account, as Socrates knew how to use it by his method of question and answer.—ἀλλα τι. This formula, or the fuller, ἀλλα τι δι, is often used, especially in Plato's Dialogues, simply to ask a question, implying an affirmative answer, like εἰκον, or nonne, only with perhaps still stronger affirmative implication. C. 541, N; K. 344, 5, g; Mt. 487, 9. Render: do you not, etc.—διωνδε . . . ἵππαι. διωνδε, with the fut. ind., denotes more continuance as well as more certainty than διωνδε with the aor. subj. Here the object is to express a permanent state of excellence among the youth. Cf. C. 601; K. 330, 6; Mt. 519, 7.—μίλων γι σοι, especially (γε) since it so concerns you. The part. agrees
with the foregoing question understood, with which it forms an acc. absolute. C. 638; K. 312, 5; Matthiæ calls it nom. abs. 564. —τόν ... διαφθείρων, him who is corrupting them. —εἰσάγεις, literally, bring in, sc. to court, cf. 29, A: εἰσάγοι ... εἰς δικαστήριον. Here, however, it is followed by a dative of the persons, before whom he is brought, sc. the judges (τούτωι). Either the magistrate or the prosecutor might be said εἰσάγεις.

It may usually be rendered impeach, or prosecute.

E. νῦ τῆν Ἡραν. Cf. note, 22, A.—τὶ δαὶ δή. δαὶ, a lengthened form of δή, expresses surprise, astonishment, and is used only in questions with τί and πῶς. K. 316, 7; Mt. 603.

ἀκρασίας. The spectators, at trials of any interest before the Heliaea, were very numerous, thus bringing that court still more under popular influence.

25 A. οἱ βουλευταί. The members of the βουλή, or senate, of which there were two, the Senate of the Areopagus and the Senate of Five Hundred. Both kinds of senators are perhaps here intended.—'Ἀλλ' ἄρα, κ.τ.λ. But then, Meletus, may not perchance those in the assembly, the assemblymen, corrupt the young? The μὴ implies some fear or anxiety, lest it may be so.

B. οἱ μὲν βελτίονος ποιούντες αὑτούς, sc. δοκοῦσι, supplied from the preceding clause, of which this is explanatory, and therefore without a connective.—τούναντιον τούτου πάν. Adverbial acc. = all the reverse of this.—πάντως δή τινος, altogether so no doubt, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. οὐ, instead of μὴ, follows the conditional particle (ἐὰν), because it unites with φησί to convey one idea, οὐ φησί = deny. K. 318, 2, h; Mt. 608, 1.—εἰ ... διαφθείρεις. The use of the ind. pres. implies a kind of ironical assent to the truth of the supposition: if (really, as you affirm) only one corrupts them. C. 603, ζ; K. 339, 3, a; Mt. 524, 1.—οἱ ἄλλοι, the rest, all others.
NOTES.

C. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, but it is not so, for; or but really, cf. note, 20, C.—ζ Ὄμηθε... ἀμέλειαν... μεμελήκε. A play upon the name: O Careful One, you show your want of care, that you have never cared, &c.—εἰσόγυς, cf. note, 24, D.—ζ πρὸς Διὸς Ὄμηθε. The πρὸς Διὸς seems to be placed between ζ and Ὄμηθε to carry out the play on the name in the foregoing sentence: O thou before Jupiter Careful One.—νοῦς ἐν... δυναὶς ἐν, preceded by the art. and followed by a part. means, in every case, i.e. in each instance, in which the supposition holds.

D. δ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The very words of the law are cited by Demosthenes in his Second Oration against Stephanus: Νόμος. Τοὺς ἀντιδίκους ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀλλήλους το ἐρωτήμαν, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ.—τηλικοῦτοι, at my time of life, sc. so old, i.e. 70, cf. 17, D. τηλικόσδε, at your time of life, sc. so young, cf. note, 23, E. The words both mean the same, viz., either so old or so young, according to the connection.

Ε. ταύτα, acc. of the respect.—οἷμαι... οἰδίναι, sc. πείσοσθαι σοι. C. 661, 1. So in the next clause, there is an ellipsis of διαφημιω with ἄκων, and still further on of ποιῶν with παύσομαι. Throughout this passage, Socrates manifestly takes the ground, that virtue is coextensive with knowledge. It is impossible for any man to injure others without injuring himself; and no man who really knows this, will wrong another any sooner than he would injure himself, which no one ever does intentionally. Such is his argument here. So in Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 5, he reasons, that no man who knows temperance, justice, and moral excellence, would prefer any thing else to these virtues. These virtues, therefore, are all resolvable into knowledge or wisdom. Every man does what seems to him best, and if he knows what is best, he will do it, and therefore do right. See also Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 20; Arist. Ethic. Eudem.
1, 5; Protag. 345; Gorg. 460, and Prof. Woolsey’s remarks upon it in his Introduction.

26 B. ὅτι κατὰ τὰν γραφήν, ἥν ἐγράψατο, σκ. μὲ φῆς διαφεβεῖριν τοὺς μετέρως, repeated from above.—οὗ ταύτα, κ.τ.λ. ταύτα is the obj. of διδάσκων placed where it is for emphasis.—ὡς νῦν ὁ λόγος ἵστιν, of whom our discussion now is. ὅν is objective genitive.

C. Καὶ αὖθις ἡμι, and I myself accordingly.—οὗ μίνων, κ.τ.λ., not however the same as the city indeed recognizes, but others, and this is what you accuse me of, that (I teach them to believe that there are) others; or do you say that I both do not believe in any gods at all myself, and that I teach others this doctrine. Observe the correlation of ὅτε—in, in the last member of this somewhat complicated and irregular sentence. Στοῦ usually omits the article after νομίζει, ἤγεῖσα, &c. = believe in gods.

D. ἵνα τι. C. 539, 2, a; K. 344, R. 6.—οἰδὲ...οἰδὲ, not simply correlative, like ὅτε...ὅτε = neither...nor, but emphatic = not even...nor yet. Cf. note, 18, C. The language implies that it was quite incredible; that Socrates should not believe even in gods so universally recognized as the sun and the moon. For the omission of the article with ἄλον and σελήνην, cf. C. 485, a; K. 244, R. 3, c; Mt. 264, 5. Μά Δι, sc. οὗ νομίζεις, which is understood from the foregoing question. Μά is not of itself negative; hence it may be used with either μαί or οὐ; but when preceded by neither of these particles, a negative clause precedes or follows, or it is clear from the context and from an accompanying adversative particle, that the sentence is to be understood as negative. Cf. K. 316, 4, and Stallbaum ad loc.—Ἀναθέσαν. Anaxagoras of Clazomene taught (according to Diog. Laert. 2, 8) that the sun was a mass of hot ἵρον, as some understand it, or ἕρτον, as Socrates takes it here and Xen. Mem. 4, 7, 7, and the moon an
earthy body, like our own planet. There was the more plausibility in imputing to Socrates the doctrines of Anaxagoras, since Socrates was a disciple of Archelaus Physicus, who was a disciple of Anaxagoras.—οὐκ εἰδέναι. For οὐκ, instead of υἱ, see note on οὐ φητε, 25, B.

E. Καί δὴ καί, and moreover also. The sentence which follows is ironical; δ is the object of προμίσον.—εἰ πάνω πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς, for a drachma at the very highest. πολλοῦ, like δραχμῆς, is gen. of price. This was the highest price which the managers could lawfully demand for a seat in the theatre. The common price was two oboli (Dem. pro Cor. 28), which was paid out of the treasury. Cf. Boeckh’s Pub. Econ. Ath. 2, 13; Beck. Char. Ex. Sc. 10; and Smith’s Dict. Antiquq. The doctrines of the philosophers were brought upon the stage, partly to be commended, as by Euripides in his tragedies, partly to be ridiculed, as by Aristophanes in his comedies. Some have thought that the allusion is not to the performances on the stage, but to the sale of the books of Anaxagoras at the orchestra. Cf. Schleiermacher ad loc. But as Forster well remarks, we never read of book sales there.—ἄλλος τι καί, κ.τ.λ., especially when they are so absurd; literally, for other reasons and also (in particular) they being so absurd.—οβρω-σι, thus entirely and absolutely.—’Ανωτέρος γ’ εἰ... δεκαί. Cf. note on δίκαιος εἰμι, 18, A.

A. Ἰόκε... διαπεραμένει, for he seems like one having 27 composed (i. e. he seems to have composed) as it were an enigma, testing the question, Whether will Socrates, the wise man forsooth, know, etc. In the earlier editions καί is inserted between the two participles. But Plato often uses two or more participles without a connective, especially when, as here, the action expressed by one participle is preliminary to that expressed by the other—he seems to have composed as it were an enigma in order to test. Cf. Gorg.: τίρποι περὶ τὴν διαμίμησιν,
εὐωδοῦσα, κ.τ.λ. — having divided herself into four parts and thus put on, or in order to put on, &c. For the use of the part. after τοιῷς, cf. C. 615; K. 310, R. 2; Mt. 555, obs. 2. Compare also the note on εὐωδία with the part. 21, B.—ιμοῦ χαριτωτομένου. γινώσκει, though usually followed by the acc., sometimes takes the gen. in common with other verbs denoting mental state. Mt. 349, 1.—δοσπερ ἰπ. Cf. note, 17, D.—ἡ ... λέγειν, in what manner he seems to me to speak these contradictions.

B. ἐν τῷ εἰκόνω τρόπῳ, in my usual method, &c. of question and answer.—ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, one after another, again and again.

C. δαυμώνα μὲν νοµίζει πράγματ' εἶναι. δαυμώνα is here constructed as an adjective. So Cicero translates το δαυμώνον by divinum quiddam, de Div. 1, 54. Schleiermacher and Stallbaum (see their notes ad loc.) argue, that Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle understood it to be used in this sense in the indictment. Certainly if he could have taken it as a noun (meaning divinities, instead of an adjective meaning divine things), it would have been far easier for Socrates to show the glaring inconsistency of his accuser, and he might have spared all his argumentation and illustration drawn from ἱππικά πράγματα, ἀνθρώπων πράγματα, &c. The expression in the indictment had reference to those divine voices or monitions which Socrates professed to hear and obey as the guide of his life (cf. 31, D, and notes ad loc.), and which would more properly be called divine things, than divinities.—ὡς δίνησαι: what a service you have rendered—how obliging you are—que tu m'oblige. Cousin. Al. δίνησαι.—μόγς = tandem aliquando, Stallb. —ἄλλ' οὖν δαυμώνα γε νοµίζεω, but then I believe in divine things at all events, &c. whether they be old or new, i.e. though they be new ones as charged in the indictment.—ἀντιγραφή = ἀντιμορφία, cf. note, 19, B, and Fischer's note ad loc.
D. ὃνις ζεύς γε ἡγούμενα ἢ ζεῦν παίδαις. The word δαλ-
μονες, in Homer and the early Greek poets, is synonymous
with ζεῦ; in Plato and other writers of his day it denotes
more especially the inferior deities constituting an intermediate
and connecting link between the superior gods and men; and
in Plutarch and some of the latest Greek classics, it sometimes
signifies bad as well as good beings of a superhuman order,
thus approaching to the New Testament sense of demons or
evil spirits.—τούτο... χαρακτησαν, this would be wherein
I say (27, A), that you speak riddles and joke, to say that I
who do not believe in gods, on the other hand do again believe
in gods, since at all events I believe in demons. The last clause
repeats the premise (already laid down at the beginning of the
sentence) in closer connection with the main point in the con-
clusion—a practice not unfrequent with Plato, and one of many
by which his style is made to resemble the language of conver-
sation.—διν δή καὶ λέγοντα, from whom forsooth they are
said to be. The preposition (ἐκ) is often omitted before the
relative after having been inserted before the antecedent. C.
651, e; K. 300, b; Mt. 595, 4.—καὶ δοὺς. Forsterus de-
lendam censebat hanc particulam (ἡ); sine causa idonea; nam
That is, mules may have horses or also asses for their male
parents, for the case to be illustrated limits the comparison to
male parents.

E. οὐχι limits ἐγράψω; ἀποπειρώμενος denotes the end in
view = for the purpose of testing me, and ἀπορῶν the cause =
because you were at a loss.—δοὺς δὲ σοῦ, κ.τ.λ. But that you
should persuade any man possessed of the least understanding,
that it is the part of the same man to believe in things pertain-
ing both to demons and to gods, and the same man not to believe
either in demons or gods or heroes, is beyond the scope of human
ingenuity. I have enclosed οὐ in brackets, because, though
found in most of the MSS., and therefore inserted by Becker and Stallbaum, neither they nor any other editor has been able to explain or translate it, and it is omitted by Forster, Fischer, Ast, Schleiermacher, and Cousin.

25 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ. Cf. note, 25, C. Socrates here brings the direct defence to a close, saying that it does not require much argument, since what he has to fear is not the indictment or the prosecutors, but the multitude—not the evidence or the argument, but popular prejudice and passion. What follows is intended, not so much to avert the sentence which he anticipates from the judges or even to deprecate the displeasure of the people, as to vindicate his character, assert his mission, and bear witness to the truth, that more impartial judges may appreciate his merits—that a better age may honor him, as a missionary and a martyr.—καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀλλὰ, and this it is which will convict me, if indeed it should lead to my conviction.—διὰ ὧν . . . φανος. This clause is an emphatic repetition and explanation of the τοῦτ’ at the beginning. Such colloquial repetitions (cf. note, 27, D) are especially frequent in antithetic clauses.—οὐδὲν δὲ δακνών, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ, and there is no reason to fear lest it should (that it will) stop with me, i. e. that I shall be the last victim.

B. Εἶτ’ οὐκ ἀδερφός. Εἶτα in questions implies astonishment or indignation, as ποτὲ does surprise and wonder, cf. note, 20, D.—τοῦ ἡ ἡ τεκνάναι are taken together as a limiting gen. with κατὰ, literally, the danger of living or dying, i. e. the prospect of life or death.—ἄδερφα, a man emphatically, not merely a human being, ἄδερφος. It is the subject of ἐπολογίζεσαι.—ὁρω . . . ὅφελος ἢ, ὥσος is of any use, however little. ὅφελος more frequently takes the person to whom it belongs, or of whom it is predicated, in the genitive. See examples in the Lexicon. With the sentiment of this passage, compare Crito, 48.
C. οἵ τε δίλλοι καὶ = especially; literally, both the others and (in particular) the son of Thetis. For δίλλοι τε καὶ = especially, cf. note, 26, E. The allusion is to Achilles, Hom. II. 18, 90–125.—παρὰ τὸ αἰοχρῶν τοι ἰσομίαυ, in comparison with (properly, alongside of) submitting to any thing dishonorable.—τιμωρήσου. This verb takes after it a dative of the person avenged, together with an accusative of the person on whom, or the thing for which vengeance is taken = if you shall avenge Patroclus your friend for his murder; or, as we say, avenge the murder of Patroclus your friend.—ἀνίκα γὰρ τοι. κ.τ.λ.; the very words of Thetis to her son, II. 18, 96. This quotation interrupts the sentence, and instead of a clause depending on δῆμοι which should regularly have followed, it goes on with an independent clause connected by δὲ.

D. Κακὸς ἄν denotes the state in which to live were to be dreaded more than death: to live being a bad man, that is, an unfaithful friend and a cowardly soldier.—Ἀνικα τεσμάυν... ἀχρὸς ἀροῦρης. Parts of two Homeric verses (Il. 18, 98 and 104) brought together.—μη... οἴει, you do not suppose, do you, implies a wish, that you should not suppose.—οἴει γὰρ ἕκει. Cf. note, 17, D.—οὐ ἄν, wherever, cf. note, 23, A.—ἡ ἵν’ ἄρχοντος ταχεῖ. Anacoluthon for ἥ ἵν’ ἄρχοντος ταχεῖ, which would correspond with ἡ ἱγγυσάμενος θάλην; instead of which we have ἵν’ ἄρχοντος ταχεῖ, corresponding to ταχεῖ, as if the first ἥ had preceded ταχεῖ, instead of ἱγγυσάμενος.—πρὸ τοῦ αἰοχροῦ, before, i. e. more than the dishonorable.

E. εἰνὲ εἰργασμένος. Heindorf makes ἱργάζεσαι here, as he says it often is, equivalent to ποιεῖν. But Stallbaum, with good reason, renders εἰνὲ εἰργασμένος, I should have perpetrated (not merely done).—εἰ, οὗ μὲν μὲ... τὸς μὲν οὖ... τοῦ δὲ σεῦ... ἵνα ἤσθη δὲ, ἢ, when on the one hand the commanders... then on the one hand I... but when on the other hand
the god . . . then on the other hand I, &c. On this peculiarly
emphatic doubling of μὲν and δὲ, cf. K. 322, R. 1; Mt. 622, 5.
—ἔμενον (past tense of the ind.) denotes an historical fact;
λύσωμε (contingent) implies a mere supposition. The bravery
and physical endurance of Socrates, as a soldier, were a prodigy
and a proverb in that already somewhat degenerate age. In
the battle at Delium, the Athenian general Laches declared,
that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as he, the Boe-
cotians would have erected no trophies. It will be observed,
that the preposition ἐπὶ is used to denote the locality of this
battle, while ἐν is used with Πορίδαφος and Ἀμφιπόλει. Where-
ever this battle is referred to, it is thus designated ἔπι Δηλίῳ
(cf. Xen. Mem. 3, 5, 4, and Robbins’s note ibid.), whereas in
other battles ἐν is the usual preposition. The reason seems to
be, that Delium was properly the name of the temple of Apollo,
and, though the city received the same designation, the old
association forbade its extension so as to embrace the sur-
rounding country, where the battle was fought.

29 A. δεινὸν μὲν ἐν εἴπ, a strange thing indeed it would be.
It is a repetition or resumption of δεινὰ ἐν εἴπερ εἰργαζόμενος at
the beginning of the section.—ὡς ἀληθῶς. ὡς gives emphasis
to some adverbs and adjectives besides superlatives. There is
an ellipsis of a corresponding demonstrative (οὗτος), and also
of an appropriate verb: ἐλέγας οὗτος ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐλέγας.—
ἐλέγας εἰς δικαιημένον. Cf. note, 24, D.—ῥᾷ ἀνθώπῳ, to
man, i.e. mankind. C. 470, A, 1; K. 244, 2.

B. Καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ., and this, how is not this ignorance
which is to be censured, that of supposing that one knows what
he does not know.—τοῦτῳ καὶ ἐνραῖζα, in this respect and
here, emphatic repetition in order to limit the superiority
strictly to this single point.—τῷ, in any thing, dat. of the
respect.—τοῦτῳ ἐν, sc. φαίην εἶναι, I should say that it was
(i.e. that I was wiser) in this.—ο$core correponds
to oik eiddw, which is equivalent to ὁσπερ oik eida.—τη φιλείου, καὶ δεύ καὶ ἀναριστορ, the better, whether god or man.—πρὸ ὅν τῶν κακῶν ἄν, κ.τ.λ., in preference therefore to the evils which I know to be evils, I will never fear nor flee those which I know not if perchance they are good, that is, I will never shun the latter more than the former—the uncertain more than the certain. Cf. πρὸ τοῦ αἴσχρου, 28, D.

C. ἀκολούθων = ἄκολογων, which Stephens substituted for it in his edition = disobeying, disregarding. τὴν ἀρχὴν with a negative means, not in the first instance, i.e. not at all. ἐλεημοσύνη for εἰσάγωνα, to be brought in either for trial. ἀποκτείνα, to put me to death, i.e. condemn me to death.

So Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 5.—ἀν... ἐπιτηδεύοντες... διαφανήσωνται.

On the use of ἂν with the fut. ind. which is rare in the Attic Greek and entirely denied by some, see K. 260, 2, (1); Μt. 599, d; and Stallb. ad loc. Stallbaum is inclined here to connect ἂν with ἐπιτηδεύοντες only = ἂν... ἐπιτηδεύον... καὶ... διαφανήσωνται. But it is more natural to suppose, that ἂν gives a contingent sense to διαφανήσωνται also.—ἐπὶ τούτῳ μεντο, ἐφ' ἰτε, on this condition, however, that you no longer, &c. ἐφ' ἰτε is equivalent to ἵστη, and is accordingly followed by the inf. C. 530; K. 341, R. 5; Μt. 479, a.

D. εἰ οὖν... ἀφιοέτε. οὖν is here resumptive = I say. It will be observed, that the same protasis is resumed twice—that is, the sentence is commenced with essentially the same condition, varied only in form, three times (εἰ μὲ νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφιούσ... εἰ μοι πρὸς ταύτα εἰσούσ... εἰ οὖν με, ἔσπερ εἰσον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφιούσει), before the apodosis is subjoined. In the first instance, the ind. (ἀφιούσ) is used, implying some probability of his release; in the other instances, the same condition is expressed as a mere contingency by the use of the opt. (εἰσούσε, ἀφιούσε), corresponding to which we have the opt. with ἄν (εἰσομ' ἄν ὑμῖν) in the apodosis.—ἀσωτά-
\(\epsilon w\) \(n e o m a e\) \(e t i\) \(a i t\) \(u t\) \(e i m u\) \(a m p l e c t a r i s\); \(\phi l e i\) \\
\(n e o m a e\) \(a i t\) \(u t\) \(e i m u\) \(o s c u l a r i s\). Hoc loco significant \(h a e\) \(v e r a\) : \(g r a t o\) \(l a t e l o g u e\) \(a n i m o\) \(v e n t r a m\) \(h u m a n i t a t e m\) \(e t\) \(c l e\) \(m e n t i a m\) \(a m p l e c t o r\) \(a t q u e\) \(v e n e r e r\). Stallbaum.—\(n e i s o m a e\) \\
\(m u l l o n\) \(t\) \(\s\) \(v o\) \(u m i n\). Cf. Acts v. 29.—\(o i\) \(n\) \(n\) \(p a i o m e n a\) \(o i\) \\
\(n\) \(n\), \(w i t h\) \(t h e\) \(s u b j.\) \(i n s t e a d\) \(o f\) \(t h e\) \(f u t.,\) \(i s\) \(u s\) \(e d\) \(i n\) \(s t r o n g\) \(d e n i a l.\) \\
Cr. 595, 8; K. 318, 7; Mt. 517.—\(d e l,\) \(c o n t i n u a l l y,\) \(f r o m\) \(t i m e\) \(t o\) \\
\(t i m e.\)—\(i o x i n,\) \(s t r e n g t h\) \(o f\) \(m i n d,\) \(i n t e l l e c t u a l\) \(a n d\) \(m o r a l\) \\
power, \(p a r t i c u l a r l y\) \(f o r t i t u d e\) \(a n d\) \(t h e\) \(k i n d r e d\) \(m a s c u l i n e\) \(v i r t u e s,\) \\
as \(a p p e a r s\) \(f r o m\) \(w h a t\) \(f o l l o w s.\)

E. \(n e i s o m a e.\) \(T h e\) \(p r e s e n t\) \(o f\) \(n i m u\) \(a n d\) \(i t s\) \(c o m p o u n d s\) \(i s\) \(g e n e\) \\
rally \(u s e d\) \(b y\) \(t h e\) \(A t t i c s\) \(i n\) \(a\) \(f u t u r e\) \(s e n s e.\) \(S o\) \(i n\) \(E n g l i s h,\) \(I\) \\
go \(o r\) \(a m\) going \(=\) \(I\) \(s h a l l\) \(o r\) \(w i l l\) go.—\(n i m a e\) \(b i,\) \(b u t\) \(t o\) \(s a y:\) \\
\(t h a t\) \(h e\) \(d o e s.\) \(I n\) \(L a c h e s, 187–8,\) \(N i c i a s\) \(g i v e s\) \(a\) \(v e r y\) \(s i m i l a r\) \\
though \(m o r e\) \(m i n u t e\) \(a c c o u n t\) \(o f\) \(t h e\) \(m a n n e r\) \(i n\) \(w h i c h\) \(S o c r a t e s\) \\
\(h o l d\) \(e v e r y\) \(o n e\) \(h e\) \(c o n v e r s e d\) \(w i t h\) \(t o\) \(t h e\) \(w o r k\) \(o f\) \(s e l f-
\(e x a m i n a t i o n: \) \(Y o u\) \(d o\) \(n o t\) \(s e e m\) \(t o\) \(k n o w,\) \(t h a t\) \(w h o e v e r\) \(i s\) \(n e a r e s t\) \(t o\) \\
Socrates \(i n\) \(r e a s o n i n g, j u s t\) \(a s\) \(i n\) \(r e l a t i o n s h i p, a n d\) \(w h o e v e r\) \(a p p r o a c h e s\) \(h i m\) \(i n\) \(c o n v e r s a t i o n, e v e n\) \(t h o u g h\) \(t h e\) \(s h o u l d\) \(b e g i n\) \(t o\) \(c o n v e r s e\) \(a t\) \(f i r s t\) \(o n\) \(s o m e\) \(o t h e r\) \(s u b j e c t, h e\) \(w i l l,\) \(w i t h\) \(i n f a l l i b l e\) \(c e r t a i n t y,\) \(b e\) \(b r o u g h t\) \(r o u n d\) \(i n\) \(t h e\) \(d i s c u s s i o n, t i l l\) \(h e\) \(i s\) \(o b l i g e d\) \(t o\) \(g i v e\) \(a\) \(c o n t o u n t\) \(o f\) \(h i m s e l f, i n\) \(w h a t\) \(m a n n e r\) \(h e\) \(i s\) \(n o w\) \(l i v i n g, a n d\) \(h o w\) \(h e\) \(h a s\) \(l i v e d\) \(h i s\) \(p a s t\) \(l i f e; a n d\) \(o n c e\) \(c a u g h t\) \(i n\) \(i t, S o c r a t e s\) \(w i l l\) \(n o t\) \(l e t\) \(h i m\) \(g o, t i l l\) \(h e\) \(h a s\) \(w e l l\) \(a n d\) \(b e a u t i f u l l y\) \(p u t\) \(a l l\) \(t h e s e\) \(t h i n g s\) \(t o\) \(t h e\) \(t e s t . . . a n d\) \(I\) \(a l m o s t\) \(k n e w, l o n g a g o, t h a t o u r\) \(d i s c u s s i o n\) \(n o w, b e i n g\) \(i n\) \(t h e\) \(p r e s e n c e\) \(o f S o c r a t e s, w o u l d\) \(n o t\) \(b e\) \(a b o u t\) \(t h e\) \(y o u n g m e n, b u t\) \(a b o u t\) \(o u r s e l v e s.\)"

30 A. \(k a i \varepsilon \nu e \iota \rho \epsilon \omega \kappa a i \pi \nu e \sigma \varepsilon \nu \iota \rho \iota \omega \iota \omega .\) Cf. \(k a i \varepsilon \nu e \kappa a i \varepsilon \nu \iota \rho \omega \nu \iota \omega \nu,\) \\
29, C, \(a n d\) \(n o t e \) \(i b i d.\) \(V e r b s \) \(o f \) \(d o i n g \) \(a n d \) \(s a y i n g \) \(m o r e \) \(c o m-
\(m o n l y \) \(t a k e \) \(t h e \) \(i n d i r e c t \) \(a s \) \(w e l l \) \(a s \) \(t h e \) \(d i r e c t \) \(o b j e c t \) \(i n \) \(t h e \) \(a c c. \) \\
K. 280, 2, R. 2; Mt. 415, obs. 1.—\(\delta \varphi, b y \) \(a s \) \(m u c h \) \(a s. \) \(T h e \) \(f u l l \) \(c o n s t r u c-
\(t i o n \) \(w o u l d \) \(r e q u i r e \) \(a \) \(c o r r e s p o n d i n g \) \(d e m o n s t r a t i v e \)
NOTES.

(τοσούτω) with μᾶλλον, denoting the degree of difference. C. 419; K. 285, (3), c; Mt. 400, 8.—γγυνεῖω may be followed either by a gen. or a dat. denoting that to which there is a nearness. C. 394, cf. 399; K. 273, R. 9, cf. 284, 3, (2); Mt. 339, cf. 386, 6. That in which, or in respect to which, the nearness exists, may also be either gen. or dat. C. 395, cf. 418; K. 274, 3, cf. 285, 3, b; Mt. 337, cf. 400, 6. But it is not according to usage to put both in the gen. or both in the dat. See Stallbaum’s note on the proper reading of this passage, and compare ad rem, as well as ad verba, the passage above cited from Laches: δὲ ἄν ἐγγυναῖῳ Σωκράτους ἔλθῃ διαφέρει γίνει. —τὴν ἔμνην ὑπὲρ ἱππείρου, my service to the god. The dat. to or for can follow substantives. C. 409; Mt. 390.—μυὸδ' ὑπερ φόδρα, no, nor so zealously, cf. note on μυὸδ' ὑπερστη- σόν, 17, B.

B. λέγων ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. Observe the sentiment, that the higher good includes the lower, as the greater does the less.—εἰ...διαφείρω. Cf. note, 25, B.—ταῦτ' ἄν εἰθε βλασφεία, these instructions and persuasions must be injurious. Compare the argument of Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 8: how then could such a man corrupt the young, unless the cultivation of virtue is corrupting.—οὐδὲν λέγει, he says nothing, that is, he is utterly mistaken. Cf. Laches, 195, B; N. 1: ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Σωκρατες, Λάχης ἐπισυμείν καὶ ὁμάδι λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρτι τοιοῦτος τοις ἐφάνη. ΔΑ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ταῦτα καὶ πειράσματος γε ἀποφήμι. οὐδὲν γάρ λέγεις. So τι λέγεων is to say something, i. e. to speak well and truly, cf. Crit. 46, D; Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 12.—πρὸς ταῦτα, wherefore, literally, in reference to these things, in view of them.—ἡ πείσεσθε...ἡ μὴ, that is, unconditionally—don’t propose any conditional acquittal, like that suggested 29, C; since I would not on any condition (ἀν refers to an implied condition) do differently, not even if I must die (strictly and emphatically be dead) many times over.
C. Μὴ Ἴσαμψείτε. Cf. note, 21; A. Socrates here enters upon another topic, and discourses upon it with such freedom and boldness, such a consciousness of his own innocence not merely, but such an assurance of his divine mission, and such compassion not for himself but for them if they should reject his instructions and condemn him to death, that they must either recognize his superior wisdom or take offence at his arrogance. Some modern critics even, Ast for example, regard the self-complacency of this and some other parts of the Apology as quite insufferable, quite un-Socratic. But is there not the Socratic irony here? Is there not at the same time Socratic truthfulness, fearlessness, and earnestness. It should be remembered that he presents himself throughout as vindicating, not so much himself as truth and justice, philosophy and religion, and God.—ἐμείνας μοι οἷς ἐδεικνύει ὑμῖν, persevere for me in what I asked of you, i. e. continue to extend to me the favor which I requested of you.—μὴ λαμ γὰρ οὖν, for I am about now (οὖν, accordingly, in accordance with that request) to say also some other things (besides those already said) at which perhaps you will cry out. This clause is connected by γὰρ οὖν (more closely than it would be by γὰρ alone), not to the clause which immediately precedes, but to the previous one, (ἐμείνας, κ.τ.λ.)—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνατο, for he would not even be able, sc. if he wished. ἂν referring to an implied condition. C. 604, N. a; K. 260, 4, a; Mt. 515, obs.

D. οὗ . . . ξεμυρὸν = nefas, not in accordance with the law of nature and of God, and therefore not possible in the nature of things. Schleiermacher: nicht in der Ordnung.

Cousin: pas . . . au pouvoir. Stallbaum: neque legibus divina sapientia respondere.—ἀμείνων ἄνδρι, for a better man to be injured by a worse, instead of ἀμείνων ἄνδρα, that a better man, &c., the design being to link it more closely with οὗ . . . ξεμυρὸν εἰσα. This famous saying of Socrates has been widely
quoted and commented on from the earliest times. Cf. Epic. Encheir. 52; Max. Tyr. Dis. 18, 8; Plut. de Tranq. 17; and not only by philosophers but by the Christian Fathers, as Origen, Theodoret, &c. The reason for the assertion, as explained by Plutarch, and illustrated by Crito, 45, D, is, that bad men, however numerous and powerful, cannot make the good man bad or the wise man a fool, and that is the only real evil which can befall a man.—ἀποκτείνει. Cf. note, 29, C. Here the word not only refers to the condemnation rather than the execution of the sentence, but, like the two verbs which follow, it has a causative sense = procure my condemnation to death, to exile, or to disfranchisement.—ἀπιμάσειν denotes not dishonor in general, as some have understood it, but deprivation of civil rights. Cf. Forster ad loc.—ἄλλα ταῖρα, κ.τ.λ., but these this man (viz., the prosecutor) probably supposes, and many another man perchance, to be great evils. τις here gives an indefinite extension and application to ἄλλος, like many a in English.—ἄλλα πολὺ μάλλον, intell. οἷον μέγα κακόν. Stallb. —πολλοῦ δὲ ἐγὼ ἐπέ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογείςαι, I am very far from making a defence for my own sake. Observe the emphatic insertion and juxtaposition of ἐγὼ with ἐπέ ἐμαυτοῦ = I for myself. C. 672, note; K. 348, 10.—ὑμῖν, dat. after δόσιν. Cf. note, 30, A. Socrates means that he was given or sent to the Athenians by Apollo to be their monitor and reprover.

Ε. ἄξιον... προσκείμενον, really, though the comparison may be too ridiculous, attached to, &c. προσκείμενον, besides the passive sense of being attached to, involves also the active significance of pressing upon or following up, as a gadfly does a horse, to suit which the word was chosen.—μύωτος may mean a spur or a gadfly. Ficinus, Schleiermacher, Ast, Cousin, and some others, take it here in the former sense. But the epithets προσκείμενον, προστεθείκειναι, and προσκαβιζομένων
apply better to a gadfly. Moreover this makes the comparison more ridiculous (γελοιοτερον), and is more in the spirit of the Socratic irony. Out of regard to these reasons and to the life and point of the whole passage, I incline to agree with Forster, Stallbaum, Carey, &c., in taking μενωσις in its original and proper sense of a gadfly.—ολος, as afterwards modified by τοιοουτω των signifies something of this sort. οιοουτω των is placed where it is, it is to introduce more easily the following clause.

31 A. is often strengthened by ταχ' αυ and is equivalent to mayhap.—ιχθυομενοι ... πιστομενοι. The reader will observe the singular succession of participles. Some of them may be rendered into English by verbs; αυ gives a potential sense to the participle (κρούσαντες), C. 615, 2; K. 260, 5; Mt. 598, 6; but you mayhap being offended, just like sleepers when they are roused out of sleep, would (or will) strike at me, and heartening to Anytus, rashly put me to death.—κρούσαντας still keeps up the allusion to the gadfly. So does ειπεμψει, send upon you.—βη τι ἐγὼ τρυγχάω, κ.τ.λ., but that I now am just (τρυγχάω αυ) such a person, as to have been given by the god to the city, you might discern from this fact. The thing to be proved is that his character is such, that he might well be supposed to have a divine mission; and the proof is his self-forgetfulness and disinterested devotedness to the highest good of others, which, he argues, is something more than human (οι γάρ ανθρωπίνη ίοικε). Compare Cousin’s translation and Stallbaum’s note ad loc.

B. ανίχεσαν τοις ὀλεαν ἀμελουμένων, to suffer my private affairs to be neglected, literally, to hold myself up over them being neglected. ανίχεσαν denotes superiority, and hence takes a genitive usually with a participle. K. 275, 1; Mt. 358. It will be seen, that both ανίχεσαν and πράττεω express continued past action, in other words, they are imperfects.—
eíchoiv àv tina lógoiv, I should have had some reason, i.e. my conduct would have been explicable on ordinary grounds without supposing a divine mission.—toúto... ápánai xurpòsa, to reach this (such a) pitch of shamelessness.

C. ἡ ἐπαξίμη... ἡ ἔγησα, that I ever either exacted or asked pay of any one. πράττεσαι = exigere (ex-agere), amschachen, make money.—ικανόν... περιαν, for sufficient, I think, is the witness (observe the article τὸν πάρυπον) I bring forward, that I speak the truth, viz., my (well-known) poverty. Cf. note, 23, B.

D. γείνεται [φονή]. The suggestion first made in Forster's edition and adopted by most editions since, is certainly probable, that φονή, though found in all the copies, has crept in from the margin, since it is needless here, has no influence on the structure of the sentence (being followed by the neuter pronouns δ and τοῦτο), and is not only repeated in the next clause, but is there accompanied by τοις, as it hardly could be if it had already been used just before.—τείνω τι καὶ δαμώνω, something divine and demoniacal, if we may be allowed to use the word demoniacal in its etymological sense of superhuman, or proceeding from δαιμόνες. Cf. note, 27, D.—ἐπικωμίδων, calumniating or satirising after the manner of the ancient comedy. Cf. Fischer ad loc. The reference is to the ἐγέρα δαμώνα καυά of the indictment, 24, B.—δὲ ἀπορρέει... προσέπει δὲ ὅσπερ. Ast makes this statement an argument against the Platonic authorship of the Apology, as being inconsistent with what Xenophon (Mem. 4, 8, 5) and others say of the positive as well as negative character of the divine influence. But the same declaration is made almost in the same words in the Theages, 128, D. So Cicero likewise understood it, de Div. 1, 54: nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti. And though Xenophon, and Plato himself in other passages (e.g. Phæd. 242, B, C; Theset. 151, A), appear to ascribe to the
voice a persuasive as well as dissuasive influence, that is only a general statement of the fact, whereas here we have a more definite and precise explanation of the manner; for, after all, the discrepancy is more apparent than real, since a dissuasive from all that he should not do, involved instruction in all that he should do. Cf. 40, A, B, C; also Schleiermacher’s note ad hunc loc., and Appendix to Robbins’s Memorabilia. As to the nature of this voice, or sign or oracle, as he elsewhere calls it (ἡ μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου... τὸ τοῦ ἡσυχήσιον, 40, A), there has always been much discussion, and the question may still perhaps be said to be sub judice. Some have supposed that Socrates believed himself to be under the guidance of a particular δαίμων, guardian genius or tutelar divinity, whose special, if not sole office, was to lead and protect him. But no such idea would be gathered from this, nor indeed from any other passage in Plato or Xenophon, where this subject is mentioned. Others have gone to the opposite extreme and have come to the conclusion, that the δαίμων of Socrates was nothing more than the voice of reason, considered as the voice of God, in his own soul. But this falls as far below the demands of the passage before us—of the appropriate significance of the language of Socrates—as the other goes beyond and superadds to it. After a diligent comparison of the language of Plato and Xenophon, together with such lights as Plutarch, Cicero and subsequent writers have shed on the subject, I find scarcely any room left for doubt, that Socrates meant by his φωνή, and ἡσυχὴ τι καὶ δαίμονα, very nearly that same divine teaching and guidance which good men in every age have believed to be communicated to themselves, and to all who seek it by prayer and in the use of proper means—partly within the soul, and yet not from within but from above—partly by outward signs, omens, oracles, dreams and visions. Cf. below 33, C; ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐκ ἐνυπνίων, κ. τ. λ. Certainly the Apology gives us no intimation of a
tutelary divinity peculiar to himself, and in the Memorabilia, Socrates explicitly declares, that the same divine teaching is within the reach of all men. Cf. below, 40, A, B, C; Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 3, 4; 1, 4, 15, 18; iv. 3, 13; iv. 8, 1. See also an interesting discussion of this question in Plutarch, De Genio Socratis.

E. ἀπολώλη... ἀφελήκη. This form of the pluperfect is common in Plato, though not to the exclusion of the common form, cf. ἡμιβίον... ἐδειν, 22, D. Observe the repetition of ἀν in each disjunctive clause (πάλαι ἄν... ὅρ' ἄν ὑμᾶς... ὅρ' ἄν ὕμαντον) and compare the examples in Stalh. here and at Gorg. 475, E.

E. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν... ὅτε ἄλλω πλήξει οἴδεν... ἐκατοννομος. Socrates shows himself no demagogue or even democrat. In this, he had the company and sympathy of most of the literary men and philosophers of Athens, who, as a class, cherished little respect or affection—and had little reason in their personal relations to it, to cherish respect or affection—for the Athenian democracy. But more than this, the unbending integrity and firmness of Socrates placed him often in the attitude of “opposition” to the existing government, whether democratic or aristocratic, insomuch that he was deemed quite an impracticable. Compare his resistance to the popular assembly as described below, 20, B, with his refusal to obey the thirty tyrants in the arrest and “rendition” of a fugitive from oppression, 20, C; Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2, 7.

A. Καί el μήλλει. Καί el, even if, is to be distinguished from el kai, although. kai el concedes what is not true, or what is true only to a limited degree (the limit here being marked by ὕλιγον χρόνων); el kai concedes what is true, simply and without degrees. Cf. Hermann ad Viger. 832; Stalh. ad loc.; and K. 340, 7—μη δημοσιεύειν. In Xen. Mem. 1, 6, 15. Socrates gives as a reason for not engaging in public affairs, that
he could do more to control and benefit the state by educating as many others as possible to be good citizens and able statesmen, than he could by undertaking the affairs of state in his own person.—οὐδὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἤπειράσωμαι, I would not yield in the least to any one whatever. οὐδὲν . . . ἑαυτῷ is more emphatic than οὐδὲν; and ἤπειράσωμαι is an intensive form instead of the common ἤπειρασώμαι, verbs ending in -σω, -σημ, &c., being intensives. This strengthened form is regarded by some as an aorist, cf. C. 299. But they are not accented as aorists (the inf. is εἰκάζεσαι, not εἰκαζεῖν), nor are they found to have the force of aorists. Cf. Hermann Progr. de Verbis Graecorum in -σω, -σης, and -σω exentibus; Stallb. ad loc.; Woolsey ad Gorg. 483, A; ad Antig. 1096; K. 162. In the next clause, we have ἤπειρασώμαι, because there no emphasis is required.—μὴ ἤπειρασώμαι δὲ, κ.τ.λ., and as soon as I did not yield, just so soon I should perish. The first ἀμα belongs with ἤπειρασώμαι, the second, strengthened by καὶ, with ἀπολοίης. Cf. Fischer ad loc.—φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικὰ, displeasing and wearisome indeed. δικανικὰ has reference primarily to pleadings in the courts of law, which are apt to be tediously minute and circumstantial. Some take it here in the sense of boastful.

B. ἄλλην μὲν . . . ἐσούλευσα δὲ, I never held any other office, but I was a member of the βουλὴ, or council of five hundred. See the same fact, and ἐσούλευσα used in the same sense, Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 18.—ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς, the tribe to which Socrates belonged, viz., Antiochis.—πρυτανεύοντα, presiding, i.e. furnishing the Prytanes, who acted as presidents both of the council and of the popular assembly. Each of the ten tribes chose by lot fifty representatives in the council, and these representatives, or the tribe through them, presided during about one tenth of the lunar year, or thirty-five days. Moreover, these fifty representatives of the tribe were subdivided into five bodies, of ten men each, each of which presid-
ed during a fifth part of the presidency of the tribe, i.e. during one week. Out of these ten proedri (as they were called) for the week, an ἰπιστάρης or chief president was chosen by lot, who presided as chairman in the council and also in the assembly for one day. Socrates was ἰπιστάρης on that day when the fate of the ten generals was to be decided, and refused to put the illegal proposition to vote in the assembly. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2: ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἰπιστάρης γενόμενος.—τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς. The Athenians chose ten generals, one for each tribe, at the commencement of a war. Sometimes they were all in the field together. More frequently, however, only three were sent out to carry on the war, while the others took charge of the war department at home. In the case before us, the battle at Arginusæ, only eight were actually present. For the details, see Xen. Hellen. B. I. C. 7.—τοὺς οὐκ ἀναλογίους, who did not bring away for burial the bodies of the slain. They were victorious in the battle (over the Lacedemonians at Arginusæ), and in order to pursue the enemy, they left the care of the dead to some of the inferior officers, instead of attending to it in person. For this they were accused before the assembly, and, in spite of the intervention of Socrates, condemned, and six of them actually put to death. The fact illustrates in a striking manner the sacred interest and importance which the Greeks attached to the rite of burial. Though they had gained the victory, the generals had not done their duty or finished their work, till the dead were buried. So the Iliad was not deemed complete till the burial rites of the heroes, Achilles and Hector, were narrated in the 23d and 24th Books; and the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles are prolonged to considerable extent beyond the catastrophe for the same purpose—to put the minds of Grecian hearers and readers at rest from that pious horror, which they entertained of remaining unburied. Had certain critics of the Homeric poems considered this matter duly, they
would not have found in the last two books an argument against the unity of the Iliad.—τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας. Cf. C. 659, a; K. 300, 4; Mt. 596, a.—ἀπόσωμε, together, by one vote, cf. μακ ψήφῳ, Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 18.—παρακόμως. The law required that the vote should be taken separately, cf. Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 37: κρίνεσθαι δίχα ἐκαστὸν.—ὡς . . . ἵθος. Xenophon says (Hel. 1, 7, 39), they soon repented of it and punished the authors of the measure as deceivers of the people.—ἐγὼ μόνος, κ.τ.λ. The prytanes all opposed at first, but when threatened with the vengeance of the people, they all gave in except Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 15.—μηδὲν ποιεῖν. C. 665; K. 318, 8.—ἐδεικνύει καὶ ἀπάγειν, to indict me and lead me away to punishment.—βοῶτων. See in Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 13, 14, the tumult and uproar of the meeting.

C. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔλεγαρχία . . . οἱ τριάκοντα. There was always an oligarchic faction at Athens, who were aided and sustained by Lacedemonian influence; and when at the close of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedemonians triumphed, they placed thirty of this faction in the supreme power, who were after known as the thirty, or the thirty tyrants.—με πίστην δυνα, myself and four others. C. 511, 5; K. 303, R. 4, e; Mt. 469, 9.—Δέοντα τῶν Σαλαμίνων. A native of Salamis, but a citizen of Athens, who had withdrawn to Salamis to escape the power of the tyrants.—ἀναπήγας αὐτιῶν, to complicate with their own crimes.

D. οἱ καὶ ἄρωκότερον, if it were not too rude (rustic) an expression, is an apology for the use of οἷς διοίκων in such a connection as would probably offend the polite ears of the Athenians.—τοῖν δὲ τὸ πᾶν μὲλεί, for this, I say, I care every thing. τὸ πᾶν is an adverbial or synecdochial acc. the exact opposite of οἷς διοίκων.—ἐμέ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀρχή, κ.τ.λ., for, me (emphatic both in form and position) that government (of the
thirty), strong as it then was, did not so terrify. — ἤγαγον 
Δέοντα. He was put to death. Xen. Hel. II. 3, 39. — ἔχομον 
ἀπεικόνισθεν εἰκασί, went immediately home. — διὰ ταχέως = ταχέως. 
The government of the Thirty Tyrants lasted only four years.

E. τοσάδε ἐτη, so many years as I have lived. — ἔπραττον. 
The imperf. denotes continued action. — τοῖς δίκαιοις, the 
things that are just = justice. — ἔσσερ στρέψας, as one ought al-
ways to do—this is implied in the present. — οὕτω γὰρ ἄν ἄλλος 
ἀνθρώπων συνείδης, sc. διεγένετο, would have lived so many years.

A. τουτοῖς φανούμαι, shall be found (on examination) such a man, sc. one who has never fallen in with any one in any 
thing contrary to justice, as explained by the following clause. 
— ὦ μοῦς μακρᾶς εἶναι. Socrates was charged by his enemies 
with the crimes of Critias and Alcibiades, the one the prince 
of demagogues and the other the leader of the Thirty Tyrants. 
They had indeed listened to his conversations; but neither 
they nor indeed any other man (he proceeds to say) were his 
disciples, for he had no disciples, and never professed to be a 
teacher. Hence he never called his hearers μαστραβιτα, but οἱ 
συνόντες. See this whole topic discussed at length, Xen. Mem. 
1, 2. — τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ, my proper business, my appointed mission, 
already described as assigned him by Apollo.

B. μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὖ, sc. διαλέγομαι, but in case I not re-
ceive pay, not converse. — παρίχω ... ἐνωτάν, I give liberty to 
question me to rich and poor alike, and to every one who may 
wish, εἴνας = παριτίς δοσίς ἄν. Stallb. — τὴν ἄλλην ὑπόχους, 
bear the responsibility. — ἀποκρινόμενος, answering, has refer-
ence to the Socratic method of question and answer, and is 
equivalent to entering into conversation. — τούτων ... ἄν ... 
μηδείς. Of (in respect to) these (alleged disciples) I should not 
justly bear the responsibility, to no one of whom I ever prom-
ised, etc.

C. ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν, κ.τ.λ. This clause may depend
directly on εἶπον, or may constitute the answer to the question ὅποιον, κ.τ.λ. — they do it, because they are pleased. Most editions prefer the former, Stallbaum the latter reading. I have adopted the former because of its greater case and naturalness. The same words are used above, 23, C. There, however, the participle ἄκουοντος stands last, and is followed by its proper case, the genitive, ἦταν τοῖον, κ.τ.λ., while here the verb χαίρουσιν follows the participle and is followed by its appropriate case, the dative, viz., ἦταν τοῖον, κ.τ.λ.—τοῦτο, sc. to examine those who suppose that they are wise but are not.—παρί τρόπω. Among these ways, Xenophon (Mem. 1, 1, 3) specifies ὀλονίως, ἔνειας, φήμας, συμβολαι.—εὐδέλεγκτα, strictly, easy to be confuted; but here, easy to be tested and proved.

D. εἰ γὰρ δὴ, for if really.—χρὴν δῆσυν, they ought surely. The imperf. implies that they had not done it.—εἰτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι . . . νικᾶν ὄδοιν, αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ., both if any of them, after having become older, become conscious that when they were young, etc. Instead of εἰτε the correlative member of the sentence begins with the more emphatic εἰ δὲ. So below, 40, D, E, εἰτε δὴ μηδείς αὐτῶν ἐστιν . . . εἰ δὲ αὐτῶν ἀποκρήσασαν. So δὲ is sometimes antithetic to τε, and εἰ δὲ to ὅτε.—αὐτοὶ, themselves, in contradistinction from their relatives. So αὐτοῖς in the previous clause.—μεμνημόσαι depends on χρὴν in the antithetic member of the sentence, the force of which still continues.—ἐναυσά. Cf. Cr. 659, γ; K. 300, 4, R. 8.—Κρίτων αὐτοῖς, this Crito here. His name has become identified with that of Socrates, as his friend and patron, and is perpetuated in the Platonic dialogue, or rather monologue, called Crito. He was a wealthy Athenian, of the same deme (δημότης) or ward as Socrates, viz., Alopece, and now, it seems, like him, far advanced in life. The son Critobulus seems to have done little credit either to his father or his teacher. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 3, 8 seqq.; Athen. 220, A.
E. Αὐτραίας. Cf. Diog. Laert. 2, 60.—ὁ Σφήττους, of the deme Sphettus. It was customary at Athens to add by way of distinction to the name of the individual the ward to which he belonged, and often also the name of his father. The same object was accomplished at Rome, as it also is in modern times, by several names.—Αἰσχίνου, usually called the Socratic, to distinguish him from the orator of the same name. He established no school of philosophy, but taught the doctrines of his master for money, and wrote Socratic dialogues. The extant dialogues, however, which bear his name, and which have been edited by Fischer, are not genuine.—ὁ Κηφισεῖς, of the deme Cephisia. This Antiphan is to be distinguished from the orator and from several others of the same name. The son, Epigenes, is mentioned by Xenophon (Mem. iii. 12), as well as by Plato in his Phædo, 59.—ῥοίνυ, moreover, is not inferential but transitional, as it often is in the orators as well as the philosophers. Cf. Stallb. ad loc., also Schaefer ad Demosth. Several of the names which follow are found only here, e. g. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Δαντοδόρος. Touching Demodocus, see Theag. 127, E; Adimantus, de Repub. 357–368, 548; Apollodorus, Phæd. 59, A, 117, D; Xen. Mem. iii. 11, 17. Apollodorus was a most devoted follower of Socrates. Theages and Plato also were favorite disciples.—καταμηνεία is Latin, deprecari, sensus est: non potest Theodotus Nicostratum fratrem rogare, ne me accuset et contra me testetur. Stallb.

A. μάλιστα μὲν is correlative to εἰ δὲ τὸν. The best time 31 for Meletus to call some of these witnesses—the time when he ought especially to have called them—was in the course of his argument before the court; but if he forgot it then, &c.—παραχωρᾶ, give way, yield him the floor as we say, or in the technical language of the Greek bar, let him speak or testify during my water (the measure of time by the clepsydra).
B. άν λόγον ἔχον βοήθουσέ, might have a reason for helping me, i.e. for defending me, right or wrong.—άλλ᾽ ἡ. Cf. note, 20, D.—ζυνίσαι Μελήτω, κ.τ.λ. Comp. note, 21, B.—Εἰεν. Cf. note, 19, A. Socrates here concludes his direct defence, διὰ μὲν ... ἀπολογείσαυ ... τοιαύτα, and proceeds to justify himself in not resorting to the ordinary means of moving the compassion of his judges and so saving his life.—Τάλα δ᾽αυ, κ.τ.λ. Such means of acquittal were expressly prohibited by law. Cf. Demos. adv. Timocr. ; Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 4. But the law was disregarded, and it was the prevailing practice to bring in the wives and children of the accused, and to resort to all possible ways of exciting the compassion of the judges, as is manifest from many passages of the orators and of Aristophanes, e.g. Vesp. 568 sqq.; Demost. in Mid. 99; Isoc. de Perm. 31. Ast thinks the Apology here a manifest imitation of Isocrates in the passage last cited, and therefore not genuine; but with how little reason, see Schleiermacher ad loc.—γὰρ δὲ οὐδὲν ἂνα, κ.τ.λ., while I, as ought to have been expected (ἀνα), will do none of these things.—καὶ ταῦτα, and that, too, when incurring, &c.

D. οὐκ ἄξιον μὲν γὰρ ἔγγρα, εἰ δ᾿οὖν, for I for my part do not expect it, but if, I say, any one of you is in such a state of mind. For ἄξιον, cf. 19, D; for οὖν, 21, A.—καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ τοῦ Ὄμηρου, and well I may have, for in the very language of Homer. Acc. in apposition with a sentence, C. 324, 8; K. 266, R. 2; Mt. 410. So quotations, especially proverbs, are often introduced. The quotation is from Od. 19, 163, where Ulysses, in the guise of a beggar, is thus addressed by Penelope. The expression is proverbial, and denotes that the person to whom it is applied is a man among men, sprung from men and related to them—vicies γε ... τρεῖς, and sons even, men of Athens, three of them, cf. Crit. 47, B, note.—μηράκιον, a young man, &c. Lamprocles, who is called μέγας in Phaed. 65,
and is introduced in Xen. Mem. ι. 2, holding a conversation with his father touching his filial duty to his termagant mother.—παιδία, small children, sc. Sophroniscus and Menexenus, cf. Phaed. 3, where they are called σμικροί. Seneca (Epis. 104) says that the sons of Socrates resembled their mother rather than their father.

E. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ., but whether I can meet death with confidence or not is another question. He barely hints at this as one reason for his course, but dismisses it as not exactly pertinent on the present occasion.—πρὸς δ'οὖν δίκαιον, however that may be, in regard to reputation both mine and yours, &c. Cf. note, 17, A. So just below, ἀλλ' οὖν διδομένον, but whatever may be the fact, it is at least supposed.—ῃλικόντε, sc. seventy, cf. 17, D.—τοῦτο τοῦτομα, sc. σοφός, cf. 23, A.—ψευδός, the subs. is often associated with the adj. ἀλήθες, as shown by Heindorf, Ast, and Stallbaum.

A. τι εἶναι. C. 518, β; Mt. 487, 5.—ζουπερ ... ἐσομέ—35
C. 640; K. 312, R. 13; Mt. 568, 2.—καί όνομα εἶναι, to be even any thing whatever, i. e. to have any weight of character, however inconsiderable.

C. χωρίς δὲ τῆς δίκης, but irrespective of the reputation, sc. which attaches to me and of which we have been speaking. Observe the force of the article. The emphatic negative οὐδὲ should also be noticed; it appears to me that it is not even right. The second οὐδὲ is not merely correlative to the first, but emphatic = no nor, or nor even.—καταχαρίζομαι τὰ δίκαια is to pervert justice for the sake of pleasing.—ταῦτα, sc. τὰ δίκαια = justice.—ομοίωμεν. The oath of office taken by the δικαιται, and the security it afforded, are very often adverted to, particularly by the Attic orators, e. g. Demos. de Cor. 2 and 6. The substance of the oath was that they would administer justice according to the laws so far as there were laws, and where no laws existed, according to their own best
judgment of what was right. Cf. Poll. Onom. 8, 122; Democ. adv. Lept. 118.

D. ἄλλως τε πάντως ... μᾶλιστα μίντοι καὶ, both every other way, to be sure, especially, however, when accused of impiety, &c., cf. note on ἄλλως τε καὶ, 26, E.—σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, cf. note, ὅπερ οὖν ἂν, 17, D.—σεόν ... εἰναι. Observe the emphatic position of these words, the one at the beginning, the other at the end of the clause: I should teach you not to believe in the existence of the gods.—νομίζω τε γὰρ, sc. σεόν, for I both believe in them.—δὲ οὖδεὶς = more than any.—καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ σεόν κρίναι, and I commit it to you and the god to decide. This clause is to be closely connected with its correlative clause (νομίζω τε ... καὶ ... ἐπιτρέπω), and in that connection it implies, that he shows his belief in the gods practically by his calm reliance on the providence of God in this trial for his life. It will be observed, that Socrates here uses the singular τῷ σεόν, though he has been using the plural just before.

He may refer to the god at Delphi, of whom he has often before spoken particularly, and in the singular number (cf. τῶν σεόν τῶν ἐν Δέλφοις, 20, E, sqq.), and who, having indirectly, by means of the oracle, involved him in difficulty, would now provide for the best result; or he may refer to the supreme God, whom he often, as represented in the writings both of Plato and Xenophon, singles out and distinguishes from the inferior deities (cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 3, 13).

With the above words of pious resignation and confidence, Socrates concludes the first and principal part of his defence and submits the question of guilty or not guilty to his judges. They pronounce him guilty by a small majority of votes. The question still remained, what punishment should be inflicted. In all those cases, where the laws do not prescribe the penalty (ἀγάντες ἀγνηστοι),—and charges of impiety were of this sort, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 702, 5—it was customary for the accuser to
propose what he deemed a suitable penalty (τιμᾶσθαι), and the accused, if he chose, to propose some other punishment (ἀντιμᾶσθαι or ὑποτιμᾶσθαι), and then the judges decided between these two, no third proposition being admissible. Cf. Grote, vol. viii. chap. 68; also Boeckh, Meier and Schömann, and Smith's Dict. Antiqq.: Ἀγώνες ἄμηπτοι καὶ τιμητοί. The accusers of Socrates pronounced him worthy of death. Had Socrates chosen to propose banishment, for instance, instead of death, he might doubtless have escaped the extreme penalty, cf. 37, C; Crit. 52, C. But when he disdained to acknowledge guilt by proposing any counter-assessment, and even claimed reward instead of punishment as his due, the judges took offence and sentenced him to death. His remarks on what he thought the proper sentence constitute the second part of the Apology, capp. 25–29.

A. τὸ μὲν μὴ ἄγανακτεῖν depends on ξυμβάλλεται. The article simply marks the infinitive a little more distinctly as the object of the main action; otherwise we should expect the infinitive alone. Mt. 543; C, 622. The μὲν is correlative to δὲ at the commencement of the next chapter: Τιμᾶται δ' ὅν.—ἀλλα τε...καί, both many other things conspire to cause, and especially, it has happened to me not unexpected, cf. note on ἄλλοι τε καί, 28, C. The full and regular construction would have been καί δὴ καί τοῦτο ὅτι σὺκ ἄνθρωπον, κ.τ.λ. Ἀπίσι and its derivatives are used with reference to objects of fear as well as hope. So spes and sperare in Latin, cf. Virg. At sperato Deos memores fandi atque nefandi.—παρ' ὀλίγον...παρὰ πολύ. παρὰ implies comparison. for I, for my part, did not suppose it would be thus by little, but by much, sc. that the votes against me would exceed those in my favor. Cf. K. 297, iii. (2); Mt. 588, c.—εἰ τρεῖς μόνοι, κ.τ.λ. We have here taken the liberty to depart from the reading of Stallbaum, since he has departed (as we think without sufficient
reason) from the reading of most of the MSS. and all the
standard editions. His reading is τριάκοντα. If that were the
true reading, the majority against Socrates must have been
twice that number, viz., sixty; and a majority of sixty could
hardly have seemed to Socrates surprisingly small, nor would
he have added μίκας to so large a number as thirty. The diffi-
culty is created by a passage of Diog. Laert. 2, 41, in which he
says, that Socrates was condemned by a majority of 281 votes,
i.e., as the passage is usually interpreted, there were 281 votes
against him. If a change of 3 votes would have secured his
acquittal, there must have been 275 in his favor, and the whole
number of votes must have been 556. But for such a number
of dikasts, it is argued by Stallbaum, there is no authority,
since the Heliasts usually sat in sections of 500, 1000, 1500,
or some such multiple of a single section. See note, 17, A,
and authorities there cited touching the constitution of the
Heliæa. But examples are not wanting of such fractional sec-
tions, as 200, 400, 700, &c. Neither can we be sure, that all
the jurors that were impannelled were present or voted in every
trial. There does not, therefore, seem to be a sufficient reason
for departing from the commonly received and most obvious
reading and explanation of the passage.—μετέπεσον, fallen
over, sc. into the other urn, which received the votes for ac-
cquittal.—ἀποσηφεῖγαι. For this form of the plup. see note,
31, E.—ἀνέβησκε, &c. Upon the βῆμα to aid Meletus in the
advocacy of his cause, cf. note, 18, B.—χιλίας δραχμάς.
The prosecutor, unless he received a fifth part of the votes,
was liable to a fine of a thousand drachmas and also a forfeit-
ure (δρυμία) of the right to appear as prosecutor in future—a
very useful and very necessary check on the virulence of pub-
lic prosecutions in the Athenian courts. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 103;
in Mid. 23; Boeckh, Pub. Econ. Ath. chap. 9, 11. Socrates ar-
gues, that Meletus (not being the most popular or influential
of the three accusers), if he had been the sole prosecutor, would not have carried more than a third as many votes as were actually gained by the joint influence of the three, and consequently would not have received a fifth part of all the votes. Cf. Schleierm. ad loc.—τὸ πέμπτον μέρος. Observe the force of the article, the required fifth according to the well-known law. Demosthenes (de Cor. 103) uses simply τὸ μέρος in the same way, the required portion.

B. ὁ ἄνὴρ, sc. the accuser, of whom he had just been speaking in the foregoing chapter.—τιμᾶτα is middle voice. The usage in regard to assessment and counter-assessment (τιμᾶσαι and ἀντιτιμᾶσαι) has been explained above.—ἡ δῆλον, or is it needless to ask—is it evident, etc.—παῖς, refers to corporal punishment, ἀσωματία to a pecuniary penalty. The question is asked in the words of a judicial formula, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 105.—ὁ τι μαζὼν differs from τί μαζὼν only in being relative and indirect. It may be rendered because, but further indicates surprise or censure. This implication can be expressed in English only by a parenthesis: because I did not keep quiet (and what had I taken into my head, literally, learned, that I did not). Cf. Mt. 567; C. 631; K. 344, R. 5. See also Schleierm. and Stallb. ad loc.—ἐν ὑπὲρ οἱ πολλοί, sc. ἐπιμέλεια, not caring for those things which the mass care for. Cf. Mt. 634, 3.—τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, not the other magistracies, for the specifications which precede are not all magistracies, but the rest, sc. the magistracies. So Gorg. 473, C: πολίτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνων = the citizens and the rest, viz., the strangers. So οἱ ἄλλοι is often used.—ἐξομοσίων καὶ στάσεων. Conspiracies and factions abounded at Athens in the age of Socrates.—ἐπικινδυνεῖον...σώζεσαι, too upright a man to be safe if I went into these things.

C. ἀνάεις, for ἀναιῶσι, as we often use there for thither. C. 659, 8; K. 300, R. 7. Below ἀναιῶσι is equivalent to ὕπο
τοῦτο, answering to ἐπὶ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν and ἵνα is redundant: but to go and confer on each individually the greatest benefit, to this (literally, there) I went.—τῶν τε ἄλλων ... ἐπιμελεῖσαι, that is, on the principle that the man is more than his property, the state more than its possessions, and in general persons or things more than their adjuncts. The same great principle is often inculcated by our Lord in the gospels, cf. Mat. vi. 25, 33.

D. τιμᾶσαι here also is mid.—to assess myself. Compare E, below: εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἄξιας τιμᾶσαι. —τουμένων δὲ τι, instead of τουτον οἷον, to make it more indefinite; such a good of whatever kind it may be, as, etc. Below we have a still more singular mixing of correlatives: μᾶλλον πρέπει οὖσα ὁ, where we should expect μᾶλλον ... ὁ or οὖσα ὁ, but find both forms brought together. A similar construction occurs at 30, A: πρότερον μηδὲ οὖσα σφόδρα ὁ, except that there μηδὲ is interposed between πρότερον and οὖσα, and makes the construction somewhat less concise and abrupt. —πένθι. Cf. note, 23, B.—εὐεργετή, a public benefactor, a term of honor, which the Athenians conferred by formal vote on those who had deserved well of the state, and which foreigners, and even foreign kings and princes, were ambitious to receive. So in Egypt, Ptolemy Euergetes.—ἐπὶ τῇ ἕμετρᾳ παρακλησεῖ, for your admonition, i. e. to instruct you, the adj. taking the place of the objective gen.—ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτείσαι. The Prytaneum was a sort of city hall or state house, where the laws and public archives were kept, where the Prytanes and some other magistrates had their meals, and entertained, at the public expense, not only ambassadors from foreign states, but citizens who had deserved well of the state. To be thus entertained was the highest honor. Socrates claims it as a εὐεργετής who has rendered the most useful services to the state, and also as affording him the requisite leisure, that he might devote himself
wholly to the instruction of the citizens.—πολὺ γε μᾶλλον. Victors in the public games were honored with entertainment at the Prytaneum. Socrates claims the honor as due to himself much more at least than to such.—ἵππῳ, a race horse under a rider; ἕνωρίδι, a two horse chariot; ᾠνίτις, a general term for carriage, here denotes especially a chariot drawn by more than two horses, and may be rendered four horse chariot.

—’Ολυμπιάσιν, at the Olympic games. The acc. (’Ολυμπιάδα or ’Ολύμπια) more frequently follows μικῶν. See Lex. under μικῶς.—δικίων εἶναι ... εἶναι. Socrates was an uncompromising enemy of all seeming, and often exposes the folly, as well as the baseness of it, since the best way to seem to be good (in whatever excellence), is to be good. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 7, 1. —δ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δείται, ἐγὼ δὲ δίομαι, sc. because he is rich, as the victor in a chariot must be, while I am poor. He here has respect to the πέντε above, as in the preceding clause he refers to the εὐργίτην. He is a real benefactor, and he is really poor. He both deserves and needs to be provided for in the Prytaneum.

A. παραπληροῖς ... ἔσσερ περὶ τοῦ οἰκτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνιβολῆς 37 σεως. The reference is to chap. 23, where he scorns to resort to supplications or appeals to compassion, and yet denies that he does this αὐθαίρετος, from arrogance. Here he employs the rare word ἀνιβολής instead of the usual ἰκετεία.—τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, not such as that, but such as this; not such as you suppose, but such as I proceed to explain (cf. note, 21, B), i.e. it is not arrogance but truth and duty that impels me.—ἐκῶν εἶναι is stronger than ἐκῶν alone. It means, so far as depends on my will. C. 623, N.; K. 306, R. 8; Mt. 545.—πέλας sometimes takes two acc.—διαλύμενα. The perf. has respect to this apology, which he regards as virtually finished—it was finished so far as the question of guilt or innocence was concerned.—ἔσσερ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνιβόλους. He probably has
particular reference to the Lacedemonians, whose laws Socrates,
in common with most of the philosophers, highly revered,
and who, as Thucydides and Plutarch inform us, never decided
capital trials hastily, but extended them over several days.

B. τον κακόν, some evil, i. e. any punishment. So ουκούν
τινός, any thing of this sort. It is gen. of price or penalty,
and is accompanied with the dat. of the person (ἵμαται) on
whom the penalty is assessed. The same construction is seen
in ὁ Μῖλησι μοι τιμᾶτε, et passim. Ad rem, cf. note, 38, B.
— ἢ μὴ πάσω. ἢ is interrogative: shall I do it through fear
that I may suffer death, when I am so ignorant of death that I
do not know whether it is a good or an evil?— ἔλωμαι, subj.
sor. in a deliberative question. It is to be rendered by the
future. It is followed by a partitive genitive: shall I choose
of those things which I know to be evil, sc. imprisonment, ban-
ishment, &c. We have in this sentence another example of
that usage which occurs so often in Plato—two constructions
condensed into one. The author might have said: ἔλωμαι τι
τοῖν ὁ διὸ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἑστίν, or ἔλωμαι τὶ γὰν, ὁ διὸ οἶδα, κακῶν
ἕστων. But instead of either we have parts of both. Cf.
Stallb. ad loc.

C. τῷ δὲ καλοσταμένη ἀρχῇ, the ever shifting government.
The Eleven who had charge of the prisons, executions, &c.,
were chosen annually (one from each of the ten tribes, with
a secretary). Socrates implies that it were hardly worth while
to live subject to the caprice of such a succession of petty
tyrants as might chance to be established from time to time
(such is the exact force of δὲ καλοσταμένη) over the public
perpetual imprisonment, because he had no money and there-
fore would never be released.— τιμήσομαι . . . τιμήσοιτε. Ob-
serve the change of voice. The middle voice is used of the
accuser and the accused, and the active of the judges.
D. βαρύνεται, too burdensome.—ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ., while others, however (or forsooth), will bear them easily. Cf. note, 34, C.—κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, κ.τ.λ., and if on the one hand I do repulse them, they will themselves drive me out of the city.—ἐξελῶσι is Attic fut. C. 200; K. 117, 1; Mt. 181, 2.

E. ἡμῖν, for us, in respect to us, is inserted simply to make the discourse more emphatic and subjective. C. 410, Note; K. 284, 10, d; Mt. 387.—ἐξελέσων, sc. into exile.—ὡς εἰρη-μνομένω, supposing that I spoke ironically.

A. ὅ δὲ ἀνέξίαστος, κ.τ.λ., and that a life without investi-38 gation is not worth living, literally, not to be lived. This clause depends on λέγω δι', and ἀνέξίαστος, contrary to the prevailing usage, is to be taken in an active sense.—ῥαίτα δ', this on the other hand. δὲ emphasizes the apodosis in the latter of the two supposed cases. Cf. Mt. 616, 3.

B. δόσα ἐμελλὼν ἐκτίνειν, as much as I was about to pay, i. e. as much as I should be likely to be able to pay.—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ ζήλωσιν implies that he would have considered the loss of property, if he had it, no real loss. This accords with what he had said above (37, B), that he would not assess himself to the amount of any evil, for he did not deserve it.—νῦν δὲ . . . οὐ γὰρ, but now I cannot amerce myself in a sum of money, for I have not got it.—ἀντὶ δ' ἓγγυσαί. Intell. φασί, quod continetur precedentis verbo κελεύσατι. Stalb.—ἀξιωχρεφ. Cf. note, 20, E. The comparatively small fine in which Socrates here proposes to amerce himself (only half a talent, or about $500), and the whole strain of his remarks on the subject, prove that he was not in earnest. Accordingly the Apology ascribed to Xenophon denies that he proposed a counter and lower assessment. He was not really desirous to preserve his life. He must have foreseen, that his judges would not accept such a substitute for the death penalty,
which the accusers had named in their indictment. He must also have known, that his freedom of speech, his playful irony, and especially his assumption of entire innocence which merited reward instead of punishment, would provoke the hostility of those judges at least who had already pronounced him guilty, and, as they had to choose between the penalties proposed by the parties, they would certainly choose that of the accusers and put him to death. According to Diogenes Laertius, eighty who had voted for his acquittal, now passed over to the majority and voted for his death. Cf. Cic. Orat. 1, 54: Socratis responso sic judices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

Here ends the second part of the Defence. The vote is now taken touching the penalty. Socrates is condemned to death by a majority of 83 votes. He then concludes his speech in a tone of conscious innocence and moral heroism, in which, as Cicero says, he appears, not so much in the attitude of a culprit or a suppliant before his judges, as of their master and lord.

C. Οὐ πολλοὶ ... χρόνοι. The remainder of the life of Socrates (now 70 years of age) was so short, that it was hardly worth their while to incur so much dishonor for the sake of extinguishing what would soon have terminated in the course of nature.—διὸ μάλα ἢ ἔτερα καὶ αὐτίκα, you will have the name and blame, both here in a bad sense, though often in a good one. For οὖν, cf. note, 17, A.

D. τολμᾶς καὶ αἰνοχυρίας, i. e. what Socrates would consider audacity and shamelessness, viz., daring to say and do such things, whether true or false, noble or ignoble, as would disgrace him, while persuading them. Cf. οὔτε τολμᾶ πάντως, below, 39, A.

E. τόρε, sc. while making my defence, before sentence was pronounced.—ἐκεῖνος, sc. ἀπολογησάμενος, having defended myself in that way.
B. 

are... as... being = inasmuch as I am. — δεινοι 39 is the opposite of προσβύτης, and δίκαιος of βραβύς. The swifter pursuer, viz., vice, is represented as overtaking the swifter party, viz., the judges who condemned Socrates; while Socrates himself, tardy with years, is seized upon by the more tardy pursuer, viz., death. — ζανάροι δικην δικλον, having incurred sentence of death. — ὅπο τῆς δικαιίας, sc. as judge. Compare Maximus Tyrius (Diss. 9), where he says: Socrates was, indeed, put to death, but the Athenians were condemned, and God and truth was their judge. — ἀφληκτότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ δίκιαν = having been convicted of wickedness and injustice. — μετρίως ἐχειν, to be suitable, i.e. well.

C. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, the after this, i.e. the sequel, or consequence. — χρησμοδοῦσιν, οὕτως μελλωσιν ἀποσκεύασαι. This idea, that the soul, when about to leave the body, shows its divine nature and prophetic power, was widely prevalent among the ancients. Thus Patroclus predicts the death of Hector (Ili. 16, 851 sqq.), and Hector prophesies the death of Achilles (Ili. 22, 358 sqq.); cf. also Phaed. 84, E; Xen. Apol. 30; Cic. de Div. 1, 30; Sex. Empir. Math. 9, 20. — οἷαν ἔμε ἀπεκτόρας. For the double acc. cf. C. 435; K. 280, 1; Mt. 421, obs. 4. — τοῦ διδῶνα λέγοντο τοῦ βιου, from giving proof of your life, i.e. from the necessity of letting your manner of life be put to the proof.

D. ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους, by putting men to death.

E. ἐν δὲ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀγολίαν ἄγουσι, while the magistrates are busy, and I do not yet come, whither when I have come, I must be put to death, i.e. before the Eleven (cf. note, 37, C) get ready to lead me away to prison.

A. τι ποτε νοεῖ, what in the world it means, or what can 40 be its meaning. Cf. note, 20, D. — δὲ ἄνδρες δικασταί. He has habitually addressed the court hitherto as ἄνδρες Ἀρείων. The change here is intentional, since that portion of the court
whom he now addresses were judges indeed, that is, administrators of justice. — ἦ γὰρ εἰς εὐδοκία μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαμονίου, for the customary prophetic voice of the divinity. Cf. 31, D, note ibid. Schleiermacher considers ἢ τοῦ δαμονίου as a gloss, because Plato elsewhere calls the voice itself τὸ δαμόνιον, and where a genitive of source is added to μαντικὴ, φωνή, &c., it is not τοῦ δαμονίου, but τοῦ θεοῦ. Stallbaum admits that the combination here is unusual, but does not, for that reason, feel at liberty to depart from the established reading. — καὶ πάντα ἐν συμποιί, even on very trifling occasions. πάντα is often placed thus before the preposition for the sake of emphasis. — ἂ γε δὴ οἰς ζεῖν ἐν τίς καὶ νομίζεται, which one might certainly suppose to be, and are in fact usually considered. The relative is the object of the first verb and the subject of the second. The former verb is optative, to denote what any one might naturally suppose; the other is indicative, to denote what is in fact the prevailing sentiment. The reader will observe the difference between οἰς ζεῖν and νομίζει here implied and habitually observed.

B. τοῖτο ἄγαδὼν γεγονέναι. In a conversation with Hermogenes, recorded by Xenophon (Mem. iv. 8), Socrates assigns several reasons why, aside from his hopes for another world, he deemed it better for his happiness in this life, and better for his reputation, that he should die then rather than live to a more advanced age. Add to these the considerations touching a future life, which follow in the next chapter of the Apology, and we have the most complete demonstration of his deliberate preference to be condemned rather than to be acquitted, and thus a justification of the otherwise inexplicable manner and spirit of his defence.

C. Few passages in the Greek classics have been oftener cited, translated and commented upon in ancient or modern times, than the chapter on which we now enter. Cf. Plut.
Cons. ad Apol.; Xen. Cyrop. viii. 7, 18 sqq.; Cic. Tusc. Quest. 1, 41; also the Christian Fathers, Eusebius, Theodoret, &c., &c.—δοικεν γάρ εὑρεσον. Stallbaum remarks, that here we doubtless have the true Socratic doctrine of a future state, whereas the Phædo and other Dialogues exhibit Plato's views on the subject. Accordingly Xenophon in his Cyropaedia, as above cited, makes Cyrus on his death-bed discourse in exact accordance with the passage before us.—οἷον μὴ δὲν εἶναι, of such a nature as to be nothing, i. e. to be annihilated. So be low, D: οἷον ἕπνος, and E: οἷον ἀποδημὴσαι.—κατὰ τὰ λέγομενα, according to what is said, i. e. the common opinion.—γὰρ ψυχή, dat. for the gen. C. 411; Mt. 389, 3.—τοῦ τῶνον. The gen. of the place from which, without a preposition, may follow a verbal noun as well as a verb.—τοῦ ἔνειδε, for τοῦ ἐναιδία, because of the motion expressed by μετοικεῖσα.—εἰς δὴ μηδεμία. This εἰς has its correlative in εἰ δ' αὖ below, E, which is only more emphatic than another εἰς. Compare οὕτω...οὐδὲ γε, 19, E, and note ibid.

D. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἷοι introduces a long and involved sentence. The force of the ἂν falls on εἰπέειν several lines below, where it is repeated (cf. notes, 17, D, and 23, B). οἷοι itself and διοι are also repeated.—μὴ δὲ οἰκίσκην, not only a private individual. C. 671, 12; K. 321, 3. The reader need not be informed, that by the great king the Greeks mean the king of Persia, the richest and most powerful sovereign with whom they had to do in all their early history. The comparison of death to night and sleep has always been, as it is now, common especially with the poets. Cf. Hom. Il. 14, 231; 16, 672; Od. 18, 80; Catul. 5, 5; Hor. Od. 1, 28, 15.

A. εἰς Ἄιδον, to Pluto's, sc. house or realm. So we omit θι the word house after the owner's name, and the word church after the name it bears.—Μίνως τε καὶ Ραδάμανθος, nom. by attraction to the relative εἰσερ. Minos and Rhadamanthus
were brothers (hence closely connected by τε καὶ), both sons of Jove, and celebrated kings, judges and lawgivers, the former in Crete and the latter in the islands of the Ægean. Æacus, who reigned in Ægina, was also a son of Jupiter, and the father of Pelcus and Telamon. Triptolemus was the favorite of Demeter the inventor of the plough and agriculture, and the great hero in the Eleusinian Mysteries. We find Minos represented as performing the office of judge in the lower regions in the Homeric poems (Od. 11, 568 sqq.); Rhadamanthus in Pindar (Olymp. 2, 137 sqq.); when Æacus was first added to the number, we do not know. In the Gorgias (523, E), these three are represented as administering justice at the entrances to Tartarus and to the Isles of the Blessed: Rhadamanthus to souls from Asia, Æacus to those from Europe, and Minos, as president judge, to decide in doubtful cases. Triptolemus is assigned that office only in this passage, though in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (153), he sits in judgment on earth; and as others, whose names are not mentioned, are here said to be judges in the lower world, we may perhaps suppose that the common opinion ascribed to Triptolemus and others the same office and occupation there, which they held on earth. The conception is, however, limited here to those early and just judges and lawgivers, whom the imagination of the Greeks had invested with the dignity of demigods (ὅσοι τῶν ἡμῶν δίκαιοι ἔγνωσαν ἐν τῷ εαυτῶν Βίῳ).—ἐνὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δεῖξαι ἄν ὡμῶν; Quanti tandem estimatis. So Cicero renders it. Tusc. Quest. 1, 41, 98.—εἰ μηδεγε, κ.τ.λ., for to myself also the converse there would be delightful, where I might converse with Palamedes and Ajax the son of Telamon. Both these Grecian heroes had come to a tragical end, the former at the hands of the army, the other by his own hands, in consequence of unjust decisions brought about by the wiles of Ulysses. The story
of Ajax is found in Homer (Od. 11, 541 sqq.); that of Palamedes in the Tragic Poets, especially Euripides.

B. ἀναπαραβάλλοντι ... οὐκ ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂ

C. ἀμήχανον ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂ

D. ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων, to be set free from the business and troubles of life.

E. ταῦτα ταῦτα λυπούντες ἀπερ ἐγὼ ἐμάς ἐλύσων, i. e. besiege them with warnings and expostulations. λυπεῖν here takes a double accusative, as a verb of doing ill. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.—ἰδον δοκῶν τῷ εἴης μηδὲν ὄρεις, if they think they are something when they are nothing. The same idea is expressed in the same words by Paul, Gal. vi. 3.
CRITO.

43 A. τηρικάδε, at this time of day, that is, at so early an hour. τηρικα and its corresponding relative and demonstrative words, together with their derivatives, have respect, in Attic usage, not to time in general, but to the hour of the day.—η οί τηρι ω τι εντιν, or is it not still early in the morning? Buttman writes τηρω (without the iota subscript); Fischer τηρω; the earlier editions τηρωι, which Bekker, Ast and Stallbaum shorten into τηρω after the authority of the poets and the old grammarians.—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, certainly it is, is the most common expression of full assent in Plato's Dialogues. Sometimes it stands in construction with a verb, as in Apol. 26, B, but more frequently by itself, as here. πάνυ γε is also frequent in affirmative answers, cf. Apol. 25, O. The πάνυ expresses assent, the μὲν and γε restriction, and oὖν accordance = certainly so far (it is) as you say.—τηρικα μάλιστα, what time of day about. μάλιστα, with words of number, denotes uncertainty, or indefiniteness.—Ορθρος βαζώς, very early dawn. τηρω is simply morning; ορθρος is the dawn or rising of the day. βαζως adds emphasis, very early. We speak of midnight deep, deep night, &c. The Greeks extend the same figure to morning and evening—the former in its earliest, and the latter in its latest stages.—υπακοίουσαι, to hearken and hence open the door for admittance. ορθροσ gives emphasis to the expression of surprise: I wonder how it happened that he was willing to admit you, sc. at so very early an hour, as he was not accus-
tomed to open the prison gate very early, cf. Phædo, 59, D. —τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. I have said in the Preface, perhaps the same cell, hewn out of the solid rock, near the old Agora, which now bears the name of "the Prison of Socrates." Professor Felton says: "undoubtedly; I read the Phædo there, and when I came to the passage where Crito says, the sun is yet upon the mountains, I stepped to the entrance of the cell, and lo! the shadows covered the valleys, but the sun still lingered on Mars' Hill, the Acropolis, and Lycabettus." —καὶ τι καὶ εὐργίητα, and he has also been somewhat obliged by me. For the omission of the augment. in εὐργίητα, see C. 188, N.; K. 126, R. 1; Mt. 167, 6. —Ἐπικεκὼς πάλαι, a considerable time since.

B. ἵνα πώς, then how did it happen, that, &c., expressive of surprise.—οὖν ἀν αὑτὸς Ἑλέου, I should not have myself preferred to be in so much sleeplessness and sorrow, sc. if I had been at liberty to choose simply for myself; but for your sake I felt constrained not to disturb your quiet slumbers. This reason is implied here and more fully expressed below: ἐπίνησις σε οὐκ ἔγειρον, ἵνα ὃς ἡδίστα διάγης.—ἐν τοσαύτῃ, sc. so much as I have suffered, while I have been watching your peaceful slumbers. τὸ preceding ἀγυννία shows that τοσαύτῃ belongs not only to ἀγυννία, but also to λύπη = so much both sleeplessness and sorrow.—ὅς ἡδίως = ὅτι οὕτως ἡδίως. So below, ὡς ῥαδίως = ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως. Stallb.—διάγης. The subjunctive after a past tense denotes continuance to the present time.—τῆλικατον δὲντα, a man of my age, sc. 70, Apol. 17, D.

C. ἄλλ' οὐδὲν αὑτῶς ἐπιλύεται, κ.τ.λ., but not at all does their age set them free from grieving at their present fortune, literally, as to not grieving, or so as not to grieve. τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν is acc. of specification, and does not differ essentially from
166 NOTES.

ἐστιν ἀγαπατέω. μὴ οὐχὶ = ne non, or quo minus. Instead of ἀυτοὺς, ἀυτοῖς was the reading previous to Bekker.—ὡς ἡμοἰ δοκῇ. Cf. note, 18, A.—ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι. This is one of several ways in which the superlative is strengthened by the Greeks. The origin of the formula is variously explained. In such passages as this, it may be analyzed as Stahlbaum does viz. = ἐν τοῖς βαρίωσιν ἐγώ βαρύτατ' ἐν ἐνέγκαμι. In other passages, τοῖς seems to be neuter, and to be used like a pronoun, i.e. ἐν τοῖς = ἐν τούτοις. Cf. C. 462, β; K. 239, R. 2; Mt. 290.—τίνα ταύτην, κ.κ. φέρεις = τίς ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀγγέλια, ἢ φέρεις.—ἡ το πλοῖον, κ.τ.λ., or has the vessel arrived, &c.

The ἢ in such interrogative sentences is restrictive of a more general question, or corrective of the foregoing context = but why do I ask? The vessel here mentioned is that in which Theseus returned from Crete, bringing back in safety the seven young men and seven maidens, whom the Athenians were obliged to send every year as a tribute to Minos, the Cretan king. Ever after this unexpected deliverance, the same vessel (patched and repaired till its identity became a vexed question for the speculative philosophers) was sent every year in sacred procession to the island of Delos, as a thank offering to Apollo. And from the moment when the sacred stern was crowned with garlands till its return, it was unlawful to defile the purified city with any public execution. It so happened, that the vessel set sail for Delos the very day before the condemnation of Socrates. He thus gained a respite of some thirty days, which he spent in prison, but in free conversation with his friends. See the whole thing explained in full, Phædo, 58. Cf. also Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 2; Plut. Vit. Thes., &c.

D. δόκει μὲν. μὲν is not unfrequently used, especially after δόκει, oμαί, and the like verbs, without the corresponding ἢ expressed, but implying some such clause as σαφῶς δόκει μὲν ὅτα. Here, however, δόκει μὲν is employed with that Attic
urbanity, which avoids positive assertions, even when no doubt is intended, for just below he says: δὴλον οὖν, διὶ ἥξει τῆμερον. Sunium was the south-eastern promontory of Attica.

—τῷ ὕμνῳ δyecto. A formula of prayer or well-wishing, often used by the Greeks in entering upon any enterprise or at the mention of any anticipated event, equivalent to the Latin, quod bene vertat. The use of it by Socrates in this connection is a striking illustration of his cheerfulness and hopefulness in view of death.

A. ποιν, I suppose, ni fallor.—τῇ ἱστεραῖα ἥ ἄν ἲςη = 44 the next day after the ship may arrive. ἱστεραῖα is followed by ἥ because it involves a comparative.—Φασὶ γέ τοι δῇ, so say, at least, to be sure, those who have the disposal of these things, sc. the Eleven. Φασὶ is emphatic, they say so to be sure, though Crito would fain doubt it and show them to be mistaken, if he can but persuade Socrates. The restrictive particles, γέ τοι = so much at all events cannot be denied, viz., that they say so. δῇ then positively affirms the same thing: they certainly say so. Cf. Arn. Gr. Pr. Comp. 191, 192, and Hermann ad Viger, p. 790.—τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας, the coming day, i.e. the day about to dawn = to-day.—τῆς ἐτήρας, the second day = to-morrow. Socrates means of course the same days which Crito above calls τῆμερον and αὔριον.—δλίγον πρῶτερον, a little while ago, of course after midnight; dreams before midnight the ancients deemed false.—κατανοήσεις = δοκεῖς in Attic writers. How it came to have that meaning, see explained in Stallb. ad loc., and in the Lexicons.—ἐν καρφῷ τιν, quite opportunely.

B. ἄματι κεν τριτάτω, κ.τ.λ. These are the words of Achilles declaring to Agamemnon his intention to return home to Phthia, and his expectation to arrive there on the third day. Hom. II. 9, 363. Socrates finds in them a beautiful accommodation to his own departure to his heavenly home. This dream
is not to be set down as a mere fiction of Plato. Besides the general truthfulness and trustworthiness of this dialogue, Socrates was a notorious dreamer of dreams or seer of visions, and a full believer in their divine significance. Moreover, he was a great reader and admirer of Homer. What, then, could be more natural or probable, than that his approaching departure to another world, which he talked of by day and meditated on by night, should present itself before him in his dreams and clothe itself in the familiar language of the Homeric Poems.—ἐναργές, clear, i.e. easy to be understood.—μὲν οὖν = imo vero, nay but. Arn. Gr. Pr. Comp. 373.—θαυμόνε is used as a form of address, in itself respectful, and in its own proper signification only respectful, yet sometimes applied in such a connection, and spoken in such a tone of irony or severity, that some lexicographers have erroneously concluded that it was in its nature a term of reproach, as well as of honor. Compare ὁ μακάρεις Κρίτων below, and our My dear sir, My excellent fellow.—τί καὶ νῦν, yet even now, implies that Crito had previously plied Socrates with unavailing arguments of the same kind.—οὐ μία, not one merely. Al. οὐδεμία.—χωρὶς μὲν ... τί δὲ, besides in the first place sustaining the loss of an invaluable friend, I shall in the second place incur the reproach of many. The unusual concurrence of μὲν and δὲ in the same proposition, sets forth strongly the twofold evil. The correction of Wolf, τοῦ ἐστερήσατι for σοῦ ἐστερήσατι of the MSS. is with good reason adopted in all the recent editions.

οὐδένα μὴ ποτὲ. This combination has the same emphasis of negation as οὐ μὴ = such as there is no reason to expect that I shall ever find.—ὡς οἶος τ' ἄν σε σώζειν. The ὡς belongs with the participle ἄν, not, as Buttmann and some others have taken it, with the infinitive ἀμελήσατι and performs here the office which it usually performs with a participle, viz., of denoting the ground or supposition on which Crito would appear
to many to have neglected the preservation of the life of Socrates: as if I was able, i.e. supposing that I was able to save you;—a supposition which, in this case, was contrary to the fact, since the inflexible will of Socrates rendered it impossible for Crito to save him. Cf. C. 640; K. 312, 6; Mt. 568.

O. τὴν αἰσχίνην ἐν ταύτῃ δόξα, ἡ δοκεῖν, what reputation could be more dishonorable than this—than to be reputed. Here the comparative is first followed by a genitive, and then by an explanatory clause with ἡ. C. 461, 3; K. 323, R. 5; Mt. 450. It will be observed, that δόξα and δοκεῖν have the same root.—διερεπ ἀν πράξεν, just as they were done, however that may be. ἀν denotes contingency, and may be expressed with διερεπ = in whatever manner, or with the verb = however that may be.

D. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παράντα. Al. δηλοῖ by conjecture. But the emendation is not necessary. The passage is explained by Stallbaum, Jacobs, and others, as an example of anacoluthon: Nam Crito quum additus esset haec: ἓν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐξειργασμένα ἐστίν, constructione repente mutata, rem multo gravius eloquitur, dicens: ἓν οὖν τὲ εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ. Stallb.—ἐν γὰρ ὕψεως. C. 599, N; K. 259, R. 6; Mt. 513, obs. 3.—οὐκ . . . ἦσαν. The past tense of the indicative here implies, that they are not able. C. 601, 5; K. 330, 5; Mt. 519.—οὕτε γὰρ φρόνιμον, κ.τ.λ. The noble sentiment is here implied, that so long as the multitude cannot alter a man's character for better or worse, all else is of no account. The concluding clause in this chapter, ποίους . . . τῶν χωρίων, means, that the multitude are governed by mere chance and caprice instead of fixed principle.

E. ἂρα γε ἡμι ἵματι προμηθεί, do you not at least feel some solicitude for me, &c. The particles imply a fear that he does.—οἵ συνοφάντα. The word is well explained in the Lexicon of Liddell and Scott, and the class of men in Smith's Dictionary
of Antiquities.—πράγματα παρέχοντες, make trouble.—ἡ καὶ
μᾶς, κ.τ.λ., either to lose even all our property, or at least
large sums of money, or even to suffer some additional
penalty, such as imprisonment, exile, or death, cf. below, 53, B.
—ζασον αὐτῷ χαίρειν, bid it farewell, that is, dismiss the fear.

For ποὺ, cf. note, 44, A.—μὴτε τοῖνυν φοβοῦ. The sen-
tence, interrupted by a long explanation, is resumed in μὴτε
ταῦτα φοβούμενοι, below, B, and is there followed by the
correlative clause, μὴτε ὅ θελες.—τούτους is contemptu-
sous, like the Latin iste, cf. below, 48, C: τούτων τῶν πολλῶν,
and Demosthenes, passim.—ὅς εἶτελεῖς, sc. εἰσίν, how easily
they can be bought. Crito knew this from his own experience,
cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 9, 1.—ἐν αὐτῶν, for them, sc. to bribe
them.

B. ἵππορξει, is ready for your use. ἱκανός is added to
express the idea, that his property alone is, in his opinion (ὅς
ἡγομαι), sufficient. Crito was wealthy, cf. note, 33, D.—
ἕνω. Simmias and Cebes were Thebans, cf. Phaed. 59, C.—
ἀποκάμης, desist from the effort. Crito takes for granted that,
in itself considered, irrespective of the danger to his friends,
Socrates must desire, and make effort, to save himself. ἀπο-
κάμω is more frequently followed by a participle, though
sometimes, as here, by an infinitive. Cf. C. 633; K. 310.
—ὅ θελες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, cf. Apol. 37, C, D.—ὅ τι
χρῆσαι σαυτῷ, what to do with yourself. Cf. C. 432; K. 278, 4;
Mt. 409, 6.—ἐλούσῃ, by attraction for ἄλλαξον. C. 527, R.;
K. 332, R. 13; Mt. 474.

C. οίδε δίκαιον. οίδε is emphatic, not even right.—
σπεύσαντες τε καὶ ἐπεμείναν. See the same combination of
the opt. with the ind.—of the probable with the actual—Apol. 40,
A: οἰδείς ἂν τις καὶ νομίζει.

D. ὀλιχήσει καταλιπών. C. 637; K. 310, 4, 1; Mt. 559, c.
It is an emphatic form, as if Socrates were in haste to leave his children orphans. Observe the force of the ἐκ in ἐκπράψαυ and ἐκπαιδεύσαυ, to bring up and educate completely.—τὸ σῶν μῆρος, so far as you are concerned. Orphans at Athens were provided for by the state, and intrusted to the care of the Archon Eponymus. Still they must of course be subjected to many inconveniences (cf. Hom. II. 22, 490); and so far as Socrates was concerned, his children would be left to do well or ill, just as they might chance to do.—χρή. Αἱ χρήν.—βασμότατα is the opposite of ὄγαζε καὶ ἄνδρεῖς.

Ε. Καὶ ἡ ἐισόδος τῆς δίκης, κ.τ.λ., both the coming in of the case into court, cf. Demos. adv. Phorm.: μελλούσης τῆς δίκης ἐισέναυ ἐς τὸ δικαστήριον.—ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσέλθειν. He could have avoided coming to trial, either by flight and voluntary exile, or by inducing, as he might easily have done, the accusers to withdraw the charges before the trial had commenced.—ἀυτὸς ὁ ἄγων, κ.τ.λ. Socrates did not employ advocates, or resort to any of the ordinary means of influencing the judges.—κατάγελως. Cornar, with the approval of Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and others, suggests that there is an allusion in this word to the absurd and ridiculous conclusion of a comedy, which has its three parts, the πρότασις, ἐπίτασις, and καταστροφή, corresponding with the εἰσόδος, ἄγων, and κατάγελως of the Socratic drama, as it is here represented.—διαστεφθέντι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν is exegetical of τὸ τελευταῖον τοῦτο: and finally this almost farcical conclusion of the matter, that it should seem to have escaped us through some sloth and unmanliness of ours.

Α. εἰ τι... ἁφελος ἦν. Cf. note, Apol. 28, B. The force ἄν of the perfect is seen not only in βεβουλέυσαω, but also in πεπράξαω = to have consulted, to have been done.—ἀδίκανον, κ.τ.λ., impossible and no longer practicable.

B. ἡ πραξιμία, κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the oōpula
(ἐστιν), cf. C. 547; K. 238, R. 8; Mt. 306. For the sentiment compare the words of Paul to the Galatians, iv. 17: καλὸν δὲ ἡδονασαί ἐν καλῷ.—τῶν ἐμὸν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείσεσαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ. The strongest argument, in other words, the truth, as it appears to his mind, after careful consideration, is here beautifully represented by Socrates as his best friend, and the only one to whom he yields a controlling influence.

C. πλείω limits μαρμολύττεμα, as it is construed by Stallbaum; not ἐπικεραυνοῦσα, as it is construed by Buttmann.—δεσμοὺς καὶ ζωάτους. Observe the force of the plural, and compare Paul's emphatic enumeration of his sufferings, 2 Cor. xi. 23: ἐν κόσμῳ, ἐν πληγαῖς, ἐν φυλακαῖς, ἐν σανάτοις.—μετριώτατα σκοποῦμεν. Cf. note, Apol. 39, B. This question, in many editions, is put into the mouth of Crito. But it seems more appropriate to Socrates, who, in the next sentence, answers himself, as he often does.—ἀναλάβομεν, resume for further consideration.—ἐκάστοτε, in every instance, sc. when we were discussing the subject.

D. Καράδηλος is for καράδηλον, being attracted by λόγος. C. 551; K. 329, R. 4; Mt. 297.—ἀπα = forsooth, as it seems. Cf. K. 344, 3, and note, Apol. 34, B.—ἀλλως = temere, without reason.—δὲ ἡχοῦ, sc. in danger of losing my life.—τι λέγειν, to say something, sc. to some purpose, of some importance, cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 12.

47. A. ἄνα γε τάνωρψεω, in all human probability.—καρῶς is explained below by καλῶς.

B. τούτο πράττων, practising this, making a business of it. So πρακτίον, below. We see here Socrates's fondness for illustrations drawn from the common pursuits of life.—καὶ ἐθετιοῦν γε, yes, and eat and drink. ἄν ἔσσε. So καὶ τισίς γε, Apol. 34, D, might be rendered, yes, and some. The eating and drinking here come within the province of the λατρία, as the gymnastic exercises come under the direction of the παιδορρίβης.
D. ἀλαχώνως καὶ φοβεῖσαι. These verbs are often followed, as they are here, by an accusative of the person before whom one must be ashamed and afraid, especially to do anything dishonorable or wrong.—ἐγίνετο . . . ἀπέλλυτο. The imperfect has reference to what was said in former discussions, cf. at the beginning of the chapter: πῶς αὖ τὰ τουάτα ἐλγέτο.

Ε. πέπομενος μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαιόντων δόξῃ, by obeying not the opinion of the wise; but of the unwise, is implied in the antithesis by the position of μη. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 6: καὶ μη δὲ δοξάζειν—not what he knows, but what he does not know.—δ . . . λαβαρα, which the unjust injures. The editions before Bekker changed δ to δ. But the MSS. all have δ, and λαβαρα may be followed either by the accusative or the dative.—φαυλοτερον—cheaper, less valuable, the opposite of πιμώτερον, below.

A. τι . . . ἡμᾶς. τι for δ τι, cf. Cr. 535; K. 344, R. 1; 48 Mt. 488, 1. For the two acc. cf. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.

B. οὔτος τε ὁ λόγος, κ. τ. λ., is correlative to καὶ τῶν ἀδ νεκότει. To the suggestion, that the multitude have power to put him to death, Socrates has a twofold answer: in the first place, that does not invalidate the argument which we have gone through with nor make it any less conclusive, or in any way different from what it was, before his life was endangered; and in the second place, he says, consider also, whether this doctrine, once admitted by us, abides or not, that we must not set the highest value on mere living, but on living well.—τῶν ὀμολογομένων, things that are generally agreed upon; different from τῶν ὀμολογημένων, things that have been agreed upon in the discussion.

C. ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων, 44, E, seqq.; δόξης, 45, B, seqq.; παιδών τρόφης, 45, G, D.—μη, sc. ἥρ. C. 602; 3. ἥρ is expressed below, 49, D.—ῥαδίως, lightly, rashly.—καὶ ἀνα-θωσκομένων γὰς, yes, and would restore them to life again.
For the force of ἀν with the participle, cf. C. 615, 2; K. 260, 5; Mt. 597, 1. —τοῖτεν τῶν πολλῶν is added to express contempt, and, in connection with οὐδείν ξὺν νῷ, it implies, that it is characteristic of the multitude to act thus without reason. —ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ, the argument so establishes the point. This use of αἰρεῖ arises from its use to express a victory at the games, or a conviction in a court of justice. Cf. ratio vincit, Hor. Sat. 1, 3, 115, et al.—καὶ χρήματα τελοῦται ... καὶ χάριται. Zeugma, τελοῦται being strictly applicable only to χρήματα, and ἔγονται being required with χάριται.—καὶ αὐτοί, κ.τ.λ., and whether we shall do right ourselves both in leaving out of prison, and in being led out.

D. μὴ οὖ δέη, κ.τ.λ., we must not consider the question, whether we must die, if we remain in prison and keep quiet, nor whether we must suffer any thing else, however dreadful, rather than do wrong, i.e. we must not take the consequences into the account at all, but only the question of right and wrong. Before μὴ οὖ, there is an ellipsis of a verb of seeing, or fearing, and the meaning is, I fear, that we must not take into account, etc. Cf. C. 602, 2, 8; K. 318, R. 6; Mt. 517, obs. 4.

E. ἐν ἐγὼ πείρα πολλοῦ, κ.τ.λ., as I esteem it of great importance to persuade you to do this, but not to do it against your will, i.e. I am exceedingly desirous to pursue the course I am pursuing with your consent (persuado ıτ, so Ficinus and Bekker), and not against your will. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, Elberling, and the majority of commentators, make σε the subject of πείρα, and understand ἐγὼ as its object, and ἐμοῦ with ἀκοντος. But besides the improbability of πείρα being followed by its subject, and omitting its object, it does not accord with the sentiments and character of Socrates that he should say, I deem it of great importance that you should persuade me to leave the prison, which would then be the meaning of the passage.—σε λέκως, to your satisfaction.
NOTES.

A. ἐκόντας διδυμόνεν εἶναι = ἐκόντας διδυμὶν δεῖν. Cr. 642; 49 K. 284, R. 6; Mt. 447. 4.—καὶ πάλαι ... ἀρα, and so for a long time we, men of such advanced years.

B. ἦ παντὸς μᾶλλον, or rather.—διότι, yet, i. e. whatever may be the consequences.—τυγχάνω δὲ, turns out to be.—ἀς οἱ πολλοὶ σωσταί. The general sentiment of antiquity not only justified but required retaliation, as just and manly, cf. Mem. Cap. iii.: αὕτη ἔστιν ἄνδρος ἀρετῆς, ἦσαν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πολεοῦς πράττειν, καὶ πράττοτα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὐθούς, τοὺς δὲ ἔχουσιν κακῶς. Eurip. Frgm.: ἔχερὶν κακῶς δράν ἄνδρος ἔγινες μέρος. But Socrates in the Gorgias, 469, A, insists that it is far better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.

C. οὐ φαίνεται, it seems not, that is, it seems that we must in no case do an injury.—οὖδ' ἐν ὑποίνου, κ.τ.λ., not even if he suffer any thing however severe by them.—κοινωνία, whether you hold these opinions in common with me, and think as I do. —τῆς ἀρετῆς, the premise, or first principle of the argument, sc. that it is never right to do an injury, &c. To τῆς ἀρετῆς, as the premise, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο stands opposed as the conclusion.

A. ἅπαντες ἐκείνες, in going out hence, sc. from prison. 50 This clause is to be connected, not only with ποιοῦμεν, but also with ἵματομεν, whether in going out hence ... we abide by what we have admitted to be right.—τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πολεοῦς, the commonwealth. So Cic. in Verr. ii. 46, 114; communi Siciliae.—ὁλὸς τι ἢ = nonne, do you not.

B. ἀναζητάσας, be immediately subverted. For this force of the perfect, cf. C. 584; K. 255, R. 7; Mt. 500.—αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι, the judgments that have been rendered.

C. ἄριστον ἧδεις γὰρ ἡμᾶς. The ἄριστον in direct quotations is pleonastic. The γὰρ refers to an implied cause: we do right to escape, for the state did us an injustice, sc. when it pronounced sentence against us.—τῷ ἔργῳ τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεται. The reader will recognize here an allusion to the well-known
method of discussion, which was so characteristic of Socrates as to be called "the Socratic method."

D. πρῶτον μὲν. The second question, which answers to this as the first, is found in ἄλλα τοῖς πέρι τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆς, κ.τ.λ., and is introduced with ἄλλα instead of ἔπειτα, in consequence of the intervening question, μέμφει τε, κ.τ.λ.——

εἶμεν, imperfect to denote the process through which the wife was obtained. The editions previous to Buttmann had ἀλαβε.——ἐν μουσικῆ καὶ γυμναστικῆ, i. e. in physical and mental education, cf. Repub. 376, E: ἢ μὲν [παιδεία] ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστικῆ, ἢ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσικῆ. The former comprehended the whole exercise and training of the body, in which the Greeks so excelled; the latter the entire discipline and culture of the mind, or, as the word denotes, the department of the muses. The prominence which the Greeks gave to the cultivation of the taste and the emotions, helps to explain the name by which they called this department of education. Some writers add a third department, viz., γράμματα, letters, or primary education. Cf. Smith's Dic. of Antiqq., Gymnasium. Aristotle, in his Politics, vii. 2, makes four departments, adding to letters, gymnastics, and music, the department of drawing and painting, γραφικὴ.

Ε. δοῦλος. Cf. Cic. pro Cluentio, 53: Legum omnes servi sumus, ut liberī esse possimus.—καὶ σὺ ταύτα, κ.τ.λ. Al. καὶ σοί. Both readings have good MS. authority. But the regular construction would be δὲ ... δικαιον εἶναι, and the σὲ is changed to σὺ by attraction to σοί.——ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἁρα σοι τὸν πατέρα. The unusual position of σοι (hyperbaton) is explained by the fondness of the Greeks for bringing contrasted words into juxtaposition. σοι is dat. after ἐξ ἵνα.

51 A. ἅρα. Cf. note, 46, D.—καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς, κ.τ.λ., is an emphatic repetition of πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα, &c., above.—ο ὁ ἄληθεια τῆς δρετῆς ἑπιμελόμενος is added in bitter irony.——
πατρίς, one's country, indefinite, and hence without the article. So μητρός and πατρός above. Cicero (de Off. i. 17, 57) has a similar sentiment: cari sunt parentes, etc. Sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est.

C. πείσειν depends on δεῖ, implied in ποιήσων.

D. τῷ ἐξουσιαν πεποιηκέναι, by having given liberty.—δοκιμάσῃ, when he has been examined and approved, i.e. admitted to the rank of a citizen, al. δοκιμάσῃ.—ἐξεῖναι depends on προσγορεύομεν.

E. ὁμολογήκειν ἵγρο denotes a "tacit compact," but one of a very different kind from that fiction, in which some political philosophers of modern times find the origin of society and government.—ἡ μήν, of a surety. These particles are used especially in confirmation of an oath or promise, cf. Hom. II. 1. 77; Xen. Anab. 2, 3, 27. Al. ἡμῖν. The present, πείσεσαι, denotes obedience in general, or as a habit. Al. πείσοσαι.

A. προτιθέμενων ἡμῶν, κ.τ.λ., sets forth the peculiar rights 52 and privileges of an Athenian citizen in canvassing laws when they are proposed, and moving for their repeal afterwards, if they are found to be oppressive. προτιθέμενων is better taken with πείσει, and ἐφιέμενων with ποιεῖ, a new clause commencing with διὰλα. The style is intentionally repetitious in imitation of the style of conversation.—ἐνίεσεσαι = will be implicated in, or obnoxious to. So ἔνοχος = obnoxious, cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1, 64: πῶς ὁμ. ἔνοχος ἐν εἰς τῇ γραφῇ.—ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Cf. note, 43, Ο: ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι.

B. διαφερόντως, preeminently above.—σκοπιάν, a spectacle, such as the games and religious festivals. As these were attended by the leading men from all Greece, the non-attendance of Socrates, with the single exception of going once to the Isthmian games, might well be remarked as an indication of singular satisfaction with Athens.—στρατευόμενος. Cf. ἐν Ποταμίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφισβελῶι καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλόν, Apol. 28, Ε, and note 8*
ibid.—ἐπισυμία first governs πόλεως and νάμων in the gen., and then is followed by the infin. εἰδίνα, with which is to be understood a pronoun in the acc. referring to those genitives, a desire of another city or other laws—to know them.

O. τά τε ἄλλα καί, besides all the rest, sc. of your acts, which prove your preference for Athens. Cf. note on ἄλλα τε ...
... καί, Apol. 36, A.—φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι. Cf. note, Apol. 31, D.—ἀληχύνει, respect, lit., feel ashamed before.—ἐντρέπει, regard, lit., turn yourself towards.—Ἀλλο τε οὖν ἄν φαίνῃ ἢ, do you not then, they would say, violate, &c., lit., do you do anything else than violate. The ἄν would regularly follow φαίνῃ; but when two clauses are incorporated in one (especially with φαί & phain), the particle is often attracted out of its place, cf. Hermann on the particle ἄν.

E. ἐν τεσσαρεὶ ὑδατοχήνῃ. Cf. Apol. 17, D.—οὕτε Λακε-
δαιμονα ... οὕτε Κρήτην. These states were often cited as models of law and order by Plato and other political philosophers of the day, cf. Republic 544, C; Legg. 634.—δή = scil.
... = quotiescumque de iis loqueris. Stalib.

53 A. ἄν ἦμιν γε πείθη. Sub. ἄλλ' ἐμενεις.

B. τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, to the polity of these men, instead of these states, as if πολιτέων, instead of πόλεως, had preceded. Examples of this figure (συνεσία) are frequent in Plato.—βεβαιώσῃ τοῖς δίκαιοις, κ.τ.λ., that is, will confirm others in an opinion favorable to the judges, so that they will be regarded as having decided the case right.—τάς τε εὐνομοφάνες ... τοῖς κοσμημάτων, the cities that have good laws, and the men who have the most regard for law and order.—τίνας λόγους, what discourses, Socrates? such sooth as you utter here, that, &c. ἢ is strictly or, and ἀναφωνῆσιν διαλεγόμενος is understood after it.—ἄν φανεῖσαι. Cf. note on ἄν ... δια-
φωνησοντα, Apol. 29, O.

D. ἀπαρεῖς, you will depart, lit., carry away, remove.—
ékei γάρ ... ἀκολασία. The Thessalians were infamous for their vices. Cf. Demos. Ol. i. 22: ταῦτα γὰρ (τὰ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν) ἄστρα μὲν ἦν δὴποὺ φύσει καὶ ἄνδρῶν ἀνερϑοὺς; and Athenaeus, vi. 260, B: ἀκολαστοὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν βιῶν ἀσελγεῖς, and many other passages from different authors. —σκέυη, a cloak or wrapper sufficient to cover the whole body, as is implied in περιστέμενος. The word is often used of robes or costumes for the stage. —Διφείρα is a dress of skins, worn by rustics, and hence peculiarly fit for a disguise. —Σχῆμα is also referred to the dress by Stallbaum, but it is better to take it in the more general sense of gait, or personal appearance, as the Latin habitus also is often used.

E. ἵνα, ἀν μή, κ.τ.λ., perhaps not, if you do not offend any one; but if otherwise, i.e. if you do offend any one, you will hear, &c. —ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει, κ.τ.λ., so you will pass your life in fawning upon everybody and being their humble servant—doing what, but feasting in Thessaly, having gone abroad for an entertainment, forsooth, into Thessaly. The irony, which runs through the whole, is made more pungent by the contemptuous repetition of Thessaly. —ποῦ ἡμῖν ἑσονται? what will become of them—where shall we find them?

A. Ἀλλὰ δὴ = at enim, at inquies. Stallb.—τί δαί; 54 why, pray? —ἀπολαύωσις is, of course, ironical, as it often is taken in a bad sense. —ἡ τούτο μὲν οabilia, or not this indeed, &c. ποιήσεις, i.e. you will not take your sons to Thessaly. —αὐτού, here, in Athens.

B. οὐτέ γὰρ ἐνώδε ... οὔτε ἐκεῖσε, neither here in this life ... nor when you come thither, into another world. These two clauses beginning with οὔτε are correlative to each other, while those beginning with οὔτε are only emphatic additions to the former.

D. οἱ κορυθαναῖοι, those who celebrate the rites of the Corybantes in the worship of Cybele in Phrygia. As these
rites were accompanied with noisy music and wild dancing, the Corybantes were an expressive figure of persons so inspired and possessed with certain ideas or feelings, as to be incapable of seeing or hearing any thing else. In the case of Socrates, it is the voice of the Laws, in other words, the voice of the God, that so rings in his ear and possesses his soul. The passage is one of singular beauty. The Laws stand before him personified, embodied, clothed with more than human authority. They reason with him. They expostulate with him on the folly and wickedness of the course which his friends are pressing upon him. They draw nearer and nearer to him, and speak in more earnest and commanding tones, till at length he can see and hear nothing else, and puts an end to the fruitless arguments and entreaties of his friends in those words of humble yet sublime piety: It is the voice of God — let us obey.
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